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§ 1 Introduction 
 
 The law of the European Union affects the national copyright and related laws of its 
Member States. These Member States constitute an Internal Market of more than half a 
billion consumers, one which conducts over one-third of all trade worldwide. This section 
will start by introducing the legal framework of the European Union and then indicate the 
bases for the application of its law to copyright and related rights.
1
 
 
 [1]--Legal Framework  
 
 The European Union is based upon a pair of treaties. First, from January 1, 1958,
2
 to 
December 1, 2009, the Treaty Establishing the European Community
3
 had governed this 
Community
4
 as the key lawmaking jurisdiction for the Internal Market. Second, effective 
November 1, 1993,
5
 the Treaty on European Union
6
 laid the groundwork for this Union
7
 
which, effective December 1, 2009, replaced the Community. At the same time,
8
 the E.C. 
Treaty was, not only amended and recoordinated with the E.U. Treaty, but renamed the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
9
 The following overview will outline these 
developments
10
 and then survey resulting institutions.
11
 
                                                 
 
     
1
 Unless otherwise indicated, this chapter discusses law current to January 1, 2012. Cases 
not yet reported may be found at http://curia.europa.eu. 
 
     
2
 For further details, see § 1[1][a] infra. 
 
     
3
 Hereinafter referred to as the former E.C. Treaty in historical contexts. 
 
     
4
 Hereinafter called the former Community, or abbreviated as the former E.C., in historical 
contexts.  
 
     
5
 For further details, see § 1[1][b][i] infra. 
 
     
6
 Hereinafter referred to as the E.U. Treaty.  
 
     
7
 Hereinafter called the Union or abbreviated as the E.U. 
 
     
8
 For further details, see § 1[1][b][ii] infra. 
 
     
9
 Hereinafter referred to as the F.E.U. Treaty.  
 
     
10
 To track developments in and beyond this historical introduction, references to 
currently operative treaty provisions will, as needed, be followed or footnoted by references 
to corresponding prior versions. In some instances, provisions have merely been formally 
reconfigured or renumbered; in others, they have also been substantively revised. 
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  [a]--The Former European Community. Two treaties were signed in Rome on 
March 25, 1957: one established a European Economic Community;
12
 the other, a European 
Atomic Energy Community.  Both Treaties entered into force on January 1, 1958, and formed 
inter-related "Communities."  The first of this pair of treaties was amended several times, 
most importantly by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, effective November 1, 1993, 
and by the Lisbon Treaty, effective December 1, 2009.
13
 The Maastricht Treaty shortened the 
original term "European Economic Community" to the "European Community."
14
 The Lisbon 
Treaty, integrating the Community into the Union, replaced the term "European Community" 
with the term “European Union.”15  
 
 The original six members of the former Community, now the Union, were Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
16
 They were joined by nineteen 
other countries at successive, later stages: Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom in 
1973;
17
 Greece in 1980;
18
 Spain and Portugal in 1986;
19
 Sweden, Finland, and Austria in 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
     
11
 On the institutions, see § 1[1][c] infra. 
 
     
12
  Sometimes called the Treaty of Rome and, until November 1, 1993, the Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community, this last term abbreviated as the E.E.C.   
 
     
13
 The E.E.C. Treaty, revised as the E.C. Treaty and then as the F.E.U. Treaty, had its 
provisions renumbered. Unless historical context requires further detail, only the last 
renumbering, by the Lisbon Treaty, will be tracked here. For a full set of treaties, as well as 
tables of equivalences for this last renumbering, go to http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm. 
 
     
14
 For further analysis, see § 1[1][b][i] infra. 
 
     
15
 For further analysis, see § 1[1][b][ii] infra. 
 
     
16
  N.b., in principle, each adherence is effective at the beginning of the calendar year 
indicated--as, for example, for the original six on January 1, 1958.  However,  the adherence 
for the ten Member States adhering in 2004 is effective on May 1, 2004. 
 
     
17
  Act concerning the Conditions of Accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties--
Accession to the European Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, O.J. 1972 No. L 73. 
 
     
18
 Act concerning the Conditions of Accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties--
Accession to the European Communities of the Hellenic Republic, O.J. 1979 No. L 291. 
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1995;
20
 Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, 
Malta, and Cyprus in 2004,
21
 and Romania and Bulgaria in 2006.
22
 A number of other 
applications for accession have been made: some have been rejected, and some are still 
actively pending.
23
 
 
 The activities of the former Community had encompassed realizing a customs union and 
abolishing obstacles between Member States to freedom of movement for persons, goods, 
services, and capital. As explained below, with the development of the Union, such 
objectives have been amplified well beyond purely economic goals.
24
 
 
  [b]-- The European Union and Economic Area. The former E.C. Treaty had been 
amended on a number of occasions: after accession of new Member States to the former 
Community, by the Single European Act, and by further treaties, including that instituting the 
European Union.
25
 Finally, effective December 1, 2009, the Lisbon Treaty integrated the 
Community into the Union by amending both the E.U. Treaty itself and the former E.C. 
Treaty, renaming it the F.E.U. Treaty.
26
  As a result of a different line of developments, 
culminating in the European Economic Area, much of formerly E.C. and now E.U. law has 
been extended beyond Member States to other European countries.
27
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
     
19
 Act concerning the Conditions of Accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties--
Accession to the European Communities of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese 
Republic, O.J. 1985 No. L 302.  
 
     
20
 Act concerning the Conditions of Accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties--
Accession to the Treaties upon which the European Union is based of the Kingdom of 
Sweden and the Finnish and Austrian Republics, O.J. 1995 No. L 1. 
 
     
21
  Act concerning the Conditions of Accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties, 
O.J. 2003 No. L 236. 
 
     
22
 Act concerning the Conditions of Accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties, 
O.J. 2005 No. L 157. 
 
     
23
 An application for accession by Morocco was rejected in 1986.   Currently, 
applications are pending for Montenegro, Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Turkey and Iceland.  
 
      
24
 See § 1[1][b][ii] in fine infra.  
 
      
25
 See § 1[1] supra and § 1[1][b][i] infra.  
 
     
26
      See § 1[1][b][ii] infra. 
 
     
27
 See § 1[1][b][iii] infra. 
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   [i]--From the Community to the Union.  Initially in conjunction with the 
former E.C. Treaty discussed above,
28
 the following instruments have developed the basis for 
the European Union: 
 
+ The Single European Act: In June of 1985, an intergovernmental conference to amend 
the former E.C. Treaty
29
 concluded the Single European Act, which entered into force on 
July 1, 1987. To start, the Single European Act provided for the establishment, before 
January 1, 1993, of the Internal Market, which it defined as "an area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured."
30
 The Single European Act, inter alia, made changes in European decision-
making institutions, notably strengthening the role of the Parliament in the legislative 
process.
31
  
 
+ Maastricht Treaty: The E.U. Treaty, negotiated at Maastricht in December of 1991, was 
signed on February 7, 1992, and came into force on November 1, 1993.
32
 It instituted the 
European Union, which was based on three pillars: first, at its core, the former European 
Community;
33
 second, cooperation in the field of common foreign and security policy; 
and, third, police and judicial cooperation in the field of criminal law.
34
  In many cases, 
decisions under this last pair of headings, basically covering intergovernmental 
cooperation, were so closely linked with what were formerly E.C. instruments that they 
could interact with supranational European decision-making procedures. 
 
+ Amsterdam Treaty: In October of 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty was signed, amending the 
Maastricht Treaty, inter alia, to make institutional structures and decision-making more 
                                                 
     
28
      See § 1[1][a] supra. 
 
     
29
 Commission, Completing the Internal Market, COM(85)310 final, 2 Aug. 1989.  
 
     
30
 The term “Common Market,” originally used in the E.E.C. Treaty as concluded in 
Rome, was superseded by that of an “Internal Market” under the Single European Market.  
Except where “Common Market” appears in quoted matter, “Internal Market” will here be 
used in all historical contexts. 
 
     
31
 On these institutions, see § 1[1][c] infra. 
 
     
32
 O.J. 1992 No. C 224.  
 
     
33
 I.e., the first pillar included what were previously the European Economic 
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community.  On these two Communities, see 
§ 1[1][a] supra.   
 
 
34
 For an illustration of a possible interface between the first and third pillars, see the 
issue of cybercrime discussed in § 4[3][b][iv] infra.  
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efficient with a view to extending the European Union to new Member States.
35
  It also 
provided a system of rights, political powers for its citizens, and policies at the European 
level aimed at addressing citizens’ main concerns in such areas as employment, 
environment, consumer protection, public health and safety, freedom of movement, 
security, and immigration.
36
  
 
+ Nice Treaty:  In February of 2001, the Nice Treaty was signed, further amending the 
Maastricht Treaty.
37
  The Nice Treaty, effective February 1, 2003, dealt with institutional 
issues that had arisen in enlarging the European Union.  These include, inter alia, the 
allocation of powers and responsibilities within E.U. institutions and the increased 
protection of human rights.  On the occasion of the signing of the Nice Treaty, the 
Member States outlined the process for convening a new Intergovernmental Conference, 
which was held in 2004 to revise the E.U. Treaty fundamentally.
38
 
 
   [ii]--The Community Replaced by the Union. The Treaty signed in Lisbon on 
December 13, 2007, proposed neither to repeal nor to replace prior treaty texts, but to change 
their texts on a number of points.
39
  As already indicated, this Treaty of Lisbon went into 
                                                 
     
35
 O.J. 1997 No. C 340. 
 
     
36
 For commentary, see P. Craig and G. de Bùrca (eds.), The Evolution of E.U. Law 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1999). 
 
 
37
 O.J. 2003 No. C 325.  For commentaries, see P. van Nuffel, “Le Traité de Nice--Un 
commentaire” (The Nice Treaty--a Commentary), [2001] Revue du Droit de l’Union 
Européenne 329; A. Dashwood, “The constitution of the European Union after Nice: law-
making procedures,” [2001] E.L. Rev. 215; A. Johnstone, “Judicial reform and the Treaty of 
Nice,” [2001] C.M.L. Rev. 499. 
 
       
38
 A Treaty to establish a Constitution for Europe, was signed in Rome on October 29, 
2004. O.J. 2004 No. C 310.  However, it never went into effect. For commentary, see A. 
Winterstein and B. Smulders, “The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Economic 
Policy and Open Markets with Free Competition--an Update,” [2004] Markt & Mededinging 
202; D.N. Triantafyllou, La Constitution de l’Union européenne selon le Traité de Rome de 
2004 (The Constitution of the European Union according to the Treaty of Rome of 2004) 
(Bruylant, 2005); G. Amato, H. Bribosia, and B. de Witte (eds.), Genesis and Destiny of the 
European Constitution (Bruylant, 2007). 
 
 
39
 O.J. 2007 No. C 306.  For commentary, see G. Barrett, "The king is dead, long live the 
king: the recasting by the Treaty of Lisbon of the provisions of the Constitutional Treaty 
concerning national parliaments," [2008] E.L. Rev. 66; J. Dufourcq, "Après le traité de 
Lisbonne, quels objectifs stratégiques pour l'Union européenne" (After the  Treaty of Lisbon, 
what Strategic Aims for the European Union), [2008] Revue du Marché Commun et de 
l'Union Européenne 156; K. Lenaerts, "De Rome à Lisbonne, la Constitution européenne en 
marche?" (From Rome to Lisbon, the European Constitution on its Way?), [2008] Cahiers du 
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effect on December 1, 2009, amending both the E.U. Treaty and the former E.C. Treaty, 
while renaming the latter as the F.E.U. Treaty.
40
 Both the E.U. and the F.E.U. Treaties are to 
“have the same legal value,” and the Union is to “replace and succeed the European 
Community.”41 
 
 As a result of this institutional shift, freedoms of commerce and competition, established 
under the former E.C. Treaty and essential to the operation of the Internal Market, were not 
significantly changed.
42
 However, the E.U. Treaty confirms that E.U. objectives now go well 
beyond the economic goals of the Internal Market: they encompass, inter alia, improving 
welfare, enriching culture and advancing science and technology, and assuring freedom, basic 
rights, and justice.
43
 The achievements of the harmonization of national copyright and related 
rights, previously undertaken under the aegis of the former Community, were not impacted. 
Rather, such legislative initiatives may now be further pursued within the Union in the light 
of its larger aims.
44
   
 
   [iii]--The European Economic Area.  On January 1, 1994, the Agreement 
Establishing a European Economic Area entered into force.
45
  It had the objective of creating 
a free trade area between the former European Community, now the European Union, and 
those countries which belonged to the European Free Trade Association at the time.
46
 As 
explained above, on January 1, 1995, three of these countries became full Member States of 
the former Community, now the Union, namely Austria, Finland, and Sweden.
47
 As of 1995, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Droit Européen, 229; W. Kingston, "Intellectual Property in the Lisbon Treaty,” [2008] 
E.I.P.R. 439; P. Craig, "The Treaty of Lisbon: Process, architecture and substance," [2008] 
E.L. Rev. 137; M. Dougan, "The Treaty of Lisbon 2007; Winning Minds, not Hearts," [2008] 
C.M.L. Rev. 617. 
 
 
40
 See § 1[1] supra. 
 
 
41
  E.C. Treaty, Art. 1 in fine; F.E.U. Treaty, Art. 1(2). 
 
 
42
 On the impact of such freedoms in the field of copyright, see §§ 2 and 3 infra.  
 
       
43
 See E.U. Treaty, Art. 3 [prior E.U. Treaty, Art. 2; former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 2-3]. See 
also E.U. Treaty, Art. 6(1) (recognizing the rights, freedoms, and principles set out in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, discussed in § 5[1][b][i] infra).  
 
 
44
 On such harmonization, see § 4 infra. 
 
     
45
 O.J. 1994 No. L 1. 
 
     
46
 The European Economic Area is sometimes hereinafter abbreviated as E.E.A. and 
the European Free Trade Area as EFTA.  N.b., the E.E.A. Agreement failed to reach approval 
in a referendum in Switzerland, one of the seven EFTA States as of 1994.  
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the remaining EFTA countries in the European Economic Area are then Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, and Norway. 
 
 The E.E.A. Agreement thus widened the scope of application of E.C. law, now of E.U. 
law.  It assures the free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital within an Internal 
Market of thirty Member States.
48
 Further, it coordinates a system of competition law, one 
similar to that of the former Community, with the E.U. system.
49
 In addition, it provides for 
close cooperation in a wide range of fields, for example, environmental policy and research 
and development. As indicated below, a number of institutions control the application of 
E.E.A. law within the E.E.A.
50
  
 
  [c]--Institutions and Instruments. The Council and the Parliament are the main 
actors in E.U. legislative processes, while the Commission has executive powers in specified 
areas. The Court of Justice of the European Union is the chief, but not the only, E.U. court.
51
 
  
 Under the E.U. and F.E.U. Treaties, each institution, either in itself or in tandem with 
others, is granted specific powers, sometimes called attributed or conferred powers.
52
  These 
are powers to make decisions that are legally binding on an E.U. institution, a Member State, 
or private parties.  The following principles govern the exercise of these powers:
53
   
 
+ The principle of attributed powers applies if an E.U. action proves necessary to attain an 
E.U. objective, but neither the E.U. nor the F.E.U. Treaty has expressly provided any 
E.U. institution with any specific power to take such action: in that event, procedures 
exist for adopting appropriate measures.
54
  
                                                                                                                                                       
     
47
 See § 1[1][a] supra. 
 
     
48
 See § 2[2][d] infra.  
 
     
49
 See § 3[1][d] infra.  
 
     
50
 See § 1[1][c][v] infra. 
 
     
51
  The E.U. Treaty, in Article 13, enumerates the following E.U. institutions: the 
European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Commission, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the Court of 
Auditors. 
 
 
52
 See E.U. Treaty, Arts. 13 et seq. [inter alia, former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 7-8, and 189 et 
seq. passim], and F.E.U. Treaty, Arts. 288 et seq. [former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 249 et seq.]. 
 
 
53
 See E.U. Treaty, Art. 5 [former E.C. Treaty, Art. 5].  
 
 
54
 See F.E.U. Treaty, Art. 352 [former E.C. Treaty, Art. 308]. 
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+ From the principle of effectiveness (effet utile), it follows that a power must be implied 
as included in any power that has been explicitly conferred in any E.U. or F.E.U. Treaty 
provision if, absent such an implied power, the provision would not make sense or would 
not lend itself to reasonable application.  
 
+ According to the principle of subsidiarity, the Union may take action only if, and insofar 
as, the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved at the E.U. level.
55
   
 
+ Finally, there is the principle of proportionality: any action by the Union may not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve E.U. objectives.
56
 
 
 Accordingly, the E.U. and F.E.U. Treaties empower each institution, respectively, to 
adopt specific legislative instruments that are generically called secondary legislation and 
subordinated to the E.U. and F.E.U. Treaties, which are treated as primary legislation.   Such 
secondary legislation may not restrict the application of either of these treaties, so that, 
whenever a rule of secondary legislation conflicts with any of their provisions, the Court of 
Justice will refuse to give it legal effect.
57
 Articles 288 et seq. of the F.E.U. Treaty
58
 define 
the following categories of secondary legislation: 
 
+ Regulations, issued by the Council, the Parliament, or the Commission, depending on the 
case, have general application, are binding in their entirety, and directly applicable in all 
Member States, without further implementation in national law.  The Court of Justice 
has repeatedly stated that a regulation, once issued, enters into force to dispose of claims 
between private parties, independently of any measure by any Member State to 
implement or incorporate it in national law.
59
  
 
+ Directives are adopted by the Council and the Parliament or the Commission, according 
to procedures that vary with the field.  Member States have to conform their laws to 
directives, so that national laws must have the legal effects specified in any directive, 
                                                 
     
55
  See E.U. Treaty, Art. 5(3) [former E.C. Treaty, Art. 5]. 
 
     
56
  See E.U. Treaty, Art. 5(4) [former E.C. Treaty, Art. 5]. 
 
     
57
 See Judgment of 11 Feb. 1971, Case 37/70, Rewe Zentrale, [1971] E.C.R. 34.     
 
     
58
  Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Art. 249. 
 
     
59
 See Judgment of 12 Dec. 1967, Case 17/67, Firma Max Neumann v. Hauptzollamt 
Hof/Saale, [1967] E.C.R. 441.   
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thus achieving its underlying policy.
60
 Directives, in principle, are not directly applicable 
within the national laws of the Member States, and national courts have to look first to 
the national laws implementing directives in adjudicating private claims.
61
 Nonetheless, 
a national court is under an obligation to interpret national law as much as possible in 
accordance with any directive that is relevant in a given case.
62
 
 
+ Decisions, handed down by the Council, the Parliament, or the Commission, are 
addressed specifically to, and bind, particular Member States or private parties, such as 
companies or individuals.
63
 
 
+ Recommendations and Opinions of the institutions are not binding. Likewise, 
Resolutions, Declarations, Communications, Notices, White and Green Papers, and 
Policy Statements set out non-binding guidelines for institutions, Member States, or 
private parties.  They normally encourage desirable, but not strictly enforceable practices 
throughout the Union.
64
 
 
 At present, the following basic relationships apply between E.U. institutions and 
instruments:  
                                                 
      
60
 For directives in the field of copyright and related rights, see § 4[2] and, for case law 
construing national laws to assure such conformity, see § 5 infra.   
 
     
61
 Nonetheless, private parties have invoked the direct effect of directives before 
national courts, and the case law confirms such effect only if the relevant provisions of the 
directive being applied are unconditional, clear, and precise, leaving Member States no 
margin of discretion. See Judgment of 4 Dec. 1974, Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 
[1974] E.C.R. 1383; Judgment of 5 April 1979, Case 148/78, Ratti v. Italy, [1979] E.C.R. 
1645; Judgment of 19 Jan. 1982, Case 8/81, Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt Münster Innenstadt, 
[1982] E.C.R. 72.  
 
    
62
 See Judgment of 5 April 1990, Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial 
Internacional de Alimentación SA, [1990] E.C.R. I-4135. Normally, the national law to be 
interpreted implements the directive invoked. However, the Member State may incur liability 
if its implementation is so inadequate that interpretation cannot bring it up to directive 
standards. Compare Judgment of 19 Nov. 1991, Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Frankovich and 
Bonifacci v. Italy, [1991] E.C.R. I-5357 (private party may have a right to claim damages 
"vertically" against a state for national failure to implement a directive), with Judgment of 14 
July 1994, Case C-91/92, Dori v. Racreb SRL, [1994] E.C.R. I-3325 (in a case where there 
failed to be a timely national implementation of a directive provision, private party could not 
invoke that provision "horizontally" against other private parties).  
 
     
63
 For further discussion, see § 3[1][c][iii] infra.  
 
     
64
 For further discussion, see § 3[1][c][i] infra.  
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   [i]--The Councils.  Articles 15 and 16 of the E.U. Treaty
65
 respectively govern 
distinct decision-making bodies: the European Council and the Council.
66
 
 
 Article 15(1) of the E.U. Treaty sets out the tasks of the European Council to “provide 
the Union with the necessary impetus for its development” and to “define the general 
political directions and priorities thereof”; however, the European Council may “not exercise 
legislative functions.” The heads of Member States or of their governments, the President of 
the European Council itself, and the Commission President, assisted by the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, meet in the European 
Council at least twice a semester.   
 
 Article 16(1) of the E.U. Treaty sets out the powers of the Council, as distinct from the 
European Council.  The Council is to “carry out policy-making and coordinating functions as 
laid down in the Treaties” and, as well, “jointly with the European Parliament,” to “exercise 
legislative and budgetary functions.” The government of each Member State has one seat on 
the Council; however, Council meetings may consist of ministers responsible for specific 
matters at national levels, for example, finance, agricultural, and other ministers, depending 
on the matter at hand. Unless the E.U. or F.E.U. Treaty provides otherwise, the Council acts 
by qualified majority, which takes account of the varying populations of Member States.
67
 
 
   [ii]--The Parliament.  Article 14 of the E.U. Treaty
68
 provides that the 
European Parliament, jointly with the Council, is to exercise legislative and budgetary 
functions. Within the institutional framework of the Union, the Parliament is the only directly 
elected body.   
 
 The F.E.U. Treaty governs how the Parliament is to coordinate with the Council in 
enacting legislation.
69
 These codecision procedures may vary with the field in which pending 
                                                 
 
65
 Corresponding to prior E.U. Treaty, Arts. 4, 9, 255, and 286, and to former E.C. 
Treaty, Arts. 202 et seq. passim. 
 
 
66
 Neither of these Councils should be confused with the Council of Europe, an 
international organization in Strasbourg which brings together 47 countries of Europe to 
promote democracy and protect basic rights. Under the aegis of the Council of Europe, the 
European Court of Human Rights adjudicates complaints against governments of members of 
the Council of Europe, notably for violations of basic rights. 
 
 
67
  E.U. Treaty, Art. 16(3), (4), (5), and Protocol on transitional provisions. 
 
 
68
 Corresponding to prior E.U. Treaty, Art. 9, and former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 189 et seq. 
passim. 
 
 
69
  See F.E.U. Treaty, Arts. 223 et seq. [former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 190 et seq. passim].   
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legislation is to apply: for example, “the European Parliament and the Council, acting in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish measures for the creation 
of European intellectual property rights to provide uniform protection of intellectual property 
rights throughout the Union.”70  
 
 The Parliament may request the Commission, to submit legislative and other appropriate 
proposals to achieve E.U. objectives. The Parliament may put written and oral Questions to 
the Commission which, as explained below, may itself initiate legislative proposals.
71
 The 
Parliament's assent is necessary to adopting the Union's annual budget, as well as for 
concluding certain treaties with third countries.
72
 The Parliament has the right of inquiry into 
any alleged misadministration of E.U. law brought to its attention through various means, 
including the Ombudsman it elects. 
 
   [iii]--The Commission.  Article 17 of the E.U. Treaty
73
 governs the functions 
of the Commission. The role and responsibilities of the Commission place it firmly at the 
heart of the E.U. administrative and policy-making processes.   
 
 The Commission’s executive powers are wide.  It is the guardian of the E.U. and F.E.U. 
Treaties, responsible for the correct and full implementation of their terms, for overseeing the 
correct application of E.U. law,
74
 and for managing the E.U. budget. It has delegated powers 
to make rules filling in the details of legislation: for example, as explained below, it enforces 
the E.U. competition rules and regulates mergers and acquisitions above a certain size.
75
  
Furthermore, it has an important role to play as the Union’s negotiator of certain treaties, 
such as trade and cooperation agreements with third countries.   
 
 The Commission is charged with proposing secondary legislation, notably regulations 
and directives.
76
  Thus the Commission has the "right of initiative," that is, the discretionary 
                                                 
 
70
 F.E.U. Treaty, Art. 118.  
 
 
71
  See § 1[1][c][iii] infra. 
 
 
72
 On the E.U. treaty-making power, see § 1[2][d][ii] infra. 
  
       
73
 Corresponding to prior E.U. Treaty, Art. 9 and former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 211 et seq. 
passim.  
 
     
74
 See, e.g., F.E.U. Treaty, Arts. 258-260 [former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 226-228] 
(empowering the Commission to take action against a Member State which does not comply 
with its E.U. or F.E.U. Treaty obligations, for example, to implement directives made 
pursuant to their terms).  
 
     
75
 See § 3[1][c] infra. 
 
     
76
 For examples, see § 4 infra. 
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power whether and when to introduce a proposal, at least to the extent that the E.U. or F.E.U. 
Treaties do not set limits on this power.  
 
 The President of the Commission is elected by the Parliament upon the proposal of the 
European Council which, subject to the Parliament’s approval, selects commissioners.  
Commissioners are independent and serve the interest of the Union as a whole and may not 
seek or accept instructions from national governments. 
 
   [iv]--The Court of Justice.  Article 19 of the E.U. Treaty
77
 sets out the 
responsibility of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which sits in Luxembourg, to 
“ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed.”78  
 
 Under the aegis of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the E.U. and F.E.U. 
Treaties
79
 now distinguish between the Court of Justice,
80
 the General Court,
81
 and 
specialized courts.
82
 Along with the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
the F.E.U. Treaty governs jurisdiction and procedure within these courts.
83
 Advocates 
General submit opinions to the courts on pending cases, making recommendations that the 
courts may, but need not, follow.  
 
 The Court of Justice interprets the E.U. and F.E.U. Treaties, as well as E.U. acts that, in 
most cases, it may subject to judicial review.  It may, for example, review the legality of 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
     
77
 Corresponding to prior E.U. Treaty, Art. 9, and former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 220 et seq. 
 
 
78
 On the E.U. judicial order, see S. Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU Law 
(Oxford, 9
th
 ed., 2010); D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, European Union Law 
(Cambridge, 2
nd
 ed., 2010). 
 
     
79
 See E.U. Treaty, Art. 19(1); F.E.U. Treaty, Arts. 251, 254, and 256-257.  
  
     
80
 Hereinafter the Court of Justice or, quite simply, the Court. All case law cited here is 
this Court’s unless otherwise indicated.  
 
     
81
 I.e., previously, the Court of First Instance. By the decision of the Council in 1988, 
the Court of First Instance was instituted in September of 1989 to relieve the Court of Justice 
of its increasing workload. 
 
     
82
 See F.E.U. Treaty, Art. 257 [former E.C. Treaty, Art. 225] (“The European 
Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may 
establish specialised courts attached to the General Court to hear and determine at first 
instance certain classes of action or proceeding brought in specific areas.”).  
  
     
83
 See F.E.U. Treaty, Arts. 251 et seq. [former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 221 et seq.]. 
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secondary E.U. legislation in an action for annulment
84
 or, upon the referral of questions by 
national courts, give preliminary rulings instructing these courts on how to construe national 
laws as subject to E.U. law.
85
 The Court also exercises jurisdiction in many other types of 
cases, including those brought against Member States for failing to implement E.U. law.
86
   
 
 Depending on the case, proceedings may be instituted by the Council, the Commission, a 
Member State, or by any natural or legal person with the requisite interest in the matter.
87
  If a 
Member State fails to take the necessary measures to fulfill obligations under E.U. law, the 
Court of Justice may, usually on a case brought by the Commission, subject the state to 
monetary penalties.
88
  
 
   [v]--E.E.A. Institutions.  The E.E.A. Agreement has established various 
institutions.  The EFTA Surveillance Authority ensures application of E.E.A. rules in the 
non-E.U. members of the E.E.A.
89
 At the request of domestic courts in the EFTA States party 
to the E.E.A. Agreement, the EFTA Court may give advisory opinions on the interpretation 
of that agreement. 
 
 The Joint Parliamentary Committee adopts resolutions, opinions, and recommendations 
intended for the E.E.A. Joint Committee, which is composed of representatives of the parties 
to the E.E.A. Agreement.
90
 It is to ensure the effective implementation and operation of the 
E.E.A. Agreement.  To this end, it carries out exchanges of views and makes decisions.   
 
                                                 
     
84
 See F.E.U. Treaty, Arts. 263-264 [former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 230-231]. The Court 
may also rule on the legality
 
 of certain acts adopted by the European Council. See F.E.U. 
Treaty, Art. 269.   
  
     
85
 See F.E.U. Treaty, Art. 267 [former E.C. Treaty, Art. 234]. For further analysis, see 
§ 5[1][a] infra.  
 
     
86
 See F.E.U. Treaty, Arts. 258-259 [former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 226-227]. 
 
     
87
 See F.E.U. Treaty, Arts. 258 et seq. passim [former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 226 et seq. 
passim]. On the force of E.U. law to bind private parties directly, see § 1[2][c] infra.  
 
     
88
 See F.E.U. Treaty, Art. 260 [former E.C. Treaty, Art. 228].  See, e.g., Judgment of 
12 July 2005, Case C-304/02, Commission v. France, [2005] E.C.R. I-6263 (ordering, for the 
first time under the former E.C. Treaty [now the F.E.U. Treaty], a Member State to pay both a 
lump-sum fine and a periodic penalty for “a serious and persistent failure to comply with 
Community law”). 
  
     
89
 On the E.E.A. and EFTA countries generally, see § 1[1][b][iii] supra.  
 
     
90
 For special E.E.A. bodies competent in competition matters, see § 3[1][d] infra. 
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 Finally, the E.E.A. Council consists of the members of the Council, members of the 
Commission, and one member of the government of each of the EFTA States which are party 
to the E.E.A. Agreement.  It is responsible for giving the political impetus in the 
implementation of the Agreement and laying down guidelines for the E.E.A. Joint 
Committee. 
 
 [2]--Application of E.U. Law to Copyright 
 
  [a]--E.U. Law as Supranational Law.  The E.U. and F.E.U. Treaties, as well as 
secondary legislation made pursuant to their terms, take precedence in cases of conflict with 
national laws. This principle has been applied to cases of such conflicts as have repeatedly 
arisen between the former E.C. Treaty and national laws of intellectual property.
91
 
 
 To indicate this precedence, E.U. law has been characterized as "supranational" law. 
That is, E.U. supranational law binds Member States directly, and their national courts must 
apply certain of its provisions directly to claims between private parties.
92
 Such law may be 
contrasted with private international law that guides national courts in their choice of 
substantive law, for example, in determining which laws apply to cases in which foreign 
authors, or holders of rights in works of foreign origin, claim protection in a national 
jurisdiction outside their own.
93
   
 
 The Court of Justice, in the case of Costa v. ENEL, confirmed the direct effect of such 
supranational law.
94
  It based its judgment in this case on the second paragraph of Article 10 
of the former E.C. Treaty,
95
 which made clear that Member States "shall abstain from any 
                                                 
     
91
 For a key example, see § 2[1][c] infra. 
 
     
92
 As a corollary, Member States may not subject E.U.-derived law to judicial review 
under national law.  For example, the French Constitutional Council declared that it had no 
jurisdiction to decide whether a national law implementing the Electronic-Commerce 
Directive was compatible with the French Constitution, but that implementing such a 
directive was a constitutional requirement (exigence constitutionnelle): Decision No. 2004-
496 DC, Conseil constitutionnel (France), 10 June 2004.  
 
     
93
 In this regard, E.U. law, though based on the E.U. and F.E.U. Treaties, is altogether 
distinct in type from law made pursuant to the Berne Convention or to other treaties in the 
field of international copyright.  For further analysis in the context of international copyright, 
see P. Geller, "International Copyright: The Introduction," herein, at §§ 3[3][a][ii], 
4[3][a][i][C], 5[1][c], and 6[1][a] (hereinafter “Introduction”). 
 
     
94
 Judgment of 15 July 1964, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585.  
 
     
95
 Replaced in Article 4(3) in fine of the current E.U. Treaty (“The Member States 
shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which 
could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives.”).  
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measure, which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty." As we shall 
see, "any measure" has been construed to include the enforcement of national law in private 
suits which the former E.C. Treaty, now the F.E.U. Treaty, in specific cases of conflict, has 
been held to preclude.
96
 
 
 E.U. law will be discussed below in its relationship to treaty provisions binding the 
Union, or any Member State, and any third country.
97
 
 
  [b]--Relevant E.U. Treaty Provisions.  As indicated above, E.U. objectives now go 
well beyond the economic goals of the Internal Market.
98
 The F.E.U. Treaty recodifies these 
goals that, in their prior form in the former E.C. Treaty, had already been applied to 
intellectual property and, specifically, to copyright and related rights.
99
 The following groups 
of rules may be distinguished: 
 
+ Freedom of movement of goods: Articles 34 and 35 of the F.E.U. Treaty
100
 respectively 
prohibit “[q]uantitative restrictions” on “imports” and “exports” and “all measures 
having equivalent effect ... between Member States.” However, Article 36 of the F.E.U. 
Treaty
101
 sets out caveats to the resulting freedom of movement of goods if, inter alia, 
“the protection of industrial and commercial property” is put into question. 
Corresponding provisions in the former E.C. Treaty provided the bases for decisions of 
the Court of Justice concerning parallel imports of copies between Member States.
102
  
 
+ Freedom to provide services: Article 56 of the F.E.U. Treaty
103
 recognizes the E.U.-wide 
freedom to provide services. This freedom, as set out in the former E.C. Treaty, has been 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
     
96
 For examples of such a "Eurodefense," see § 2[2] infra. 
 
     
97
 See § 1[2][d][ii] infra. 
 
 
98
 See § 1[1][b][ii] in fine supra.   
 
       
99
 The former E.C. Treaty, in Article 3(1), (a), (c), (g), and (h), most generally set out 
the goals in question.  
 
 
100
 Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 28 and 29. 
 
 
101
 Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Art. 30. 
 
 
102
 See § 2[2] infra. 
 
 
103
 Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Art. 49. 
 
EU: p. 23 
invoked in the context of copyright actions, for example, for the unauthorized 
retransmission of television broadcasts by cable between Member States.
104
 
 
+ Competition law: Articles 101 and 102 of the F.E.U. Treaty
105
 codify the rules intended 
to prevent the distortion of competition and the abuse of dominant market positions in 
the Internal Market. Applying such rules, the Court of Justice and the Commission have 
ruled on licenses of intellectual property, as well as on the abuse of dominant market 
positions by enterprises and royalty-collecting societies in the field of copyright.
106
 
 
+ Harmonization: Articles 114 et seq. of the F.E.U. Treaty
107
 govern the "approximation" 
of national laws. Comparable rules in the former E.C. Treaty have guided the 
harmonization of copyright laws.
108
 Article 118 of the F.E.U. Treaty contemplates 
measures “to provide uniform protection of intellectual property rights throughout the 
Union.” 
 
  [c]--May Private Claimants Invoke E.U. Provisions?  May a citizen of a Member 
State invoke any of the provisions just reviewed
109
 as dispositive law in litigation with other 
private parties before a national court?  It is now well established in the case law that national 
courts in legal disputes between private parties can directly apply these provisions.  However, 
this conclusion was not initially taken for granted. 
 
 The question was colorably raised with regard to the free movement of goods. It had 
been argued that the provisions on point must be seen in the context of the chapter of the 
former E.C. Treaty entitled the "Elimination of quantitative restrictions between Member 
States": thus understood, these provisions would not be addressed to individual parties, but to 
Member States. This position was, as we shall see, rejected in the case law, in which private 
parties successfully defended themselves against national copyright claims by invoking the 
free movement of goods in the Internal Market.
110
 
 
                                                 
     
104
 See § 2[3] infra. 
 
 
105
 Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 81 and 82. 
 
 
106
 See § 3 infra. 
 
 
107
 Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 94 et seq. 
 
  
108
 See § 4 infra. 
 
 
109
 See § 1[2][b] supra. 
  
 
110
 See § 2[2] infra. 
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 Competition law had not raised such questions. Articles 81 and 82 of the former E.C. 
Treaty, now replaced by Articles 101 and 102 of the F.E.U. Treaty, have left little doubt 
about their applicability to private claims, since they are intended to apply to private 
“undertakings," that is, to private enterprises. Further, in its very first ruling on intellectual 
property, in 1966, the Court of Justice affirmed the direct applicability of the pertinent 
provisions.
111
 This premise has indeed been confirmed throughout subsequent case law.
112
 
 
  [d]--Copyright Subject to the E.U. Treaty Provisions.   Distinct issues arise here:  
May E.U. law itself control the application of national copyright laws within Member States?  
May the Union enter into international treaties that in turn impact on copyright within 
Member States?  
 
   [i]--Copyright Within the European Union.  Nowhere in the former E.C. 
Treaty, now replaced by the F.E.U. Treaty, was the word "copyright" to be found. The crucial 
Article 30 of the former E.C. Treaty, now Article 36 of the F.E.U. Treaty, restricted itself to 
the term "industrial and commercial property."  Nonetheless, the case law has clearly 
established that copyright and related rights fall within the scope of this phrase. 
 
 The three first Judgments of the Court of Justice in the field of intellectual property 
concerned trademarks and patents.
113
  However, in subsequent Judgments, the Court 
dissipated all doubts about the applicability of the former E.C. Treaty to copyright.  Its fourth 
Judgment in the field, the Deutsche Grammophon case, already dealt with a neighboring right 
related to copyright: the right of the producer of sound recordings.
114
   
 
 Furthermore, in the Coditel I case, the Court handed down its first judgment on copyright 
proper, simply replacing the term "industrial and commercial property" with the all-
encompassing "intellectual property."
115
  Most explicitly, in its next copyright decision, the 
Membran/K-tel case, the Court affirmed that copyright “comprises other rights, notably the 
                                                 
     
111
 Judgment of 13 July 1966, Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig v. 
Commission, [1966] E.C.R. 299.  
 
 
112
 See §§ 3[2], 3[3], and 3[4] infra. 
 
     
113
 See Judgment of 13 July 1966, Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig 
v. Commission, [1966] E.C.R. 299; Judgment of 29 Feb. 1968, Case 24/67, Parke, Davis v. 
Centrafarm, [1968] E.C.R. 55; Judgment of 18 Feb. 1971, Case 40/70, Sirena v. EDA, [1971] 
E.C.R. 69.  
 
     
114
 Judgment of 8 June 1971, Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft v. 
Metro-SB-Grossmärkte, [1971] E.C.R. 487 (discussed in § 2[2][a] infra).  
 
     
115
 Judgment of 18 March 1980, Case 62/79, Coditel v. Ciné Vog Films SA, [1980] 
E.C.R. 881 (discussed in § 2[3][a] infra).  
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right to exploit commercially the marketing of the protected work, particularly in the form of 
licenses granted in return for payment of royalties” and concluded that “there is no reason to 
make a distinction between copyright and other industrial and commercial property rights.”116 
E.U. precedents reached in industrial property cases will here be touched on as relevant to 
copyright law. 
 
 As explained in detail below, directives, sometimes prompted by decisions of the Court 
of Justice, have harmonized national copyright laws.
117
 Article 118 of the F.E.U. Treaty 
contemplates measures “to provide uniform protection of intellectual property rights 
throughout the Union.” 
 
   [ii]--E.U. Role in International Copyright. Distinct questions arise under this 
heading:  Does the Union have the power to conclude copyright treaties that bind Member 
States vis-à-vis third countries?  What impact do obligations under international treaties have 
on Member States? What impact do they have on E.U. law itself?
118
   
 
 The E.U. Treaty contemplates that the Union may now act, with legal personality, “on 
the international scene”: in particular it is to “develop relations and build partnerships with 
third countries, and international, regional or global organisations.”119 Furthermore, the 
Union has powers to legislate uniformly for all Member-States in the fields of intellectual 
property and of commerce, and it may conclude “agreements with one or more third countries 
or international organisations.”120 Accordingly, a prior Opinion of the Court of Justice, which 
ruled that the former Community only shared powers with the Member States to bind 
                                                 
     
116
 Judgment of 20 Jan. 1981, Joined Cases 55/80 and 57/80, Musik-Vertrieb Membran 
GmbH and K-tel International v. GEMA, [1981] E.C.R. 147, paras. 12-13 (discussed in § 
2[2][b][i] infra) (also noting “... that copyright comprises moral rights of the kind indicated 
by the French Government”).  
 
     
117
 See § 4 infra. 
 
     
118
 For further analysis, see "Introduction," herein, at § 5[1][c]. 
 
     
119
 E.U. Treaty, Art. 21. See also E.U. Treaty, Art. 47 (“The Union shall have legal 
personality”); F.E.U. Treaty, Art. 3 (Union’s “exclusive competence” in, inter alia, “common 
commercial policy” and “for the conclusion of an international agreement when its 
conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union 
to exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or 
alter their scope”). 
 
     
120
 F.E.U. Treaty, Arts. 118, 207(3)-(4), and  218.   
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themselves by the W.T.O. Agreements, including the TRIPs Agreement, need not now apply 
to the Union.
121
 
 
 This brings us to the second question, to which Article 351 of the F.E.U. Treaty
122
 
responds, at least with regard to Member States’ prior treaties with non-E.U. countries.  Its 
first paragraph preserves “rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 
January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, between one or more 
Member States on the one hand, and one or more third countries on the other.”  Its 
subsequent paragraphs, however, contemplate that Member States “take all appropriate steps 
to eliminate [any] incompatibilities” between such agreements and the E.U. or F.E.U. 
Treaties in the light of “a common attitude” that takes account of the reciprocal enjoyment of 
advantages by the Member States under the E.U. and F.E.U. Treaties. 
 
 Passing to the third question, it is notable that E.U. law may take precedence over 
treaties as between Member States.
123
  The Court itself has interpreted Article 50(6) of the 
TRIPs Agreement in this regard, albeit without ruling on the direct effect of that provision.
124
  
It thus left without response the argument of the Advocate General that the Court should deny 
direct effect to any or all W.T.O. provisions, inter alia, because other countries might not 
give direct effect to such provisions. The Court also subsequently confirmed its indirect 
approach to the issue in suggesting in one case that, instead of explicitly granting direct effect 
to TRIPs provisions, national judges have a duty under E.C. law, now E.U. law, at least to 
apply their national procedural rules as much as possible in the light of TRIPs language.
125
  
                                                 
     
121
 Opinion 1/94 of 15 Nov. 1994, [1994] E.C.R. I-5267.  The Court reasoned that any 
such exclusive E.C. power to conclude treaties would by-pass voting rules in the Council 
which, with the Treaty of Lisbon, are changed and newly coordinated with Parliamentary 
powers.  See § 1[2][c] supra.  
 
 
122
  Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Art.  307. 
 
     
123
 Cf. Judgment of 6 April 1995, Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, R.T.E. v. 
Commission and I.T.P. v. Commission, [1995] E.C.R. I-743, para. 84 (Magill T.V. Guide) 
(questioning the application of the Berne Convention between what were then E.C. Member 
States) (further discussed in § 3[2][c][ii] infra).  For commentary, see J. Calvet and T. 
Desurmont, "The Magill Ruling: An Isolated Decision?," 167 RIDA 2, 46-60 (1996); 
"Introduction," herein, at § 5[1][c][i].  
 
      
124
 Judgment of 16 June 1998, Case C-53/96, Hermès International v. FHT Marketing 
Choice BV, [1998] E.C.R. I-3603.  See also Judgment of 13 Sept. 2001, Case C-88/89, 
Schieving-Nijstad v. Groeneveld, [2001] E.C.R. I-5851 (confirming this approach).  For 
commentary, see M. Bronckers, “The exhaustion of patent rights under WTO Law,” [1998] 
Journal of World Trade 137; J.P. Trachtman, “Bananas, Direct Effect and Compliance,” 
[1999] European J. of International Law 655.   For further analysis of TRIPs self-execution, 
see "Introduction," herein, at § 3[3][a][i]. 
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However, the Court has since held that a claimant in proceedings before a national court may 
not rely on the argument that E.C. law, now E.U. law, is incompatible with W.T.O. rules, 
even where relevant legislation has been declared incompatible with those rules in a W.T.O. 
dispute settlement.
126
 
 
 More generally, the Court has been reluctant to allow treaty obligations, either of the 
Member States or of the Community, now the Union, to take priority over the latter’s law as 
applied to a Member State.
127
  Indeed, the Court noted that the lawfulness of an E.C., now an 
E.U., instrument cannot “be assessed in the light of instruments of international law which, 
like the W.T.O. Agreement and the TRIPs and T.B.T. agreements which are part of it, are not 
in principle, having regard to their nature and structure, among the rules in the light of which 
the Court is to review the lawfulness of measures adopted by the Community [now Union] 
institutions.”128   
 
                                                                                                                                                       
      
125
 Judgment of 14 Dec. 2000, Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98, Dior v. Tuk and 
Layher v. Assco, [2001] E.C.R. I-11307, confirmed, Order of 2 May 2001, Case C-307/99, 
OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen, [2001] E.C.R. II-
3159.  For further commentary, see E. Neframi, “La compétence de la Cour de Justice pour 
interpréter l’Accord TRIPs selon l’arrêt 'Parfums Christian Dior'” (Jurisdiction of the Court 
of Justice to interpret the TRIPs Agreement according to the "Christian Dior" Judgment), 
[2001] Revue du Droit de l’Union Européenne 491.  
 
     
126
 Judgment of 1 March 2005, Case C-377/02, Van Parys v. BIRB, [2005] E.C.R. I-
1465.   For comments, see M. Bronckers and P.J. Kuijper, “WTO law in the European Court 
of Justice,” [2005] C.M.L. Rev. 166; M.A. Young, “WTO undercurrents at the Court of 
Justice,” [2005] E.L. Rev. 711; M. Slotboom, A comparison of WTO and EC Law (Cameron 
May, London, 2006). 
 
 
127
 Cf. Judgment of 9 Oct. 2001, Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. Council and Parliament, 
[2001] E.C.R. I-8419 (stating that, where the Netherlands sought the annulment of the 
Directive on the legal protection of biotechnical inventions, in the face of divergences 
between national laws that result from interpretations contrary to Member States' 
international obligations, “there is nothing in principle to prevent recourse to adoption of a 
Directive as a means of ensuring a uniform interpretation of such terms by the Member 
States”). 
 
 
128
 Judgment of 23 Nov. 1999, Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council, [1999] E.C.R. I-
8395.   But cf. Judgment of 30 Sept. 2003, Case C-94/02, P. Biret v. Council, [2003] E.C.R. 
I-10497 (clarifying that only under those circumstances where the Community, now the 
Union, intended to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of the W.T.O., 
or where its measure refers expressly to the precise provisions of the W.T.O. agreements, 
should the Court review the legality of the measure in question in light of the W.T.O. rules). 
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   [iii]--E.U. Initiatives in International Copyright.  The former Community 
had undertaken a number of initiatives in the field of international copyright.
129
  It is 
contemplated that the Commission will negotiate agreements between the Union and third 
countries in the field.
130
 The Union is a member of, and participates in, the World Trade 
Organization and, accordingly, in the TRIPs Council.
131
   
 
 Furthermore, on December 14, 2009, the Union, as a full Contracting Party, along with 
Member States, ratified the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty, effective March 14, 2010.
132
  
 
  [e]--Non-Discrimination Against E.U. Nationals.  Article 18 of the F.E.U. 
Treaty
133
 sets out a basic principle: Within the scope of application of the E.U. and F.E.U. 
Treaties, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited. 
 
   [i]--The Phil Collins Case.  On the basis of this principle of non-
discrimination, the Court of Justice faced a basic question of international copyright and 
neighboring rights in the Phil Collins case and in a companion case: May a national of one 
Member State obtain the same protection, effectively unconditional national treatment with 
regard to such rights, as do nationals of another Member State in that latter state?  
 
 In both cases, the German Copyright Act did not permit British musical performers to 
prohibit the unauthorized sales in Germany of recordings of their performances bootlegged in 
                                                 
 
     
129
 The Council had issued a Resolution, according to which the Member States, to the 
extent they have not already done so, undertake to become parties to the Paris Act of the 
Berne Convention and to the Rome Convention before January 1, 1995, and to assure that 
their domestic laws effectively comply with both treaties: Council Resolution of the 
European Communities 92/C 138/01, 14 May 1992, O.J. 1992 No. C 138.  This Resolution 
was withdrawn after its deadline: O.J. 1997 No. C 2.   
 
     
130
 On E.U. treaty-making powers in the field of copyright, see § 1[2][d][ii] supra.  On 
international implications, see "Introduction," herein, at § 5[1][c][ii].   On agreements with 
Eastern European countries touching on copyright, see M. Ficsor, "Hungary," herein, at § 
6[3][c]; J. Barta and R. Markiewicz, "Poland," herein, at § 6[3][a]. 
 
     
131
 On TRIPs, see "Introduction," herein, at § 5[5][b][i].  
 
     
132
 See Commission Press Release No. IP/09/1916, 14 Dec. 2009.  On the E.C. 
Directive to harmonize compliance with these treaties, see § 4[2][g] infra.  
 
 
133
 Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Art. 12. 
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the United States.
134
 They were refused German neighboring rights to this effect because the 
performances did not have connecting factors entitling them to protection under the Rome 
Convention of 1961, which assures such rights and to which Germany belongs. In particular, 
the Rome Convention protects performances made in countries adhering to it, but the 
performances at issue had taken place in the United States, which is not a Rome country.
135
   
 
 Both performers, E.C. nationals at the time, invoked the principle of non-discrimination 
under the former E.C. Treaty.
136
 The performers claimed that they had been discriminated 
against in that they had not been treated on a par with German performers who were 
protected by the German Copyright Act irrespective of the country where their performances 
took place.  On the basis of the non-discrimination principle, the Court of Justice ruled that 
each Member State must accord neighboring rights and, by extension, copyright to all 
nationals of other Member States on the same conditions as they do to their own nationals.
137
 
  
   [ii]--Effects in Time and in the E.E.A.  The Phil Collins precedent has applied 
more broadly in time and space than might have been initially expected. Consider claims 
arising before the date of the decision, as well as claims relative to E.E.A. countries or 
asserted by E.E.A. nationals.
138
 
 
 How far back in time should the Phil Collins ruling apply? Ostensibly, it has effect in the 
original six Member States relative to all transactions subsequent to January 1, 1958, when 
these states adhered to the original E.E.C. Treaty, as well as for each other Member State as 
of the date of its accession to that or to the subsequent E.C. Treaty, now the F.E.U. Treaty.
139
 
                                                 
     
134
 On the German context for these cases, see A. Dietz, "Germany," herein, at § 
6[1][d[ii] (hereinafter "Germany").  
 
     
135
 On Rome coverage and connecting factors, see "Introduction," herein, at §§ 
4[1][c][ii] and 4[2]. 
 
 
136
 I.e., under the prior E.C. Treaty, Art. 7, subsequently moved to Art. 12, and now 
found in F.E.U. Treaty, Art. 18. 
 
     
137
 Judgment of 20 Oct. 1993, Joined Cases C-92/92 and C-326/92, Phil Collins v. 
Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft mbH, [1993] E.C.R. I-5145. 
 
 
138
 See also Judgment of 20 Jan. 2009, Case C-240/07, Sony Music Entertainment 
(Germany) GmbH v. Falcon Neue Medien Vertrieb GmbH, [2009] E.C.R. I-263 (discussed in 
§ 5[6] infra and in “Introduction,” herein, at §§ 3[2][b] in fine, 4[3][a][i][C], and 5[2][b][ii] 
in fine).   
 
     
139
 For these dates, see § 1[1][a] supra.  See, e.g., the Rolling Stones decision, BGH 
(Federal Court of Justice) (Germany), 21 April 1994, [1994] GRUR 794, [1995] GRUR Int. 
65 (German national treatment applied ex tunc, as of the date of the operative facts of the 
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However, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) faced copyright claims 
raised in the works of the Italian composer Puccini, who had died in 1924, notably works 
which the German Federal Court had, prior to the Phil Collins decision, found to have fallen 
into the German public domain by applying the Berne rule of the shorter term.
140
  Then, in a 
subsequent case, the German Federal Court, confronted with the claim that the Phil Collins 
decision precluded such application, asked the Court of Justice this question: Should the non-
discrimination principle be applied in favor of an author who was already dead by the time 
the original E.E.C. Treaty entered into force in the Member State of which he was a national 
and in the Member State where protection was claimed?
141
  The court answered this question 
in the affirmative: thus, for example, Puccini, an Italian national long dead before January 1, 
1958, when the original E.E.C. Treaty went into effect between Italy and Germany, is entitled 
to non-discrimination in Germany, which may not apply the rule of the shorter term to his 
works.
142
 
 
 What about the E.E.A. countries?  Does the Phil Collins decision also apply to them?  
To start, a provision identical to that applied in this decision is found in Article 4 of the 
E.E.A. Agreement.  Further, Article 6 of the E.E.A. Agreement provides that its provisions, 
in so far as they are identical in substance to corresponding rules of the former E.C. Treaty, 
that is, now of the F.E.U. Treaty, are to be interpreted and applied in conformity with the 
relevant rulings of the Court of Justice given prior to the date of signature of the 
Agreement.
143
  It could also be argued that the non-discrimination principle is so fundamental 
to both the F.E.U. and E.E.A. Treaties that Article 4 of the E.E.A. Agreement simply cannot 
be interpreted any differently than the applicable provision was in the Phil Collins decision. 
 
   [iii]--Effects in International Copyright.  The principle of non-discrimination, 
as applied in the Phil Collins decision, has been construed to preclude the application of 
some so-called rules of material reciprocity among E.U. States, as well as EFTA States party 
                                                                                                                                                       
case, pursuant to the Phil Collins decision) (case discussed in "Germany," herein, at §§ 
6[1][c][i] and 6[1][d][ii]). 
 
     
140
 The Puccini decision, BGH, 1 July 1985, [1986] GRUR Int. 802 (also discussed in 
"Introduction," herein, at §§ 4[3][a][i][A] and 4[3][a][i][C]).  
 
     
141
 The Puccini II decision, BGH, 30 March 2000, [2000] GRUR 1020, [2001] GRUR 
Int. 75.  
 
     
142
 Judgment of 6 June 2002, Case C-360/00, Land Hessen v. Ricordi & Co. Bühnen- 
und Musikverlag GmbH, [2002] E.C.R. I-5089 (also discussed in § 1[2][e][iii] infra and in 
"Introduction," herein, at § 4[3][a][i][C]). 
 
     
143
 On the E.E.A. Agreement and the EFTA States, see § 1[1][b][iii] supra.  
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to the E.E.A. Agreement, even though treaties of international copyright allow for specific 
forms of such rules.
144
   
 
 The Berne Convention expressly allows for a number of such rules that are often invoked 
to limit national treatment. These rules include, most notably, the rule of the shorter term and 
the rule allowing limited national treatment for droit de suite.
145
 With regard to works of 
applied art, the Berne Convention allows Berne members to cut back on copyright protection 
in certain cases where copyright is not available in such a work in its country of origin.
146
  
 
 Subsequent to the Phil Collins decision, the Court of Justice ruled that Germany could 
no longer apply the Berne rule of the shorter term to works of the Italian author Puccini who, 
under Phil Collins, should have enjoyed copyright protection in Germany for life plus 70 
years, even when the applicable Italian term had been shorter and even though Puccini died 
before the original E.E.C. Treaty, compelling non-discrimination, went into effect between 
Germany and Italy.
147
  
 
 Turn to the Berne rule with regard to industrial designs. Despite German and Dutch 
decisions following the Phil Collins judgment on point,
148
 French case law had continued to 
consider applying Article 2(7) of the Berne Convention to deny copyright in a design work 
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 See also "Introduction," herein, at § 3[3][a][ii] (analyzing the E.C. Treaty, now the 
F.E.U. Treaty, as a ground of protection of copyright and neighboring rights); § 4[3][a][i][C] 
(analyzing results for recouping works out of the public domain in international context); §§ 
5[1][c][ii], 5[4][c][ii], and 5[5][b][i] (analyzing implications for most-favored-nation 
treatment among W.T.O. members). 
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 Berne Convention, Arts. 7(8) and 14ter (Paris Act).  See "Introduction," herein, at §§ 
5[2] and 5[4][b][ii].  
 
     
146
 Berne Convention, Art. 2(7) (Paris Act).  See "Introduction," herein, at § 
4[1][c][i][A].  
 
     
147
 Judgment of 6 June 2002, Case C-360/00, Land Hessen v. Ricordi & Co. Bühnen- 
und Musikverlag GmbH, [2002] E.C.R. I-5089 (also discussed in § 1[2][e][ii] supra).  See 
also "Germany," herein, at §§ 3[2][b][i] and 3[3][c][ii] (further analyzing consequences 
relative to German terms generally longer before the Term Directive went into effect).  
 
    
148
  See the Eileen Gray II decision, OLG (Court of Appeals), Frankfurt (Germany), 1 
Sept. 1994, [1995] GRUR Int. 337, in English in 27 I.I.C. 404 (1996) (refusing to apply 
Berne Article 2(7) to an Irish designer); the Cassina decision, Supreme Court (Netherlands), 
26 May 2000, [2000] 49/9 Ars Aequi 677, note Cohen Jehoram (refusing to apply Berne 
Article 2(7) to an Italian designer).  For commentary, see N. Mout-Bouwman, "Phil Collins 
Revisited," [2001] E.I.P.R. 100.  
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without regard to creation by an author from another Member State.
149
 The Court of Justice 
held that such application would lead to impermissible “indirect discrimination on grounds of 
nationality.”150 Furthermore, it found no “objective circumstance” justifying the reciprocity 
otherwise allowed by Article 2(7) of the Berne Convention.
151
 
 
                                                 
 
149
 See TGI Paris, 3e ch., 5 Dec. 2003, Com. com. électr. 2004, chron. 68, note Caron, 
Rev. trim. dr. com. 2004, 471, obs. Pollaud-Dulian, J.C.P. E. 2005, 1216, no. 8, obs. H.J. 
Lucas. For further analysis, see A. Lucas and P. Kamina, “France,” herein, at § 2[4][c] 
(hereinafter "France"). 
 
 
150
 Judgment of 30 June 2005, Case C-28/04, Tod’s SPA and Tod’s France SARL v. 
Heyraud SA, [2005] E.C.R. I-5781, [2005] E.C.D.R. 457.   
 
 
151
 See, generally, Judgment of 30 Sept. 2003, Case C-405/01, Colegio de Oficiales de 
la Marina Mercante Espanole, [2003] E.C.R. I-10391 (considering that a Member State may 
not condition how, or whether, an E.C. and now E.U. claimant benefits from the E.C. and 
now F.E.U. Treaty or from E.C. and now E.U. secondary legislation). 
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§ 2 E.U. Freedoms of Commerce  
 
 [1]--E.U. Law and National Frameworks of Rights 
 
 The Court of Justice has had to reconcile conflicts between E.C., now E.U., freedoms of 
movement of goods and services, on the one hand, and nationally granted rights of 
intellectual property, on the other.  In certain cases, notably of parallel imports of copies and 
products within the Internal Market, the Court’s decisions have precluded the exercise of 
national distribution rights: the rights are, to that extent, said to be “exhausted.” 
  
 In the field of copyright, the resulting European exhaustion doctrine has been most 
recently codified in Article 4(2) of the Information-Society Directive, in the following 
double-pronged rule:
1
 on the one hand, the “distribution right” is exhausted “where the first 
sale or other transfer of ownership in the Community,” now the Union, of “the original or 
copies of the work” is “made by the rightholder or with his consent”; on the other, it “shall 
not be exhausted within the Community,” now the Union, by other such dispositions, notably 
abroad.
2
 To understand when and how this rule applies, even in hard cases, we have to return 
to the premises of the free movement of goods and services within the Internal Market as it 
has entered into tension with the territoriality of national copyright laws. 
 
  [a]--E.U. Treaty Provisions on Point.  Let us recapitulate the relevant provisions of 
the F.E.U. Treaty which, as broached above, now form the bases for the European exhaustion 
doctrine:
3
 
 
+ Freedom of movement of goods: Articles 34 and 35 of the F.E.U. Treaty
4
 respectively 
prohibit “[q]uantitative restrictions” on “imports” and “exports” and “all measures 
having equivalent effect ... between Member States.”5  
                                                 
 
 
1
 On this directive, see § 4[2][g] infra.  On the specific codifications concerning 
software, rental rights and related rights, and databases, respectively, see §§ 4[2][b][i], 
4[2][c] and 4[2][f] infra.   
 
 
2
 N.b., however, the rule applies upon any first sale or other disposition within the 
European Economic Area, which includes the Union.  See § 2[2][d] infra.  
 
        
3
 See § 1[2][b] supra.  
 
 
4
 Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 28 and 29. 
 
 
5
 To form the Internal Market, Article 3(1)(a) of the former E.C. Treaty had required 
"the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and of quantitative 
restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of all other measures having equivalent 
effect." 
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+ Caveat regarding intellectual property: Article 36 of the F.E.U. Treaty
6
 further provides 
that these prohibitions of restrictions to the movement of goods do not necessarily apply, 
inter alia, to “prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified 
on grounds of ... the protection of industrial and commercial property” which, we have 
seen, has been held to include copyright.
7
 However, the second sentence of this Article 
36 of the F.E.U. Treaty
8
 contains what one commentator has called “a sting in its tail,”9 
stating: "Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of 
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States."  
 
+ Freedom to provide services: Article 56 of the F.E.U. Treaty
10
 recognizes the freedom to 
provide services among Member States and thus across borders between them.
11
  
 
 On the basis of these provisions, a pair of questions has been raised in the case law: On 
the one hand, once a rightholder, or a party acting with his consent, sells or otherwise 
disposes of ownership of an embodiment of a protected work or media production, notably a 
hard copy, in one Member State, may this claimant stop the copy from being further sold or 
disposed of in other Member States?
12
 On the other hand, may a rightholder or a party acting 
with his consent, exercising rights over the unauthorized recommunication of protected 
works or media productions from one Member State to another, but without commerce in 
hard copies, stop such recommunication?
13
 To date, the former, but not the latter, question 
has been answered in the negative. 
                                                                                                                                                       
  
 
6
 Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Art. 30. 
 
 
7
 See § 1[2][d][i] supra.  See also F.E.U. Treaty, Art. 345 [former E.C. Treaty, Art. 
295] (“the Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system 
of property ownership”).   
 
 
8
 Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Art. 30. 
 
 
9
 Valentine Korah, Intellectual Property Rights and the EC Competition Rules, 5 
(Hart Publ., 2006). 
  
 
10
 Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Art. 49. 
 
 
11
 To form the Internal Market, Article 3(1)(c) of the former E.C. Treaty had required 
“the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the freedom of movement for 
persons, services and capital.” 
  
   
12
 See § 2[2] infra. 
 
     
13
 See § 2[3] infra. 
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  [b]--The Problem of Nationally Territorial Rights.  A basic concept is 
indispensable to understanding the problem that the Court has had to resolve in deciding such 
questions in the case law: the principle of territoriality. The Court of Justice has defined 
territoriality as follows: "This principle of territoriality, which is recognized under 
international treaty law, means that it is the law of the country where protection . . . is sought 
which determines the condition of that protection. Moreover, national law can only provide 
relief in respect of acts performed in the national territory in question."
14
   
 
 For example, a Dutch author has a copyright at home both limited to the territory of the 
Netherlands and enforced according to Dutch law. However, this copyright is of no help to 
the Dutch author in obtaining relief against infringement taking place outside the 
Netherlands; nor can the author invoke any "international copyright" abroad.  Rather, largely 
by virtue of Dutch adherence to copyright treaties, most importantly the Berne Convention 
and the TRIPs Agreement, the Dutch author has a bundle of more than a hundred national 
copyrights in each of over one hundred foreign countries, which are parties to the 
conventions.  Each respective copyright is confined to the national territory of each such 
foreign protecting country. 
 
 In theory, this principle provides the necessary line of demarcation between national 
jurisdictions throughout the whole field of intellectual property law.  In practice, though, this 
principle is also applied at the level of facts: all too often facts forming the bases for asserting 
rights or defenses in any given jurisdiction also tend to be viewed as occurrences territorially 
isolated within that jurisdiction. For instance, according to the principle of territoriality, one 
course of conduct, ostensibly infringing copyright in several countries at once, will be 
analyzed into geographically discrete sets of infringing acts, with each such set isolated in 
each protecting country when considered as a basis for an infringement suit under the 
copyright law of that country.
15
 
 
 First-sale or exhaustion doctrines or rules, as found in national laws, are illustrative here. 
As to copyright, they generally limit a copyright owner's right to control the further 
distribution of a given embodiment, usually a hard copy, of a work once it is "first" sold. The 
distribution right in that one copy is then, in the parlance of many national laws, said to be to 
some degree "exhausted." That is, the holder of the distribution right can no longer control 
the fate of the first-sold copy which, after having lawfully entered the relevant market, may 
                                                 
     
14
 Judgment of 22 June 1994, Case C-9/93, IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH v. 
Danziger and Ideal-Standard GmbH, Wabco Standard GmbH, [1994] E.C.R. I-2789, para. 22. 
 
     
15
 See also "Introduction," herein, at § 3[1][b][ii] (territorial application of national 
laws subject to convention framework, especially in cases of border-crossing infringement).  
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be freely resold over and over again.
16
 Doctrinally, first-sale or exhaustion rules are often said 
to coordinate intangible property in the text, sounds, images, etc., to be enjoyed in a work or 
other media production, on the one hand, and tangible property in the embodiments of such 
protected contents, on the other.  But what is the relevant market in which an embodiment of 
a copyright-protected work is "first" sold or otherwise disposed of and in which the 
distribution right is then "exhausted" in that embodiment? Under exclusively national law, 
one tends to view, not only the exhaustion of a right, but the fact of a first sale or other 
transaction triggering that exhaustion, as occurring in but one country at a time. To that 
extent the relevant market is all too easily seen as a national one exclusively. 
 
 Curiously enough, territorial limitations to national first-sale or exhaustion doctrines or 
rules differ from right to right and country to country.  While such limitations are universally 
accepted in patent law, they vary in effect in trademark and copyright laws from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction.
17
  In any event, such territorial limitations, especially when used to 
compartmentalize national markets, seemed to be at odds with the former E.C. Treaty, now 
the F.E.U. Treaty, which aimed at uniting long-established national markets into one Internal 
Market.  
 
  [c]--Balancing the Rationales of E.U. and National Laws.  As just noted, the 
F.E.U. Treaty reaffirms the principle of free movement of goods and services within the 
Internal Market,
18
 but the territoriality of intellectual property allows for restricting such 
movement across borders.
19
 The Court of Justice has attempted to resolve this tension in its 
case law by applying a number of theoretical devices, but not without taking some practical 
account of the economic implications of its decisions.   
 
   [i]--Doctrine: Existence or Specific Aims, vs. Exercise, of Rights. The Court 
of Justice has formulated distinctions to guide sorting out “justified” from objectionable 
attempts to enforce intellectual property by controlling first sales from territory to territory. 
To start, it distinguished between the national "grant" of intellectual property rights, in itself 
inviolable, and the "exercise" of such rights, which may be limited as necessary to effectuate 
                                                 
     
16
 N.b., in some jurisdictions, the first sale of a copy does not "exhaust" all rights to 
control its fate, for example, rights to profit from its rental or related uses. See § 2[2][b][ii] 
infra.  
 
     
17
 See, e.g., Sherman, "Australia," herein, at §§ 8[1][a][ii], 8[1][b][i][B], and 
8[1][b][iii] (subject to complex rules, the importation of specified goods, otherwise subject to 
copyright, is allowed without the consent of the copyright owner if the item being imported 
has been first sold with such consent abroad). 
 
 
18
 See § 2[1][a] supra. 
  
      
19
 See § 2[1][b] supra. 
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the objectives of the Internal Market.
20
 It attempted to refine this distinction by speaking in 
terms of the "existence" of intellectual property rights versus the "exercise" of such rights, 
which might at times have to yield to E.C., now E.U., law.
21
 Such distinctions received faint 
praise in commentary that found them at best vague.
22
  
 
 The Court then introduced another criterion, which it initially designated in French with 
the notion of the objet spécifique of a right. This criterion was to help decide whether or not 
the exercise of a given right “may nevertheless fall within the prohibitions” of the E.C., now 
the F.E.U., Treaty.
23
 This notion, sometimes translated into English as the “specific subject-
matter” of a right, might be better encapsulated as the specific aim of the right in question, 
that is, the “policy reason” motivating it.24 This reading seems supported by language which 
the Court used in subsequent case law where it shifted to terms like "the essential function" 
or "the precise scope" of the intellectual property right in question.
25
  The Court thus sets 
itself the task of avoiding the curbing of the aim of the right asserted, while not allowing the 
right to be used, most notably, as "a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade between Member States."
26
  
 
 What is the objective or aim specific to copyright and related rights, especially of the 
right of distribution asserted in the cases under consideration?  Responses by the Court of 
Justice to this question raised for intellectual property generally suggest that it has been 
                                                 
      
20
 Judgment of 13 July 1966, Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig v. 
Commission, [1966] E.C.R. 299.  
 
     
21
 Judgment of 29 Feb. 1968, Case 24/67, Parke, Davis v. Centrafarm, [1968] E.C.R. 
55.  
 
     
22
 See, e.g., W.R. Cornish, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and 
Allied Rights, 753 (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1999) (speaking of distinctions “whose 
obscurity served only to disguise their essential banality”). 
 
     
23
 Judgment of 8 June 1971, Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft v. 
Metro-SB-Grossmärkte, [1971] E.C.R. 487, para. 11 (discussed in § 2[2][a] infra).  
 
 
24
 See G. Tritton, et al., Intellectual Property in Europe, 649 (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd 
ed., 2008); also Valentine Korah, Intellectual Property Rights and the EC Competition Rules, 
6 (Hart Publ., 2006) (“It is clear, however, that ‘the specific subject matter’ includes both the 
nature of the right ... and the reason the law grants it ...”). 
 
     
25
 Judgment of 9 July 1985, Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, [1985] E.C.R. 
2281. 
 
 
26
 F.E.U. Treaty, Art. 36 [former E.C. Treaty, Art. 30].  
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developing “a fluid concept, which is defined and refined on a case-by-case basis.”27 For 
example, in the Membran/K-tel case, the Court spoke of copyright as allowing its owner “to 
exploit commercially the marketing of the protected work, particularly . . . in return for 
payment of royalties.”28 In the Phil Collins case, the Court spoke of the aims of both moral 
and economic rights under copyright and neighboring rights, and it glossed economic rights 
with the language such as that just cited.
29
 In the Premier League case which dealt with 
broadcasts, the Court reformulated the aims as enabling rightholders “to exploit” their works 
or other productions “commercially,” notably “in return for payment of remuneration” that is 
“reasonable in relation to the economic value of the service provided.”30 
 
   [ii]--Economic Considerations in Limiting the Exercise of Rights. Once the 
Court of Justice started to formulate aims specific to rights of intellectual property, such as 
that of obtaining economic returns, it opened the way to balancing such economic aims with 
goals of the Internal Market.  Such goals as the free movement of goods and services and the 
achievement of undistorted competition effectively presuppose criteria for the optimal 
functioning of the marketplace that could guide decision-making and legislation in the light 
of economic analysis.
31
 Admittedly, such considerations might take us outside the letter of 
the exhaustion rule as it is now codified in E.U. directives, but they may remain pertinent in 
hard cases. 
                                                 
 
27
 G. Tritton, et al., Intellectual Property in Europe, 651 (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed., 
2008). 
 
 
28
  Judgment of 20 Jan. 1981, Joined Cases 55/80 and 57/80, Musik-Vertrieb Membran 
GmbH and K-tel International v. GEMA, [1981] E.C.R. 147, para. 12 (discussed in § 
2[2][b][i] infra). 
 
      
29
 Judgment of 20 Oct. 1993, Joined Cases C-92/92 and C-326/92, Phil Collins v. 
Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft mbH, [1993] E.C.R. I-5145, para. 20 (discussed in § 1[2][e] 
supra). 
 
 
30
 Judgment of 4 Oct. 2011, Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, Football 
Association Premier League v. QC Leisure and Karen Murphy v. Media Protection Services, 
[2012] F.S.R. 1, paras. 107-109 (also discussed in §§ 2[3][b], 3[2][a][iii], 4[3][b][i], 5[2][a], 
and 5[7] infra). 
 
        
31
 The European Commission has had economic studies made on point.  See, e.g., 
National Economic Research Associates (economic consultants) and S.J. Berwin & Co. 
(solicitors), “The economic consequences of the choice of regime of exhaustion in the area of 
trademarks,” 8 Feb. 1999 (arguing that exhaustion not only bears on prices, but also on 
product quality, product availability, after-sale services, employment, distribution 
agreements, and market segmentation and that the impact of a change in the existing 
exhaustion rule would be minimal in certain sectors, while it could have more significant 
effects in others).  
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 In such cases, the Court of Justice may move on to economic analysis such as is pursued 
in competition law.
32
 For example, the Court suggested that the criterion of “arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States,” which, under 
Article 30 of the former E.C. Treaty,
33
 would have helped the Court to assess attempts to stop 
parallel imports, may be applied by asking whether there is “hindrance to effective market 
access.”34 As a further example, in a case in which Yves Saint Laurent Parfums attempted 
contractually to prohibit direct sales of specified products within Member States, the Court 
proposed a market-power test, as an arguable analog to the exhaustion rule, to disqualify such 
attempts insofar as they might have “an appreciable effect on the pattern of trade between the 
Member States as to undermine attainment of the objectives of the common market.”35  
 
 Another case also illustrates how exhaustion issues can shift to competition issues. The 
French company Micro Leader had complained against Microsoft for preventing imports of 
French-language copies of its products from Quebec into France. The Commission had 
rejected the complaint because the Software Directive made clear that the copyright owner's 
right of distribution is not exhausted by imports from outside the Internal Market.
36
 The 
Court of First Instance, now the General Court, noted that, while such a restriction on imports 
does not in itself violate exhaustion or competition law within the Internal Market, it may, in 
exceptional circumstances, breach such competition law.  The case was remanded to the 
Commission for it to determine whether the price differential between sales of the relevant 
products in Quebec and in France did not call for conditioning Microsoft's exercise of its 
distribution rights in the Internal Market.
37
 
                                                 
 
32
 For E.U. competition law directly applied to the field of copyright, see § 3 infra. 
 
 
33
 Replaced by F.E.U. Treaty, Art. 36. 
 
  
34
 Judgment of 23 April 2002, Case C-443/99, Merck, Sharpe & Dohme GmbH v. 
Paranova Pharmazeutika Handels GmbH, [2002] E.C.R. I-3703, para. 31.  
 
      
35
 Judgment of 28 April 1998, Case C-306/96, Javico International and Javico A.G. v. 
Yves Saint Laurent Parfums SA, [1998] E.C.R. I-1983, para. 25.  For commentary, see W.R. 
Cornish, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights, 770 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1999); Th. Hays, “Anti-competitive agreements and extra-
market parallel importation,” [2001] E.L. Rev. 468.  
 
       
36
 See Commission, Twenty-eighth Report on Competition Policy (1998), pp. 166-167.  
 
 
37
 Court of First Instance, Judgment of 16 Dec. 1999, Case T-198/98, Micro Leader 
Business v. The Commission of the European Communities, [2000] E.C.R. II-3989.  For 
commentary, see G. van der Wal, “Arrest MicroLeader: communautaire uitputting van artikel 
81 EG-Verdrag” (The MicroLeader Judgment: Community Exhaustion under Article 81 of 
the E.C. Treaty), [2001] Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht 48-52. 
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 [2]--Distribution Right Exhausted Upon First Sale in the Internal Market  
 
 The Court of Justice has had to consider the consequences of first sale of copies or 
products. In all these cases, the Court has no longer isolated within any one national territory 
the relevant market in which any such first sale might "exhaust" the right to control further 
distribution. Rather, the entire Internal Market has become the relevant market.  
 
  [a]--Parallel Imports Between Member States.  The clearest case is one in which 
a plaintiff sues to prevent items first sold by him or with his consent in one Member State 
from being marketed in another such state, whose law ostensibly assures him of exclusive 
distribution rights. The defendant may successfully invoke the Eurodefense of exhaustion of 
these rights throughout the Internal Market in such a case.
38
  
 
 In the Deutsche Grammophon case, the Court of Justice first applied the European 
exhaustion doctrine to copyright-related rights.  In this case, the plaintiff, a German record 
producer, had sold sound recordings within Germany and exclusively licensed their 
distribution in other Member States.  Some of these sound recordings, first sold outside 
Germany but within the Internal Market by plaintiff's French subsidiary, were resold by third 
parties, ultimately to the defendant who started to market them in Germany, undercutting 
plaintiff's current price on the home market. Upon plaintiff's suit there, a German trial court 
issued a temporary injunction against defendant's sales on the grounds that they infringed 
plaintiff's exclusive distribution right under the German Copyright Act.  When defendants 
questioned whether this order was consistent with the former E.C. Treaty,
39
 the Court of 
Justice held the right to be exhausted if the sound recordings at issue had been "marketed by 
the owner of the right or with his agreement in the territory of another Member State." It thus 
disallowed the injunction because it would have resulted in "the isolation of national 
markets."
40
 
 
                                                 
     
38
 But cf. Judgment of 8 April 2003, Case C-244/00, Van Doren and Q. GmbH v. 
Lifestyle Sports, [2003] E.C.R. I-3051 (clarifying that E.C., now E.U., law does not preclude 
a national rule of evidence which imposes the burden of proving the exhaustion of a 
trademark right as a defense).  For commentary, see S. Enchelmaier, "The inexhaustible 
question: free movement of goods and intellectual property in European Court of Justice's 
case law, 2002-2006," 38 I.I.C. 453 (2007). 
 
     
39
 I.e., with former E.C. Treaty, Art. 30, now replaced by F.E.U. Treaty, Art. 36. 
 
     
40
 Judgment of 8 June 1971, Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft v. 
Metro-SB-Grossmärkte, [1971] E.C.R. 487.  
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 This pattern has been repeated in patent, unfair competition, and trademark cases.
41
  For 
example, in the Dior case, an unofficial Dutch retailer of Dior perfumes had obtained bottles 
of the perfume through unauthorized parallel imports, and Dior sued the retailer for 
trademark and copyright infringement when he put a picture of Dior packaging into his sales 
flyer.  The Court held that, once an owner of rights exhausts them by voluntarily marketing a 
product, as Dior had done, it may no longer assert its trademark or copyright to stop “normal” 
advertising of the product to the public.
42
   
 
 In subsequent cases concerning trademarked products, the Court has clearly stated that 
“putting on the market” means selling. Therefore, if a product is supplied free of charge and 
marked “not for resale,” the exhaustion principle does not apply.43 The Court would most 
likely apply this ruling by analogy in a situation involving only copyright works.  
 
  [b]--Disparities Between National Rights or Markets.  The Court of Justice has 
had to consider whether to preclude exercising national rights affecting the distribution of 
copies from one national market into another in a variety of cases where disparities existed 
between rights in these markets.    
 
                                                 
     
41
 See, e.g., Judgment of 31 Oct. 1974, Case 15/74, Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, 
[1974] E.C.R. 1147, para. 7 (holding that patent may not be exercised in one "Member State 
to prohibit the marketing" of a patented product that had been voluntarily "put on the market 
in another Member State by such patentee or with his consent"); Judgment of 22 Jan. 1981, 
Case 58/80, Dansk Supermarked v. Imerco, [1981] E.C.R. 181 (reasoning that copyright or a 
trademark may not be asserted to prohibit such marketing in one Member State "of a product 
. . . lawfully marketed on the territory of another Member State by the proprietor of such 
rights or with his consent").  
 
     
42
 Judgment of 4 Nov. 1997, Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Evora BV, 
[1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 737.  See also Judgment of 23 Feb. 1999, Case C-63/97, BMW v. Deenik, 
[1999] E.C.R. I-968 (confirming this approach by requiring something more than the bare 
assertion of an intellectual property right to stop advertising of the product protected, for 
example, statements in advertisements that might unfairly create the impression that the 
reseller belongs to the rightholder's distribution network); Judgment of  8 July 2010, Case  C-
558/08, Portakabin Ltd. and Portakabin BV v. Primakabin BV (similarly in relation to the use 
of a sign identical with, or similar to, a trade mark as a keyword for an internet referencing 
service). 
 
 
43
 Judgment of 15 Jan. 2009, Case C-495/07, Silberquelle GmbH v. Maselli-
Strickmode GmbH, [2009] ECR I-137, paras. 20-22; Judgment of 3 June 2010, Case  C-
127/09, Coty Prestige Lancaster Group GmbH v. Simex Trading AG, [2010] E.T.M.R. 41, 
paras. 43, 46, and 48; Judgment of 12 July 2011, Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay, [2011] 
E.T.M.R. 52, paras. 71-73 (clearly stating this rule and discussed in § 2[2][e] in fine infra for 
other reasons). 
 
EU: p. 42 
   [i]--Royalty Rates.  A rightholder, though no longer able to control the further 
distribution of nationally protected copies after their first sale in one Member State, might 
still want to exact royalties upon their sale or use in a second Member State. The rightholder 
would then try to obtain additional amounts or kinds of royalties payable in the second 
country, which were not available in the first one. Would such an exercise of a stronger 
national position after first sale conflict with the freedom of movement of goods in the 
Internal Market? The Court of Justice has narrowed and resolved this issue differently in 
different cases. 
 
 This issue was raised in a rather specific form in the Membran/K-tel case.
44
 The German 
royalty-collecting society GEMA sought damages for copyright infringement by two 
importers of sound recordings and music cassettes. These sound recordings had been 
manufactured and marketed in the United Kingdom with the consent of the copyright owners 
against the royalty rate of 6.25% of the retail-selling price. This rate was the practical result 
of the British Copyright Act, which then prescribed this percentage for compulsory licenses 
with regard to sound recordings, in effect putting a ceiling on any contractually agreed 
remuneration due to the rightholder. In Germany, however, the freely negotiated rate was 8%, 
and GEMA claimed the difference of 1.75% from the importers. The royalty-collecting 
society argued that it was not petitioning the Court for the prohibition or restriction of the 
marketing of the sound recordings at issue on German territory, but rather only asserting a 
claim for equality in the royalties paid for any distribution of the recordings on the German 
market. So defined, it argued, its claim would not contravene the former E.C. Treaty.
45
 
 
 In the Deutsche Grammophon  case, the Court of Justice had held that an injunction 
prohibiting a sale of parallel imports, after first sale in the Internal Market, was in conflict 
with freedom of movement of goods in that market.
46
  Here, in Membran/K-tel, where 
GEMA sought damages for such imports, thus seeking to "exercise" its right to obtain a 
different remedy, the Court found an equally irreconcilable conflict with relevant treaty 
provisions and objectives. This it made clear in its opinion: 
 
 " . . . no provision of national legislation may permit an undertaking which is 
responsible for the management of copyrights and has a monopoly on the territory of a 
Member State by virtue of that management to charge a levy on products imported from 
another Member State where they were put into circulation by or with the consent of the 
copyright owner and thereby cause the Common Market to be partitioned. Such a 
                                                 
     
44
 Judgment of 20 Jan. 1981, Joined Cases 55/80 and 57/80, Musik-Vertrieb Membran 
GmbH and K-tel International v. GEMA, [1981] E.C.R. 147.  
 
 
45
 I.e., former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 28 and 29, now replaced by F.E.U. Treaty, Arts. 34 
and 35. 
 
     
46
 Judgment of 8 June 1971, Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft v. 
Metro-SB-Grossmärkte, [1971] E.C.R. 487 (discussed in § 2[2][a] supra).  
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practice would amount to allowing a private undertaking to impose a charge on the 
importation of sound recordings which are already in free circulation in the Common 
Market on account of their crossing a frontier; it would therefore have the effect of 
entrenching the isolation of national markets which the Treaty seeks to abolish."
47
 
 
 The Court, in Membran/K-tel, rejected another argument, which seemed to go to the 
"substance" of the right being asserted there. GEMA had also claimed that the owner of a 
copyright in a recorded musical work has a legitimate interest in receiving and retaining the 
benefit of the intellectual or artistic effort embodied in the work regardless of the extent to 
which it is distributed. It specifically maintained that the owner should not lose the right to 
claim royalties equal to those normally paid in the country in which the recorded work is 
marketed. The Court dryly commented in response “that in a common market distinguished 
by free movement of goods and freedom to provide services, an author, acting directly or 
through his publisher, is free to choose the place, in any of the Member States, in which to 
put his work into circulation” by taking account of factors such as relative levels of 
remuneration and marketing opportunities. It then concluded that “[i]n those circumstances, a 
copyright management society may not be permitted to claim, on the importation of sound 
recordings into another Member State, payment of additional fees based on the difference in 
the rates of remuneration existing in the various Member States.”48 
 
 In its Basset Judgment, however, the Court dealt with a rather different set of disparities 
between national copyright laws where the use at issue was limited to one national territory.  
A challenge was raised to the practice of a national collecting society which claimed a 
complementary royalty--one doctrinally based on a combined reproduction and distribution 
right--above and beyond a royalty for licenses of the performance right proper.
49
 The 
collecting society SACEM imposed both the complementary and the performance royalties in 
France for publicly playing musical works from sound recordings there, even from recordings 
lawfully marketed in another Member State. The Court found the claim to the complementary 
royalty permissible in France although no such entitlement existed in the other Member 
States.
50
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 Judgment of 20 Jan. 1981, Joined Cases 55/80 and 57/80, Musik-Vertrieb Membran 
GmbH and K-tel International v. GEMA, [1981] E.C.R. 147. 
 
     
48
 Id., para. 25. More generally, the Court found to be completely unacceptable 
GEMA's ostensible aim "to neutralize the price differences arising from the conditions 
existing in the United Kingdom and thereby eliminate the economic advantage accruing to 
the importers of the sound recordings from the establishment of the Common Market." Id., 
para. 23. 
 
     
49
 For the doctrinal basis of this right, see "France," herein, at § 8[1][b][i].  
 
     
50
 Judgment of 9 April 1987, Case 402/85, G. Basset v. Société des Auteurs, 
Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM), [1987] E.C.R. 1747 (also discussed in § 
3[4][a][iv] infra.  
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   [ii]--Rental Rights.  In its Warner-Metronome Judgment, the Court had to 
decide whether the former E.C. Treaty
51
 precluded the exercise in Denmark of domestic 
rental rights. Video cassettes legally first sold in the United Kingdom had been imported into 
Denmark and offered for rent there: the copyright owner, who would not have had any rental 
right in the United Kingdom, sued to stop rental of the videocassettes in Denmark, where the 
legislation entitled him to submit the rental in Denmark to his authorization. The Court was 
of the opinion that the Danish right to prohibit the rental of the videocassette was susceptible 
of influencing trade in videocassettes in Denmark and hence, indirectly, of affecting trade in 
the Internal Market in those products.
52
 However, the Court declined to preclude the exercise 
of the rental right, given that “the Danish legislation applies without distinction to 
videocassettes produced in situ and video-cassettes imported from another Member State.” It 
then found no “arbitrary discrimination in trade between Member States.”53 
 
 Before concluding, the Court had to consider the following argument: The Danish 
importer pointed to the Dansk Supermarked and Membran cases,
54
 arguing that it was up to 
the owner of rights to freely choose the most advantageous national market as the place for 
his first marketing, taking into account that some laws do, and others do not, grant rental 
rights.  Under the theory of this defense, the author or other owner of rights who has chosen 
as the country of first marketing, in this case the United Kingdom, which recognizes no rental 
rights, must accept the consequences of this choice, that is, the exhaustion of his copyright 
throughout the Internal Market.  The Court rejected this reasoning and instead concluded that, 
if a legislation recognizes rental rights, this right would lose its substance if the owner would 
not be able to authorize the rental.  Earlier in its analysis, the Court had found this substance 
in the legitimate legislative attempt to provide “makers of films a remuneration  . . . which 
secures for them a satisfactory share of the rental market.”  It then refused to rely on the 
absence of rental rights in one Member State as a reason for precluding their exercise in those 
Member States where they are instituted.  The holder of the Danish rental right, the Court 
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  I.e., former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 28 and 30, now replaced by F.E.U. Treaty, Arts. 34 
and 36. 
 
 
52
 On the subsequent E.U. harmonization of rental rights, see § 4[2][c][i] infra.   
 
     
53
 Judgment of 17 May 1988, Case 158/86, Warner Brothers Inc. and Metronome 
Video ApS v. Erik Viuff Christiansen, [1988] E.C.R. 2605, para. 12.  
 
     
54
 I.e., respectively, Judgment of 22 Jan. 1981, Case 58/80, Dansk Supermarked v. 
Imerco, [1981] E.C.R. 181; Judgment of 20 Jan. 1981, Joined Cases 55/80 and 57/80, Musik-
Vertrieb Membran GmbH and K-tel International v. GEMA, [1981] E.C.R. 147 (discussed in 
§ 2[2][b][i] supra). 
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held, could then control whether videocassettes first sold in the United Kingdom could be 
rented in Denmark.
55
 
 
   [iii]--Term of Rights. In the EMI Electrola case, the Court of Justice had to 
decide whether the former E.C. Treaty
56
 had to be construed to allow the holder of subsisting 
German rights in recordings to stop the distribution of these recordings in Germany when the 
recordings had been legally first sold without consent in Denmark, where the term of rights in 
them had lapsed. This first sale, the Court noted, had been “due, not to an act or the consent 
of the copyright owner or his licensee, but to the expiry of the protection period provided for 
by the legislation of that Member State.”57  The Court, however, stressed “that in the present 
state of Community law, which is characterized by a lack of harmonization or approximation 
of legislation governing the protection of literary and artistic property, it is for the national 
legislatures to determine the conditions and detailed rules for such protection.”58 It then held 
that resulting restrictions of trade in the Internal Market were justified if they resulted from 
“differences between the rules governing the period of protection . . . inseparably linked to 
the very existence of the exclusive rights.”59 Thus a German injunction of sale of the 
recordings was allowable.
60
 
 
  [c]--Compulsory Licenses.  Should the disposition of ownership interests in a copy 
or product, other than a voluntary sale by a rightholder or with his consent, trigger the 
exhaustion rule?  This issue may arise, inter alia, when a compulsory license, common under 
national patent as well as copyright statutes, comes into play. For example, in the 
Membran/K-tel case, discussed above, the compulsory license had hung in the background 
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 Judgment of 17 May 1988, Case 158/86, Warner Brothers Inc. and Metronome 
Video ApS v. Erik Viuff Christiansen, [1988] E.C.R. 2605, paras. 15-19.  
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  I.e., former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 28 and 30, now replaced by F.E.U. Treaty, Arts. 34 
and 36. 
 
     
57
 Judgment of 24 Jan. 1989, Case 341/87, EMI Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im-und 
Export Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH, [1989] E.C.R. 79, para. 10. 
 
      
58
 Id., para. 11. On the subsequent E.U. harmonization of terms of copyright and of 
related rights, see § 4[2][e] infra.   
 
     
59
 Judgment of 24 Jan. 1989, Case 341/87, EMI Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im-und 
Export Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH, [1989] E.C.R. 79, para. 12 (applying former E.C. 
Treaty, Art. 29, now replaced by F.E.U. Treaty, Art. 35). 
 
     
60
 Id., para. 14. 
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when the owner of rights gave his initial "consent" to licensing the recordings at issue there.
61
 
The Court of Justice has declined to apply the exhaustion rule where a compulsory license 
clearly forces the placing into commerce of a copy or product otherwise subject to a right of 
intellectual property. 
 
 This question has so far only come up in a patent case. In the Pharmon decision, a patent 
owner in the Netherlands had tried to prevent imports from the United Kingdom where a 
compulsory license had been issued with respect to his parallel English patent. The Court 
started by recalling that it had consistently held that the former E.C. Treaty, now the F.E.U. 
Treaty,
62
 precluded the application of national provisions which enable a patent owner to 
prevent the importation and marketing of a product already lawfully marketed in another 
Member State by the rightholder, a related party, or a licensee.
63
  The Court, however, 
refused to apply this rule to a case where a product thus imported and offered for sale had 
been manufactured in the exporting Member State by the holder of a compulsory license 
granted with respect to a parallel patent. 
 
 In distinguishing the two situations, the Court stressed the fact
64
 that, when subject to a 
compulsory license, the patentee cannot be deemed to have consented to the operation of the 
licensee. The compulsory license, in effect, deprives the patent owner of his right to 
determine freely the conditions under which he markets his products. The Court concluded: 
 
 "As the Court held most recently in its judgment of 14 July 1981,
65
 the substance of 
a patent right lies essentially in according the inventor an exclusive right of first placing 
the product on the market so as to allow him to obtain the reward for his creative effort. 
It is therefore necessary to allow the patent proprietor to prevent the importation and 
marketing of products manufactured under a compulsory license in order to protect the 
substance of his exclusive rights under his patent."
66
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 Judgment of 20 Jan. 1981, Joined Cases 55/80 and 57/80, Musik-Vertrieb Membran 
GmbH and K-tel International v. GEMA, [1981] E.C.R. 147, paras. 12-13 (discussed in § 
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  I.e., former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 28 and 30, now replaced by F.E.U. Treaty, Arts. 34 
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 Judgment of 9 July 1985, Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, [1985] E.C.R. 
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  [d]--Exhaustion Applicable Only Between Member States. What if a parallel 
import is made from the Internal Market or into it? On the one hand, there are the cases of 
imports between E.U. and E.E.A. Member States.  On the other hand, there are the cases of 
imports from a country belonging neither to the Union nor to the European Economic Area. 
In the former case, exhaustion applies; in the latter, it does not. 
 
 At the threshold, it should be noted that the E.E.A. Agreement extends exhaustion rules 
throughout the European Economic Area.
67
 By virtue of Article 2 of Protocol 28 to the 
E.E.A. Agreement, the EFTA countries are obligated to introduce such rules imposing the 
exhaustion of rights as exist in E.U. law. As a result, owners and licensees of intellectual 
property rights will not be able to rely on rights of distribution to prevent the importation of 
goods into one E.E.A. state when these goods have been put on the market in another E.E.A. 
state by the owner of the rights or with his consent.
68
  
 
 An early trademark case of imports from outside any Member State was not found 
appropriate for applying the European exhaustion doctrine.  EMI Records and the U.S. firm 
CBS Inc., both used identical Columbia trademarks, which historically had a common origin. 
EMI Records maintained that the importation and sale of CBS sound recordings bearing the 
Columbia trademark into the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Germany infringed the rights 
which EMI owned in that trademark in those Member States, as well as in the Internal Market 
as a whole. CBS, which owned the Columbia trademark in the United States, asserted the 
Eurodefense that the principles of E.C. law, now of E.U. law, especially the provisions on the 
free movement of goods,
69
 prevented plaintiff from exercising the national rights in the mark 
which it claimed in the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Germany.  The Court of Justice, 
however, pointing out that these provisions expressly use the words "between Member 
States," ruled that "the exercise of a trademark right in order to prevent the marketing of 
products coming from a third country under an identical mark, even if this constitutes a 
measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction, does not affect the free 
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movement of goods between Member States,” nor does it “in fact jeopardize the unity of the 
Common Market.”70 
 
 The Polydor case was a more difficult one, but with a comparable decision.
71
  It 
concerned unauthorized parallel imports of sound recordings from Portugal into the United 
Kingdom. At the time Portugal was not yet an E.C. member, but there did exist an agreement 
between Portugal and the former Community which aimed at consolidating and extending 
their economic relations. Articles 14(2) and 23 of this agreement tracked the language of the 
relevant provisions of the former E.C. treaty
72
 quite closely. The importer then argued that 
the well-established case law of the Court concerning these provisions should apply to this 
case as well. The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the similarity of treaty terms 
was not a sufficient reason for applying that case law, developed for the Internal Market, 
outside its borders. The Court stated: "The scope of that case law must indeed be determined 
in the light of the Community's objectives and activities . . . by establishing a common market 
and progressively approximating the economic policies of the Member States, [the Treaty] 
seeks to unite national markets into a single market having the characteristics of a domestic 
market."
73
 However, since that rationale did not motivate an agreement with a third country,  
the exhaustion rule was not triggered by a sale in that country. 
 
  [e]--No Exhaustion After First Sale Outside Internal Market. While judgments 
of the Court of Justice broadened the exhaustion of copyright and of neighboring rights inside 
the Internal Market, directive provisions later enacted by the Council and Parliament reaffirm 
this rule and also preclude applying the exhaustion rule upon the sale of copies outside the 
Internal Market.
74
   
 
 Directives now limit the application of such international exhaustion.  In the field of 
copyright, although less frequently than in trademark law, some form of international 
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exhaustion had once occasionally applied in some countries.
75
 That is, once a hard copy or 
product had been sold anywhere in the world, the rightholder could no longer prevent its 
importation and distribution inside such countries.  Article 4(c) of the Software Directive, 
Article 9(2) of the Rental Directive, Article 5(c) of the Database Directive, and Article 4(2) 
of the Information-Society Directive, have progressively restricted the scope of the possible 
international exhaustion of rights relative to copies of works and other protected media 
productions entering the Internal Market.
76
     
 
 There had been much debate about how to construe such directive provisions.  Some 
opinions would have still left Member States free to choose international exhaustion, thus 
minimizing barriers to cross-border trade in copies and goods.
77
  However, official glosses 
and other commentators have supported a much broader reading of these provisions.  It is 
argued that, if a Member State allowed for international exhaustion in cases within the scope 
of the pertinent directives, the functioning of the Internal Market could be subject to negative 
effects.  In particular, rightholders could run the risk that copies lawfully sold abroad and 
then freely imported into some Member States, but not into others, might undercut their 
markets for the copies in some parts of the Internal Market.  Therefore, some commentators 
and nearly all the courts have favored limiting exhaustion to the Internal Market for all copies 
of protected works and media productions that come under the directives.
78
    
 
 The Silhouette decision now confirms a construction precluding international exhaustion 
with regard to subject matters of pertinent directives.
79
  The Austrian firm Silhouette 
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v. California Trading Company, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 331, also in [1998] GRUR Int. 309, note 
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Rights and on Piracy, 105 (London, 1993). 
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 Judgment of 16 July 1998, Case C-335/96, Silhouette International Schmied GmbH 
& Co. KG v. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH, [1998] E.C.R. I-4799.  See also Judgment 
of 1 July 1999, Case C-173/98, Sebago Inc. v. G.B.-Unic, [1999] E.C.R. I-4103 (clarifying 
scope of Silhouette ruling in holding that the trademark owner’s consent must relate to each 
individual item of the product in respect of which exhaustion is claimed, but that there is no 
consent whenever similar goods bearing the same trade mark have already been marketed in 
the E.E.A. with the rightholder’s consent).  
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produces expensive, high-quality, and fashionable eyeglass frames that are marketed 
worldwide, while Hartlauer sells cheaper frames widely in Austria.  In October of 1995 
Silhouette sold 21,000 outmoded eyeglass frames to a Bulgarian company at a discount, but 
on the condition that these frames only be sold in Bulgaria and ex-Soviet states.  In December 
of 1995, after Hartlauer had bought such eyeglass frames cheaply, Silhouette sought an 
injunction to restrain Hartlauer from selling the frames at a discount under the Silhouette 
trademark in Austria.  Hartlauer contended that Silhouette’s trademark was internationally 
exhausted by its sale of the frames in Bulgaria, and Silhouette countered that the Trademark 
Directive only allowed for E.E.A.-wide exhaustion.  That is, trademark rights would be 
exhausted only when products branded with the trademark at issue have been put on the 
market in the E.E.A. by the trademark owner or with his consent, while the rights survived a 
sale outside the E.E.A.  The Court indeed decided that Article 7(1) of the Trademark 
Directive, imposing E.E.A.-wide exhaustion, prohibited national rules to contrary effect, 
reasoning that only this interpretation fully achieves the directive purpose of safeguarding the 
Internal Market.
80
  
 
 The Court of Justice has further refined this case law by considering the manner in which 
the “consent” of the trademark proprietor to marketing within the E.E.A. should be 
expressed. According to the Court, this intention will normally be gathered from an express 
statement of consent, but it may in some cases be inferred from facts and circumstances 
surrounding the placing of the goods on the market outside the E.E.A.  However, such 
circumstances must unequivocally demonstrate that the proprietor has renounced his rights in 
the E.E.A., and such a waiver may in no event be inferred from mere silence.
81
  The 
Commission proposed, inter alia, to infer consent from first marketing in an E.E.A. country, 
whether or not the goods were covered by a trade mark there.  The Commission also wanted 
to clarify that there was no exhaustion in the case where the rightholder had been obligated 
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by law to grant a license.  However, by ruling in fact-intensive terms, the Court did not accept 
or reject the Commission’s suggestions or its economic analysis.82   
 
 The Court of Justice has further clarified that, where the trademark owner imports his 
goods “with a view to selling them in the E.E.A. or offers them for sale in the E.E.A.,” he 
does not put them on the market for the purposes of Article 7(1) of the Directive, since such 
acts do not transfer to third parties the right to dispose of the goods bearing the trademark, 
nor do they allow the proprietor to realize the economic value of the trademark.  However, at 
the same time, the Court also made clear that E.E.A.-wide exhaustion may not be precluded 
by a clause which, appearing in a contract between the trademark owner and the buyer of his 
goods, subjects the latter’s right to territorial limitations.83 
 
 In L’Oréal v. eBay, the Court held that when the trademark holder intends items to be 
sold outside the E.E.A. and the offer for sale of such trademarked products by another trader 
is targeted at consumers in the E.E.A., where the trade mark right subsists, there is no 
exhaustion. However, the mere fact that a website is accessible from the territory covered by 
the trademark in the E.E.A. is not a sufficient basis for concluding that the offers for sale 
displayed there are targeted at consumers in that territory. The assessment must be done on a 
case-by-case basis by national courts, a relevant factor being information about the 
geographic areas to which the seller is willing to dispatch the product.
84
 
 
  [f]--Border Controls for Imports.  Distribution rights may then be differently 
exhausted depending on whether the goods are imported from one E.U. Member State 
through or into another or from outside the Internal Market altogether.  E.U. and national 
laws, pursuant to the TRIPs provisions, may require border controls to stop the importation of 
infringing copies and products.
85
  May such border controls violate the E.U. freedom of 
commerce by excessively burdening the circulation of goods within the Internal Market?   
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 The Court of Justice considered this possibility in an action which the Commission 
brought against France for a declaration that border controls in France violated the former 
E.C. Treaty.
86
  The French Intellectual Property Code allowed for the detention by customs 
authorities of possibly infringing goods at the French border irrespective of whether the 
goods were lawfully manufactured in one Member State and intended, following transit 
through French territory, to be placed on the market in another Member State.  The Court 
recognized that Article 14 of the Design Directive,
87
 as secondary E.C. law, now secondary 
E.U. law, authorizes Member States to maintain their legislation relating to the protection of 
designs of spare parts for automobiles.  Nonetheless, that possibility existed only to the extent 
that the national legislation was compatible with the relevant treaty provisions, that is, with 
primary E.C., now primary E.U., law.
88
  However, the interdiction of the mere transit of 
unauthorized copies was found not to form part of the “specific subject-matter” of design 
rights. The Court accordingly disallowed border controls stopping such copies at the border.
89
 
 
 [3]--Communication Right Subject to Fact-Intensive Case Law 
 
 As seen above, in the Internal Market, Articles 34 through 36 of the F.E.U. Treaty
90
 
assure the freedom of cross-border commerce in goods, while Article 56 of the F.E.U. 
Treaty
91
 assures the freedom of such commerce in services.
92
 Perhaps fortuitously, this 
distinction between goods and services seems to mirror the distinction which copyright laws 
draw between exploitation in material and immaterial forms, for example, between marketing 
hard copies and communicating works or media productions, for example, via broadcasts, 
cable, or online. Rather than apply the exhaustion rule rather categorically as it has in cases of 
hard copies, the Court has varied in its approaches to cases of such communication to the 
public across borders in the Internal Market.
93
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  [a]--Right Exercisable Against Unauthorized Cablecast.  In the Coditel I case, 
the French film Le Boucher had been licensed, on the one hand, to be televised in Germany 
and, on the other, to Ciné Vog Films to show the film exclusively in theatrical screenings 
and, forty months after the first screening, in television broadcasts in Belgium. The Belgian 
cable company Coditel picked up the German broadcast of the film and retransmitted it to its 
subscribers in Belgium, thus infringing Belgian copyright in the film. Coditel, however, 
raised the Eurodefense of its freedom to provide services, arguing that Belgian copyright law 
ought not preclude it from retransmitting a work released into Belgian territory. The court 
decided that this freedom did not preclude Ciné Vog, as exclusive licensee of the Belgian 
copyright, from stopping Coditel’s unauthorized retransmission to the Belgian public.94   
 
 In its decision, the Court distinguished between the exploitation of a “cinematographic 
film . . . by performances which may be infinitely repeated” and the exploitation of “literary 
and artistic works” placed “at the disposal of the public” in “material form . . ., as in the case 
of books or records."
95
 The Court went on to emphasize that copyright owners have 
legitimate interests in calculating the fees due for licensing a film based on the actual or 
probable number of performances it will have; accordingly, they also have an interest in 
assuring that the "windows" for theatrical screenings and for television broadcasts do not 
interfere with each other. Thus, according to the Court, "[t]he right of a copyright owner and 
his assigns to require fees for any showing of a film is part of the essential function of 
copyright in this type of literary and artistic work," the exercise of which it declined to 
restrain.
96
  In concluding, the Court emphasized that there had been no "arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States" in this case where 
licensing of performances is often limited within "geographical limits" that "coincide with 
national frontiers."
97
  
 
  [b]--Right Not Exercisable Upon Authorized Satellite Relay.  The Court was 
confronted with still-more complex facts in the Premier League case.
98
 The Football 
                                                                                                                                                       
subject to the rules for the free movement of goods, and performing rights, subject to the 
rules for the provision of services, was commercially artificial, although they are governed by 
different parts of the EC treaty.”). 
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Association Premier League organizes and films football matches, and it claims copyright in 
works embedded in the matches and related rights in broadcasts of the matches as filmed. It 
licenses such broadcasts exclusively in territories of E.U. Member States and contractually 
requires its licensees to prevent them from being viewed outside their respective territories by 
encryption and by restricting the sale of decoder cards; however, in this case, defendants had 
bought decoder cards abroad to show broadcasts in the United Kingdom. To start, the Court 
applied Article 56 of the F.E.U. Treaty assuring the free provision of services, given that such 
freedom benefits both providers and beneficiaries of services which, under the facts, were 
found prominent compared to the supply of decoder cards.
99
 The Court distinguished the 
Coditel I case by noting that, here in the Premier League case, the broadcasts into the 
Member State in question, the United Kingdom, had been authorized.
100
  Indeed, it held that 
freedom of services precluded the Premier League from contractually restricting access to the 
broadcasts by limiting purchases of decoder cards, even in another Member State.
101
 
 
 This holding had to take account of the settled case law that any Eurodefense of freedom 
of commerce may not preclude the exercise of any intellectual property right exercised within 
its specific objective or aim.
102
 The Court reconstrued such an objective by noting that, as far 
as copyright is concerned, it is only supposed to assure rightholders of remuneration that is 
“reasonable in relation to the economic value of the service provided.”103 In the case at hand, 
namely broadcasts, the Court reasoned, this criterion translates into the actual or potential 
number of people who enjoy or wish to enjoy the broadcasts in the language they wish, of 
which the Premier League and its licensees took account in an auction in the light of decoder 
cards sold per territory. The Court concluded that premium prices paid to the rightholders 
resulted from their territorially exclusive agreements which, contrary to the Treaty, partition 
the Internal Market, leading to more than appropriate remuneration: accordingly, it found that 
the restriction on using foreign decoder cards was not justified in light of the objective of 
intellectual property rights.
104
 The Court also dismissed other arguments for such restrictions, 
notably that they were needed to encourage the public to attend matches especially of lower 
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divisions
105
 and to avoid purchase of decoder cards on false premises or for commercial 
purposes.
106
  
 
  [c]--Other Cases: Public Performances; Rentals; Internet. The distinction 
between exploitation in material and immaterial forms has been ensconced in directive 
provisions that codify the exhaustion rule in the field of copyright and related rights as to 
hard copies,
107
 but not to broadcasting, cablecasting, or making a work accessible online.
108
 
As seen in this section, the Court of Justice has assured freedom of commerce in goods by 
limiting the exercise of copyright categorically to exhaust distribution rights after the sale of 
hard copies in the Internal Market, but it has not thus extended this approach to all cases of 
rights of communication to the public. For example, the Court of Justice did not preclude a 
collecting society from imposing royalties both for the reproduction of recordings and for 
playing them publicly in discotheques.
109
 Further hard cases have arisen or might arise. 
 
 Rentals constitute a hard case, in which hard copies are disposed of for limited periods of 
time, effectively to allow showings of works or recordings to members of the public.
110
  In a 
case where the rental of certain videodisks had been authorized in the United Kingdom but 
not outside it, a Danish association of videogram distributors brought suit against the 
enterprise Laserdisken which, after importing such video disks from the United Kingdom, 
offered them for rental in Denmark. The Court of Justice decided that E.C. law, now E.U. 
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law, including the Rental Directive, allowed rightholders to prohibit copies, authorized for 
rental in one Member State, from being thus offered for rental in another.  It reasoned that the 
commercial release of copies, say, of a motion picture or sound recording, does not in itself 
legitimate other unauthorized acts of exploitation of the protected work or production, such 
as rental.  Just like the performance right, the rental right may, by its nature, be exploited 
repeatedly, in potentially unlimited transactions.  It would be rendered meaningless if it were 
exhausted as soon as an embodiment was first offered for rental.
111
 
 
 It remains to be seen how the Coditel, Premier League, and other judgments here 
canvassed will apply when, on the Internet, works and other productions are exploited in 
many Member States at once.
112
 The Commission has already focused on the conditions 
under which national collecting societies license such cross-border online commerce.
113
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§ 3 E.U. Competition Law  
 
 As pointed out above, the E.C. Treaty aimed, and now the F.E.U. Treaty aims, at 
achieving undistorted competition in the Internal Market.
1
 Accordingly, in addition to 
assuring the free movement of goods and services, E.C. law, now E.U. law, has developed 
competition rules that, inter alia, have been adapted and applied to contracts and conduct 
relative to intellectual property.  This section will start by surveying these rules, as well as 
administrative means for enforcing them, and then consider their application in the field of 
copyright. 
 
 [1]--Basic Considerations  
 
 E.U. competition law has a double, but interrelated, purpose.
2
 On the one hand, its rules 
are designed to break down national barriers and create an "integrated" Internal Market where 
conditions of free competition prevail. On the other, over the long term, these rules should 
encourage the growth of "efficient" firms and sectors of the Internal Market at the expense of 
those less able to meet the demands of the open marketplace.  Where rights of intellectual 
property are in question, the relevant effects extend to culture and technology.
3
   
 
                                                 
  
 
1
 See § 1[2][b] supra.  
 
  
2
 For commentary on such competition law and its economics, see J. Faull and A. 
Nikpay (eds.), The EC Law of Competition (Oxford Univ. Press, 2007) (with contributors 
employed by the Directorate General for Competition of the Commission); I. van Bael and J.-
F. Bellis (eds.), Competition Law of the European Community (Kluwer Law Internat’l, 2004); 
R. Wish, Competition Law (LexisNexis Butterworth, 2003); A. Pappalardo, Il Diritto 
Comunitario della Concorrenza: Profile Sostanziali (Community Law on Competition: 
Substantive Aspects) (Wolters Kluwer Italia, 2007); C. Bellamy and G. Child, European 
Community Law of Competition (Oxford Univ. Press, 2008); W. Wils, Efficiency and Justice 
in European Antitrust Enforcement (Hart Publ., 2008); E. Elhauge and D. Geradin, Global 
Competition Law and Economics (Hart Publ., 2007); M. van der Woude, C. Jones, and X. 
Lewis, EC Competition Law Handbook (Sweet & Maxwell, 2008). 
 
 
3
 For comparative analyses, see S. Anderman (ed.), The Interface between Intellectual 
Property Rights and Competition Policy (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007); E. Arezzo, 
“Intellectual Property Rights at the Crossroad Between Monopolization and Abuse of 
Dominant Position: American and European Approaches Compared,” 24 John Marshall J. 
Computer & Information Law 455 (2006). 
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 This subsection will broach the basic competition rules set out in Articles 101 and 102 of 
the F.E.U. Treaty,
4
 to which "undertakings," for example, firms, joint ventures, and other 
enterprises, are subject.
5
  It will in turn consider how the Commission may apply these 
rulings both in general categories of cases and in specific cases arising in the Internal Market. 
Finally, it will indicate how the Commission works with authorities in Member States, the 
European Economic Area, and internationally. 
 
  [a]--Article 101 of the F.E.U. Treaty. Article 101 of the F.E.U. Treaty,
6
 in its first 
and second paragraphs, provides as follows: 
 
“1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all 
agreements between undertakings,
7
 decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices
8
 which may affect trade between Member States and which have 
                                                 
 
4
 Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 81 and 82. See also F.E.U. Treaty, Art. 
3(1)(b) (providing that "[t]he Union shall have exclusive competence in . . . the establishing 
of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market").   
 
 
5
 See, generally, Judgment of 12 Sept. 2000, Joined Cases C-180/98 and C-184/98, 
Pavel Pavlov, [1999] E.C.R. I-6451 (explaining the notion of an “undertaking” generally 
subject to E.C. competition rules). 
 
 
6
  Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Art. 81. 
 
  
7
 See, generally, Judgment of 6 Jan. 2004, Case C-2/01 P, Commission v. Bayer, 
[2004] E.C.R. I-23, affirming Court of First Instance, Judgment of 26 Oct. 2000, Case T-
41/96, Bayer v. Commission, [2000] E.C.R. II-3383 (distilling case law regarding the sense 
of an “agreement” which arises whenever the market behavior of two or more undertakings 
conforms to a joint intention, without any necessarily binding contract, or where a measure of 
one is shown to have received the tacit acquiescence of the others); Judgment of 11 July 
2006, Case P-74/04, Commission v. Volkswagen, [2006] E.C.R. I-6585 (clarifying further 
the notion of "agreement" in the presence of seemingly "unilateral" measures by a supplier). 
 
 
8
 See, generally, Judgment of 7 Jan. 2004, Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-
211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217 P, C-219 P, [2004] E.C.R. I-123, affirming Court of First 
Instance, Judgment of 15 March 2000, Joined Cases T-25, 26, 30-32, 34-39, 42-46, 48, 50-
56, 68-71, 87, 88, 103, 104-105, Cement cartel cases, [2000] E.C.R. II-0491 (resuming the 
case law on point: a concerted practice is supposed to involve reciprocal contracts between 
competitors, notably where the disclosure by a competitor to another of future intentions or 
conduct on the market has been sought or, at least, accepted by the other competitor).   
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as their object or effect the prevention, restriction
9
 or distortion of competition 
within the internal market, and in particular those which: 
“(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading 
conditions; 
“(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
“(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
“(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
“(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.” 
“2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be 
automatically void.”10 
 
 The third paragraph of Article 101
11
 then limits the scope of its first paragraph by 
clarifying that its provisions may be “declared inapplicable in” the following categories of 
cases:
12
 
 
“-- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
“-- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, 
“-- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, which contributes to 
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or 
                                                 
 
9
 See O. Odudu, “Interpreting Article 81(1): demonstrating restrictive effect,” [2001] 
E.L. Rev. 261-274; O. Odudu, “Interpreting Article 81(1): the object requirement revisited,” 
[2001] E.L. Rev. 379. 
 
  
10
 See, generally, Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 
Art. 1, O.J. 2003 No. L 1 (providing, in its first paragraph, that “[a]greements, decisions and 
concerted practices caught by Article 81(1) of the Treaty [now Article 101(1) of the F.E.U. 
Treaty] which do not satisfy the conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [now Article 101(3) 
of the F.E.U. Treaty] shall be prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being required” and, 
in its second paragraph, that “[a]greements, decisions and concerted practices caught by 
Article 81(1) of the Treaty [now Article 101(1) of the F.E.U. Treaty] which satisfy the 
conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [now Article 101(3) of the F.E.U. Treaty] shall not 
be prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being required”) (discussed further in § 
3[1][c][iii] infra). 
  
 
11
 Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Art. 81. 
 
 
12
 See Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) [now Article 101(3) 
of the F.E.U. Treaty], O.J. 2004 No. C 101. 
 
EU: p. 60 
economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, 
and which does not: 
“(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable 
to the attainment of these objectives; 
“(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of 
a substantial part of the products in question.” 
 
  [b]--Article 102 of the F.E.U. Treaty. Article 102 of the F.E.U. Treaty
13
 prohibits 
“[a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market 
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so 
far as it may affect trade between Member States.” It then states that "[s]uch abuse may, in 
particular, consist in" the following:  
 
“(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions; 
“(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
“(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
“(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.” 
 
 According to the Court of Justice, "dominance," for the purposes of this provision relates 
to "a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent 
effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of 
its consumers."
14
  This definition contains two essential elements: on the one hand, the ability 
to prevent competition; on the other, the ability to behave independently.  As regards the 
notion of "relevant market," it should be noted that the Commission, as a general rule, bases 
its analysis on the substitutability of demand: in other words, the relevant market is made up 
of those products or services which the consumer considers mutually interchangeable in a 
given area, in particular as regards use and price.  Supply-side substitutability may also be 
taken into account when defining markets in situations where its impact is equivalent to that 
of demand substitution in terms of effectiveness and immediacy.
15
 
                                                 
 
13
 Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Art. 82. 
 
 
14
 See Judgment of 14 Feb. 1978, Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, [1978] 
E.C.R. 207. 
 
  
15
 See Court of First Instance, Judgment of 30 March 2000, Case T-65/96, Kish Glass 
& Co. v. Commission, [2000] E.C.R. II-1885; also Commission Notice on the definition of 
relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, O.J. 1997 No. C 372. 
 
EU: p. 61 
 
 "Abuse" covers direct and indirect control.  Direct control may take place through unfair 
conduct, for example, where a dominant firm has taken advantage of its market power to 
exploit those with whom it deals or has dealt.  Indirect control may take place through the 
prohibition of anticompetitive conduct by firms already dominant, and such conduct may 
make further exploitation possible in the long term.
16
  The Court of Justice has repeatedly 
held that the concept of abuse is an objective one: behavior can be abusive even where the 
dominant undertaking had no intention of infringing the pertinent provisions or of harming 
the market structure.
17
   
 
  [c]--Commission Regulation and Enforcement. The Commission is responsible 
for applying Articles 101 and 102 of the F.E.U. Treaty
18
 on a E.U.-wide basis.
19
 Most 
notably, with regard to E.U. competition rules, the Commission may grant exemptions, 
investigate ex officio or on complaints, and reach decisions and grant relief.
20
   
 
   [i]--Rule-Making; Guidance. The Commission has been empowered, since 
1962,
21
 to exempt agreements in individual cases from the application of the first paragraph 
of Article 81 of the former E.C. Treaty, now Article 101 of the F.E.U. Treaty. Furthermore, 
subsequent Council Regulations
22
 also empower the Commission to declare, in its own 
                                                 
 
16
 See I. Stelzer, "Coping with Market Power in the Modern Era," White Paper 
prepared for the Hudson Institute in Washington D.C. (Spring 2007); Commission, Guidance 
on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, O.J. 2009 No. C 45. 
 
 
17
 See Judgment of 13 Feb. 1979, Case 85/76, Hoffmann LaRoche v. Commission, 
[1979] E.C.R. 461.  
 
 
18
 Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 81 and 82. 
 
 
19
 As indicated above, private parties may invoke, before judicial instances of the 
Union and of Member States, Articles 101 and 102 of the F.E.U. Treaty [Articles 81 and 82 
of the former E.C. Treaty] as "directly applicable" provisions that confer rights and duties on 
them. See § 1[2][c] supra. 
 
 
20
 As indicated below, however, the jurisdiction of the Commission is not fully 
exclusive, since authorities of the Member States have some, but not all, of its powers on 
national levels.  See § 3[1][c][iv] infra. 
 
     
21
 Council Regulation 17/62, Art. 9, O.J. 1962 No. 13.  
 
     
22
 For an itemization of critical Council regulations in this regard, see Article 29(1) of 
Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, O.J. 2003 No. L 1 (discussed 
further in § 3[1][c][iii] infra). 
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Regulations, that this paragraph need not apply to certain categories of agreements meeting 
the criteria of the third paragraph which follows it.
23
  
 
 In addition, the Commission issues communications, notices, and guidelines that, unlike 
regulations, do not set out legislation as such: notably, they do not set out binding rules. 
These non-regulatory documents may take different forms and pursue different objectives 
that, in practice, are not easily distinguishable and often overlap.
24
 These documents may also 
summarize how the Commission understands judicial decisions interpreting competition law.  
Often given deference by judicial instances, these non-regulatory documents may vary in 
their legal effects.
25
 
 
   [ii]--Methodology: Block Exemptions. The Commission has developed a 
methodology for exempting, en bloc, types of agreements from its enforcement of 
competition rules.  This chapter can only broach the types of criteria which the Commission 
typically uses in such rule-making, without setting out all the complexity of the rules 
themselves.
26
 Most notably, the scope of the Commission exemptions often turns both on 
criteria of permissible market shares and on criteria of impermissible contractual language.  
 
 In 2001, the Commission revised its de minimis Notice, which indicates cases of lesser 
importance, typically of “[s]mall and medium-sized undertakings,” in which the Commission 
may not “institute proceedings.”27 Reflecting an economic approach, the revised Notice sets 
out de minimis thresholds of market shares below which, absent so-called hardcore 
restrictions, it need not exercise oversight. Where the aggregate market share is held by 
actually or potentially competing parties to an agreement, the threshold is 10% of the relevant 
market or, for non-competing parties, 15% of such a market.  Where networks of agreements 
produce any cumulative anticompetitive effect, lower thresholds apply; in any event, 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
     
23
 For these criteria, see § 3[1][a] in fine supra.  
 
     
24
 An updated survey of these documents can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/legislation.html.   
  
  
25
  For further analysis, see B. Smulders, "Institutional Aspects of European 
Commission Guidance in the Area of Antitrust Law," [2009] Competition Policy 
International 6. 
 
 
26
 See also § 3[2][b] infra (indicating commentary with regard to the Technology 
Transfer Block Exception Regulation, which concerns the licensing of intellectual property). 
 
 
27
 Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably 
restrict competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
O.J. 2001 No. C 368.  
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adjustments may be made in the light of the passage of time.
28
 However, if an agreement 
contains any one of a list of hardcore restrictions, notably those concerning horizontal and 
vertical agreements, it may be subject to Commission enforcement.
29
 
 
 This same methodology is used in other Commission instruments.  The following 
examples illustrate the types of criteria with potential relevance to copyright cases:   
 
+ Vertical agreements and concerted practices are exempted between two or more 
undertakings that take up to a 30% share of the relevant market, subject to limited 
conditions and to the absence of hardcore restrictions of specified types within 
contractual terms.
30
    
 
+ Block exemptions may apply: for example, the Technology Transfer Block Exemption 
Regulation, coupled with accompanying guidelines, creates safe harbors for the licensing 
of know-how, software copyright, and patents.
31
 
 
+ Guidelines and other non-regulatory documents complete such regulations as are 
pertinent to licensing intellectual property as well as to research and development.
32
 
 
   [iii]--Procedure: Investigations; Decisions; Remedies. On December 16, 
2002, the Council of Ministers adopted the Regulation on the implementation of the rules on 
competition.
33
  This Modernization or Enforcement Regulation reduced the administrative 
burden on the Commission by simplifying and decentralizing the enforcement of competition 
rules. This Enforcement Regulation is intended to enable the Commission to refocus its 
activities on serious infringements within the Internal Market and to allocate some 
                                                 
 
28
  Id., Arts. 7-9. 
 
 
29
  Id., Art. 11. 
 
 
30
 Commission Regulation (EC) 330/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and 
concerted practices, O.J. 2010 No. L 102. 
 
 
31
 Commission Regulation (EC) 772/2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements, O.J. 2004 No. L 203 (discussed in § 
3[2][b] infra).   
 
 
32
 See § 3[1][c][i] supra.  
 
 
33
 Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (hereinafter the 
Enforcement Regulation), O.J. 2003 No. L 1.    
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enforcement functions to Member States’ competition authorities.34  Only the high points of 
current procedure can be touched upon:
35
 
 
+ Initiating proceedings: The Commission retains the power to commence proceedings to 
enforce E.U. competition rules, whether acting on its own initiative or on complaints by 
Member States or by private parties with legitimate interests at stake.
36
  It may also 
withdraw a case from a national competition authority of a Member State, for example, 
where it disagrees with the authority's decisions or methods of implementation.
37
   
 
+ Investigative powers: The Commission has broad investigative powers.  Given specified 
economic trends, it may conduct inquiry into economic sectors or into particular 
agreements across such sectors, requiring pertinent information of interested parties who 
may be subject to penalties for failure to comply.
38
 The Commission may conduct 
searches on business premises and even into the private homes of managers, directors, 
and employees, but these searches may be subject to judicial oversight.
39
  
 
+ Decisions and appeals: In individual cases before it, the Commission acts by issuing 
Decisions, from which parties individually affected may appeal to the General Court
40
 by 
virtue of Article 263 of the F.E.U. Treaty.
41
 A further appeal can be had to the Court of 
Justice on points of law only, and the Court may also give rulings when proceedings are 
started in national courts that, at their discretion, may request the Court of Justice for a 
                                                 
 
34
 On the decentralization of enforcement functions to Member-State authorities, see § 
3[1][c][iv] infra.   
 
 
35
 For commentary, see C.-D. Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu, “The Modernisation of E.C. 
Antitrust Law: Consequences for the Future Role and Function of the E.C. Courts,” [2002] 
E.C.L.R. 72; E. Paulis and C. Gauer, “La réforme des règles d’application des articles 81 et 
82 du Traité” (Revision of the Rules of Application of Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty), 
[2003] Journal des tribunaux Droit européen 35; A. Riley, “EC Antitrust Modernization: the 
Commission does Very Nicely--Thank You!,” [2003] E.C.L.R. 657.  
 
 
36
 See Enforcement Regulation, Art. 7.  
 
 
37
 See  id., Art. 11(6). 
 
 
38
 See id., Arts. 17-18. 
 
 
39
 See id., Arts. 20-21. 
 
 
40
  Previously, the Court of First Instance. 
 
 
41
 Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Art. 230. 
 
EU: p. 65 
ruling under Article 267 of the F.E.U. Treaty.
42
 Thus a binding interpretation of the 
F.E.U. Treaty or regulations may be obtained in the case at bar.
43
 
 
+ Interim and final relief: The Commission has the power to fashion interim and final 
relief for infringements of E.U. competition rules.  In a case where serious and 
irreparable damage to competition is threatened, the Commission may, on the basis of a 
prima facie finding of infringement, impose interim measures for a specified period of 
time.
44
 Ultimately, the Commission may order the termination of infringements, either 
through relief compelling changes of behavior or the restructuring of undertakings, 
although behavioral remedies are favored over structural remedies where they can 
achieve equivalent effects without imposing greater burdens on the parties.
45
  The 
Commission continues to have the power to impose fines and periodic penalties on 
parties who violate competition rules.
46
 It has published notices specifying the conditions 
under which such sanctions may be avoided or attenuated.
47
 
 
   [iv]--Member-State Enforcement; International Cooperation.  Under the 
Enforcement Regulation just discussed,
48
 the Commission no longer exercises ex ante control 
over restricted practices and leaves it largely to national authorities and courts to enforce the 
                                                 
 
42
 Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Art. 234. 
 
  
43
 For commentary, see O. Odudu, “Article 81(3) Discretion and Direct Effect,” [2002] 
E.C.L.R. 17; A.P. Komninos, “New prospects for private enforcement of EC Competition 
law: Courage v. Crehan and the Community right to damages,” [2002] C.M.L. Rev. 447. On 
the relations between the Commission and Court generally, see § 1[1][c] supra. 
 
 
44
 See Enforcement Regulation, Art. 8.  See, e.g., § 3[2][c][iii] infra (discussing the 
I.M.S. case, in which an interim order, ultimately withdrawn, was made to compel licensing). 
 
 
45
 See Enforcement Regulation, Art. 7. 
 
 
46
 See id., Arts. 23 and 24. See, e.g., § 3[2][c][iv] infra (discussing the Microsoft case, 
in which significant fines and penalties were imposed).  See also Commission Green Paper, 
Damages actions for breach of Articles 81 and 82 EC, 19 Dec. 2005, COM(2005) 672, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html (identifying 
the principal obstacles to a more effective system of damage claims and to set out different 
options to facilitate such claims for breaches of E.C., now E.U., antitrust law).  
 
 
47
 See, e.g., E.C. Commission, Leniency Notice, O.J. 2006 No. C 298 (seeking to 
encourage cartel participants to cooperate with the Commission by disclosing information 
regarding illegal agreements as soon as possible in order to obtain a reduction in their likely 
fines). 
  
 
48
 See § 3[1][d][iii] supra.  
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competition rules ex post in most cases.
49
  The fact that national courts and authorities may 
apply Article 101 of the F.E.U. Treaty
50
 should accelerate the convergence of national laws 
and E.U. law on point and thus simplify the task of enterprises in determining commercial 
strategy.
51
  
 
 The European Community, now the Union, and the United States concluded two 
agreements in relation to their respective competition laws: one in 1991, the so-called Co-
operation Agreement, as amended in 1995;
52
 and another in 1998, the so-called Positive 
Comity Agreement.
53
  The agreements provide for the exchange of information between the 
respective competition authorities, the notification to the other party of the cases handled by 
each competition authority, and rules on negative and positive comity.  In cases of negative 
comity, when one of the parties is adversely affected by anticompetitive activities 
impermissible in the territory of the other, the party adversely affected may request the 
other’s competition authority to take action.54  
 
  [d]--Competition Law Under the E.E.A. Agreement.  The competition rules set 
out in Articles 53 and 54 of the E.E.A. Agreement
55
 operate in tandem with Articles 101 and 
102 of the F.E.U. Treaty.
56
 Articles 53 and 54 of the E.E.A. Agreement incorporate the 
                                                 
 
49
 For commentary, see C.-D. Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu (eds.), “Constructing the EU 
Network of Competition Authorities,” [2002] European Competition Law Annual; J.S. Venit, 
“Brave New World: the Modernization of Enforcement under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty,” [2003] C.M.L. Rev. 562;  A.P. Komninos, “Article 234 EC and National 
Competition Authorities in the Era of Decentralization,” [2004] E.L. Rev. 106; G.V.S. 
McCurdy, “The Impact of Modernization of the EU Competition Law System on the Courts 
and Private Enforcement of the Competition Laws,” [2004] E.I.P.R. 509. 
 
 
50
 Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Art. 81. 
 
 
51
 See  Enforcement Regulation, Art. 3 (rules governing the interface between Articles 
101 and 102 of the F.E.U. Treaty [Articles 81 and 82 of the former E.C. Treaty], on the one 
hand, and national competition laws, on the other).  
 
   
52
 O.J. 1995 No. L 95.  
 
       
53
 O.J. 1998 No. L 173. 
 
 
54
 For an overview of the implementation of both agreements, see Commission, 
Thirtieth Report on Competition Policy (2000), pp. 291-297.  
 
      
55
 On the E.E.A. Agreement generally, see § 1[1][b][iii] supra. 
 
 
56
 Corresponding to former E.C. Treaty, Arts. 81 and 82. 
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language of these provisions, with changes merely applying that language to "trade between 
Contracting Parties" and competition "within the territory covered by this Agreement."
57
 
 
 Thus equivalent competition rules apply across the territories of the E.U. Member States 
and of the EFTA States party to the E.E.A. Agreement, resulting in a significant 
strengthening of the competition rules applicable in those EFTA states.  The E.E.A. 
Agreement effectively extends the application of the E.U. competition rules to all agreements 
and practices that affect cross-border trade anywhere within the territory of the countries 
which make up the European Economic Area. Indeed, the relevant provisions of the E.E.A. 
Agreement contain rules which mirror, almost word for word, the provisions of E.U. law.
58
 
 
 To assist in the implementation and enforcement of the E.E.A. rules, a competition 
authority has been established by the EFTA States: the EFTA Surveillance Authority. 
Complex rules in the E.E.A. Agreement allocate jurisdiction between the Commission and 
the EFTA Surveillance Authority, and they generally reserve the jurisdiction that the 
Commission exercises under E.U. competition rules. The EFTA Surveillance Authority is 
responsible when there is an effect on trade only between EFTA states; other cases are 
allocated between the two authorities on the basis of a turnover test set out in the Agreement. 
The EFTA Surveillance Authority and the Commission are to have powers and functions 
equivalent to those which the Commission has for the application and enforcement of the 
E.U. competition rules.
59
 The Agreement provides for consultation and cooperation between 
the two authorities on levels ranging from general policy matters to specific cases. 
 
 [2]--Articles 101 and 102 Applied 
 
 Articles 81 and 82 of the E.C. Treaty, now Articles 101 and 102 of the F.E.U. Treaty, 
were initially applied to agreements and practices concerning rights of intellectual property in 
distinct types of cases.  On the one hand, the Court of Justice applied the first paragraph of 
Article 81 of the former E.C. Treaty, now Article 101 of the F.E.U. Treaty,
60
 to 
anticompetitive agreements and concerted practices concerning such rights.
61
  On the other, 
                                                 
 
      
57
 For the relevant provisions, see § 3[1][b] supra. 
 
 
58
 For a correlation of some E.C., E.U., and E.E.A. instruments on point, go to 
http://www.eftasurv.int/fieldsofwork/fieldcompetition/legaltext/dbaFile7180.html.  
 
 
59
 On these powers and functions, see § 3[1][c] supra. 
 
 
60
 For the relevant provisions, see § 3[1][a] supra.  
 
 
61
 See, e.g., Judgment of 13 July 1966, Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64, Consten and 
Grundig v. Commission, [1966] E.C.R. 299 (holding that that the exercise of rights of 
intellectual property may violate Article 81(1) [now Article 101(1) of the F.E.U. Treaty] if 
they are the object, the means, or the result of a cartel).  
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Article 82 of the former E.C. Treaty, now Article 102 of the F.E.U. Treaty,
62
 has been applied 
to abuses of dominant positions tending to obstruct trade, notably to refusals to license 
rights.
63
 As already indicated, the Commission investigates such cases and exempts some 
agreements.
64
 
 
  [a]--Exclusive Licensing.  Is the owner of an intellectual property right, such as 
copyright, or his authorized licensee, particularly an exclusive one, in a given national or 
otherwise delimited territory of the Internal Market, entitled to bring an infringement action 
against direct imports of another licensee from another territory, especially another Member 
State, on the ground that the importer had been granted only a territorially limited permission 
to exploit the relevant right? 
 
 In this context, there exists a close connection between the application of Articles 34 and 
35 of the F.E.U. Treaty,
65
 on the one hand, and Article 101 of the F.E.U. Treaty,
66
 on the 
other.
67
  A contractual prohibition against exports in a licensing agreement in favor of the 
owner of the right or other authorized licensees might be considered as no more than a 
reflection of the legal powers they enjoy anyway.  Further, the license may be viewed, 
notwithstanding such an export ban, as opening competition in any event.  The Court of 
Justice has shed light on this question in several important cases. 
 
   [i]--The Maize Seed Case.  The first case on point concerned the licensing of a 
plant-breeder's right. The Court of Justice there held that, under certain circumstances, an 
exclusive license of a plant-breeder's right would not come under the scope of the first 
paragraph of Article 81 of the former E.C. Treaty, now Article 101 of the F.E.U. Treaty, as a 
prohibited restrictive agreement, this to the extent that it could be regarded as an "open" 
exclusive license. The court considered an open exclusive license as one which merely 
involved an obligation on the part of the licensor not to compete himself on the licensed 
territory and not to grant additional licenses for that territory.
68
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 By parity of reasoning, if the license at issue combined exclusivity with absolute 
territorial protection, that is, if it precluded other competition by parallel importers or by 
licensees for other territories, it would be a "closed" exclusive license and would fall under 
the first paragraph of Article 81 of the former E.C. Treaty, now Article 101 of the F.E.U. 
Treaty. Accordingly, it can be argued that this provision does not leave all open exclusive 
licenses untouched, but only those for products fulfilling three criteria: products (1) with 
special characteristics, (2) considerable research and development costs, and (3) which are 
new on the market in question and unfamiliar to consumers. 
 
   [ii]--The Coditel II case.  The judgment of the Court in the Coditel II case also 
dealt with the question of exclusive licenses, this time with copyright licenses. The Supreme 
Court of Belgium applied to the Court of Justice for a ruling on the question whether the 
exclusive license granted to Ciné Vog violated the first paragraph of Article 81 of the former 
E.C. Treaty, now Article 101 of the F.E.U. Treaty. The Court replied that, given the 
characteristics of the cinematographic industry and its market in the Community, now the 
Union, this provision need not have the effect of prohibiting an agreement whereby the owner 
of copyright in a film grants an exclusive right to exhibit that film for a specific period in the 
territory of a Member State.
69
 
 
 As to further cases, however, the Court reserved the following question: Is the exclusive 
right conferred by the contract, under the economic or legal circumstances at issue, so 
exercised as to have the object or effect of preventing or restricting the distribution of films 
or to distort competition on the cinematographic market, all due regard being paid to the 
specific characteristics of that market? The Court indicated three criteria, which must be 
examined before finding such exercise to be in conflict with Article 81 of the former E.C. 
Treaty, now Article 101 of the F.E.U. Treaty:
70
 
 
+ whether the exercise of the exclusive right to exhibit a cinematographic film creates 
barriers which are artificial and unjustifiable in view of the needs of the cinematographic 
industry; 
 
+ whether there is a possibility of charging fees which exceed a fair return on investment; 
 
+ whether, in general, such exercise within a given geographic area is such as to prevent, 
restrict, or distort competition within the Internal Market. 
 
                                                 
  
69
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   [iii]--The State of the Law.  Both the Maize Seed and Coditel II cases therefore 
suggest that there are circumstances in which the grant of an exclusive license for a specific 
territory may conflict with Article 101 of the F.E.U. Treaty.
71
 The issue has been considered 
with regard to diverse factors that have included, inter alia, the degree of territorial 
exclusivity imposed and the circumstances arguably justifying such exclusivity, such as the 
needs to offset considerable investment costs and to persuade the licensee to take the license.  
 
 The issue was raised in the Premier League case.
72
 The national court asked the Court of 
Justice whether competition was unduly restricted by a clause in an exclusive license which 
obligated broadcasters to preclude the supply of decoder cards to access encrypted broadcasts 
of football matches, as well as works embedded in these matches, outside the territory 
covered by the license agreement. While upholding the Coditel II decision, the Court returned 
to its other case law; according to that case law, agreements which tend to reinstate divisions 
between national markets must in principle be regarded as having the object of restricting 
competition. The license in the case granted absolute territorial exclusivity to each 
broadcaster in its respective territory, thus suppressing competition between them in the 
Internal Market. Absent circumstances justifying such a restriction on competition, the Court 
concluded that Article 101(1) of the F.E.U. Treaty precluded it within the licenses at issue.
73
 
 
 Restrictions on exclusively licensing media productions for a specific area were loosened 
in the Ladbroke case.  In this case, the license had authorized showing films of French horse 
races in Austria and in the then pre-reunified Federal Republic Germany. The Commission 
decided that the first paragraph of Article 81 of the former E.C. Treaty, now Article 101 of 
the F.E.U. Treaty, would not allow an exclusive license to be thus limited to part of a given 
territory.
74
  Nevertheless, referring to Coditel II, the Court of First Instance confirmed that 
this provision may still allow such an exclusive license of performing rights, even though it 
was limited territorially to part of one Member State and even if the effects of the limitation 
are appreciable.  It therefore annulled the Commission Decision on the ground that, following 
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the complaint, the Commission had failed to inquire into whether the ten French associations 
organizing the horse-races had agreed to refuse a license to one of their competitors.
75
  
 
 Building on Coditel II and a number of other precedents, in 1998 the Commission 
published a document outlining its general policy with regard to competition law and 
broadcasting sports events.
76
  While the Commission acknowledged that exclusivity is an 
accepted commercial practice in the broadcasting sector, it also pointed out that each case 
must be examined according to its individual circumstances.  A balance must be struck 
between the detrimental effect on competition which may arise as a result of a prolonged and 
extensive arrangement to exclude competing broadcasters and the possible inefficiencies 
occasioned by frequent variations in the broadcasting arrangements for an event or series of 
events.
77
   
 
  [b]--Anticompetitive Clauses; Block Exemptions.  As explained above, the 
Commission may exempt agreements, including licenses of intellectual property, if the 
parties and the contractual language in question meet certain criteria.
78
  
 
 Nonetheless, Commission rulings on point are subject to judicial review.  For example, 
the Court of First Instance, now the General Court, refused to accept the Commission's view 
that agreements merely aimed at restricting parallel trade automatically violated the first 
paragraph of Article 81 of the former E.C. Treaty, now Article 101 of the F.E.U. Treaty.  At 
issue was the differentiation of prices of pharmaceutical products that Spanish wholesalers 
were charged, depending on whether a product was consumed in Spain or abroad. The Court 
agreed with the Commission that this scheme could have anticompetitive effects on consumer 
welfare; however, it found that the Commission had not sufficiently considered whether the 
dual price scheme might have contributed to innovation in the pharmaceutical sector.
79
 On 
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appeal, the Court of Justice upheld the this ruling,
80
 obligating the Commission to reconsider 
whether Glaxo’s general sales conditions in Spain may be exempted. 
 
 Most notably, the Commission has set out block exemptions for technology-transfer 
agreements.
81
  This chapter cannot treat the complexities of the resulting Technology 
Transfer Block Exemption Regulation.
82
 Generally speaking, this regulation provides for a 
regulatory safe harbor: if agreements conform to its criteria, they need not undergo 
Commission enforcement under E.U. competition rules. It cumulatively applies the typical 
criteria of such instruments: market-share thresholds and hard-core restrictions.  Enterprises 
may not be caught by its terms when their market-share threshold is below 20% of the 
relevant technology and product market if the parties are competitors, and below 30% if they 
are not. However, even then, agreements may not be exempted if they include hardcore 
restrictions such as price fixing, output limitations, market and customer allocations, and 
resale-price maintenance.
83
   
 
 The Commission has also adopted guidelines setting out the principles for the individual 
assessment of licensing agreements falling outside the safe harbors of the Technology 
Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, for example, copyright licenses.
84
 Upon Commission 
review, for example, leading suppliers of videogame consoles redrafted their license 
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agreements with independent software companies that develop and publish videogames 
compatible with their consoles.
85
 
 
 Another case based on a breach of Article 81 of the former E.C. Treaty, now 101 of the 
F.E.U. Treaty, is the Apple iTunes case. Vertical distribution agreements between Apple and 
record producers contained territorial restrictions that could limit consumers to buying music 
downloads from the iTunes online store in their respective countries of residence.  Such 
restrictions might preclude consumers from accessing music not locally available, from 
benefiting from lower prices abroad, or even from buying music online where iTunes did not 
have a store. The Commission accordingly sent a Statement of Objections to Apple and to a 
number of major record producers.
86
  However, the Commission closed the case following 
Apple's unilateral announcement to equalize prices for downloads from its iTunes online 
stores throughout the European Union. The Commission saw no need to scrutinize Apple’s 
proprietary digital-rights-management system for interoperability issues.
87
     
 
  [c]--Refusals to License; Tying. Article 102 of the F.E.U. Treaty
88
 prohibits abuses 
of dominant positions tending to obstruct trade within the Internal Market.
89
 A party already 
in a dominant position in a given market might attempt to corner that market further by 
diverse licensing practices, for example, the refusal to license copyrights or related rights.
90
  
The Court of Justice has considered outright refusals to license copyright or related rights on 
reasonable terms in a number of cases, albeit with mixed results that are outlined in this 
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subsection.
91
 In one significant case, tying the sale of one copyright-protected product with 
another also called for relief, as discussed below.
92
 
 
   [i]--Industrial Designs.  In its Volvo Judgment, the Court of Justice spelled out 
the criteria for permissible refusals to license design rights. It observed that the prerogative of 
preventing third parties from manufacturing or marketing products incorporating a design 
constitutes the core of any design right that national law may legitimately grant. Accordingly, 
compelling the right-owner to grant a license to third parties, even in return for a royalty, 
would deprive the owner of the substance of that exclusive right, and therefore refusal to 
grant such a license cannot in itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position.
93
  
 
 However, under Article 82 of the former E.C. Treaty, now Article 102 of the F.E.U. 
Treaty, the exercise of such a right may constitute abusive conduct. The Court cited as 
examples of such abusive conduct any arbitrary refusal to supply spare parts, the fixing of 
prices for spare parts at unfair levels, or decisions to stop producing spare parts for cars 
which are still in circulation. The Swedish car manufacturer Volvo should therefore have the 
right to refuse licenses to independent producers wishing to supply parts to which Volvo 
holds the registered designs, as long as Volvo does not abuse this prerogative.
94
 
 
   [ii]--The Magill Case and Progeny.  In a somewhat tortured history, the case 
law has addressed the question: When might a refusal to license data abuse a dominant 
position that is reinforced by copyright or related rights?
95
 The Magill case set an initial, and 
                                                 
 
      
91
 For other analyses, see D.A. Latham and F. Geissmar (eds.), "Should competition 
law be used to compel the grant by owners of intellectual property rights of licences in 
respect of their creations?," Report, International League of Competition Law, [1995] 
International Review of Competition Law 7; F. Fine, The EC Competition Law on 
Technology Licensing (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006). 
 
 
92
  See § 3[2][c][iv] supra. 
 
     
93
 Judgment of 5 Oct. 1988, Case 235/87, Volvo AB v. Veng Ltd., [1988] E.C.R. 
6211.  See also Judgment of 5 Oct. 1988, Case 53/87, Consorzio Italiano della 
Componentistica di Ricambio per Autoveicoli v. Renault, [1988] E.C.R. 6039 (companion 
case). 
 
     
94
 Judgment of 5 Oct. 1988, Case 235/87, Volvo AB v. Veng Ltd., [1988] E.C.R. 
6211, paras. 9-10.  
 
 
95
 See E. Derclaye, "Intellectual property rights on information and market power: 
comparing Europe and American protection of databases," 28 I.I.C. 275 (2007); Burri-
Nenova, "EC electronic communications and competition law," Thesis (University of Berne, 
2006).  On rights under the Database Directive, see § 4[2][f] infra.  
 
EU: p. 75 
stringent, precedent concerning such refusals to license data:  the Court of Justice confirmed 
that holders of copyrights in listings of television programs abused dominant market 
positions in refusing to license the publication of this data.
96
  It seemed that this case turned 
on the risk that such a refusal might exclude a party offering a new service from the relevant 
market.  Subsequent holdings have set the stage for more complex criteria. 
 
 The Magill history bears retelling in some detail. The telecasters B.B.C., R.T.E., and 
I.T.P. respectively published their own weekly guides to programs on their own television 
channels in the United Kingdom and Ireland.  Magill, an Irish company, tried to publish a 
comprehensive weekly T.V. guide, but all these other companies refused to grant any license 
to publish their listings in that format.  Indeed, the companies sued for copyright infringement 
to restrain Magill from publishing the listings at issue.  The Commission found that, by 
refusing to license their listings, these companies had, under Article 82 of the former E.C. 
Treaty, now Article 102 of the F.E.U. Treaty, abused their dominant positions in the markets 
for their weekly television program listings.
97
  It required them to supply other parties, upon 
request, with advance program listings and to license the publication of these listings, all on a 
non-discriminatory basis, for reasonable royalties, and on terms necessary to assure 
comprehensive weekly T.V. guides to programs receivable in Ireland and Northern Ireland.   
 
 The Court of First Instance upheld this Commission decision on the basis that the 
B.B.C., R.T.E., and I.T.P. were in positions to, and did, hinder the emergence of any effective 
competition in the market for information on television programs.
98
  The Court of Justice 
rejected R.T.E.'s and I.T.P.'s appeals in the Magill case.
99
  Its rulings may be analyzed in 
terms of the following issues of dominant position and of abuse, respectively:  
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+ It found that basic data--the channel, day, time, and title of programs--necessarily results 
from programming by broadcasters.  These organizations are thus the only source of such 
information for an enterprise like Magill, which wishes to publish it together with 
commentaries or pictures.  Enjoying a de facto monopoly, the broadcasters are in a 
position to stifle competition in the market in comprehensive weekly T.V. guides. 
 
+ The Court then held that the broadcasting organizations' refusal to provide basic 
information, coupled with its enforcement of national copyright laws to preclude use of 
that information in other publications, prevented the appearance of a new product, a 
comprehensive weekly T.V. guide, which they did not offer and for which there was 
potential consumer demand.  In effect, they reserved to themselves a secondary market 
by excluding all competition on that market, thus abusing their dominant position. 
 
 Evidently, the Court premised a low threshold at which consumers might be prejudiced 
when enterprises in a dominant position try to prevent the appearance of new products by 
invoking their copyrights.  The conflict might become acute where copyright is asserted in 
functional products or texts: for example, if copyright protected code constituting a computer 
interface, then it could be invoked to prevent competitors from developing compatible 
products. Furthermore, this case dealt with a copyright in listings of television programs, but 
copyright law in most Member States was, at the time, not likely to protect mere listings. 
Thus the facts, as well as the copyright asserted, in the Magill case are so unusual that this 
precedent called out for clarification in future litigation, notably with regard to other types of 
intellectual property.  
 
 Subsequent decisions have retrenched on the Magill analysis.
100
  In the Ladbroke case, 
the Court of First Instance held that, where a market is national and rightholders are not 
operating in that market, a refusal to provide a license to a competitor there is not 
discriminatory since the refusal would not reduce competition even if the rightholders were 
dominant.  The Court of First Instance reasoned, first, that the refusal to provide the license 
did not prevent the supply of a new product for which there was a demand and, second, that 
the availability of the license was not "essential" to the competitor’s services.101  By contrast, 
in the ITT Promedia case, the Belgian subsidiary of a U.S. firm, I.T.T. World Directories, 
accused Belgacom, the Belgian telecommunications service, of imposing abusive prices for 
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access to listing data for telephone directories.  The Commission considered that, since 
directory publishers were dependent on telephone services, access to the data should be 
allowed at a non-discriminatory price calculated on the basis of the data service's own costs 
of compiling the data.
102
  
 
   [iii]--The I.M.S. Health Case.  I.M.S. Health, in cooperation with a working 
group composed of representatives of the pharmaceutical industry, developed a so-called 
brick-structure database concerning German regional markets in pharmaceutical products.  
Though enjoying a 90% share of the relevant pharmaceutical markets, I.M.S. refused to 
license access to this brick-structure database to competing providers of regional 
pharmaceutical sales-data services, in particular, to N.D.C. However, it allowed free use of 
the structure by providers of other services to the pharmaceutical industry and by 
pharmaceutical enterprises themselves, so that the structure became a common standard in 
the sector.  I.M.S. asserted copyright in the structure.  
 
 In response to N.D.C.’s complaint, the Commission ordered I.M.S., on an interim basis, 
to license the structure to its competitors. The Commission reasoned that the structure was a 
standard indispensable for participation in the German markets and that it was, prima facie, 
an abuse of a dominant position for I.M.S. to refuse access to the structure without any 
objective justification.
103
  The Commission based its interim conclusions, inter alia, on the 
contribution of the industry working group to the development of the standard, on the high 
costs of switching to another standard, on the loss of interoperability with related services, 
and on the wide scope of German copyright, notably of the right to control using derivative 
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works.   For diverse reasons, this decision was withdrawn;
104
 nonetheless, in simultaneous 
national proceedings brought by I.M.S. against N.D.C. for breach of its copyright in the brick 
structure, the Frankfurt Court of Appeal asked the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
105
  
 
 In its Magill judgment, the Court had disallowed a refusal to license copyright which 
threatened to stop the use of materials indispensable for the exercise of a derivative economic 
activity.
106
  Recalling this case law, the Court stated that such a refusal constitutes an abuse if 
three conditions are satisfied: (1) the refusal prevents the appearance of a new product or 
service for which there is a potential demand; (2) the refusal excludes all competition in some 
related market: and (3) no objective justification exists for the refusal.
107
  The Court clarified 
that the first condition, requiring a new product or service, arises from the necessary 
balancing of intellectual property rights and consumer interests, so that the refusal to license 
will only be abusive where the enterprise seeking a license does not intend to confine itself to 
reproducing products or services already offered on the derivative market by the rightholder.  
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The Court also relied on its Bronner Judgment to explain, in relation to the second condition, 
that it is necessary to identify an upstream market for the indispensable materials, access to 
which is refused, and a derivative downstream market, which may be a mere potential market 
for the new product or service.
108
 
 
 This landmark case seems to clarify, at least, the following points: 
 
+ For a refusal to license to be abusive, it must result in some form of harm to consumers, 
for example, an unsatisfied demand for a new product or service in the same or related 
market as that in which the copyright owner is operating.  It remains unclear how 
differentiated the new product must be from the copyright owner’s product or service. 
 
+ For a refusal to license to be disallowed, there must be an absence of competition on the 
market in which the copyright owner is operating, which will be rectified by the 
imposition of a non-voluntary license. 
 
+ The copyright owner will be entitled to remuneration for the grant of such a license. 
 
   [iv]--The Microsoft Case. The Commission has conducted its inquiries into 
various Microsoft practices for over a decade.
109
 In a breakthrough antitrust decision in 2004, 
the Commission issued complex findings and holdings and fashioned complex remedies.
110
 
Only the highlights of this decision, and subsequent developments largely confirming it, will 
be outlined here.
111
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 The Commission found, inter alia, that Microsoft held a position of superdominance in 
the market for personal-computer operating systems, effectively over 90% market share for 
years,
112
 and that this position was reinforced by network effects that created barriers to entry. 
The Commission then held that, in violation of Article 82 of the former E.C. Treaty, now 
Article 102 of the F.E.U. Treaty, Microsoft had abused its dominant market position, notably 
by refusing to license or otherwise to provide interoperability information necessary for other 
enterprises to compete effectively in the market for workgroup-server operating systems and 
by tying its Windows Media Player with its Windows operating system. The Commission 
imposed a fine of € 497 million on Microsoft and ordered it to cease these infringements, 
notably by providing the interoperability information to interested parties and by offering the 
public a version of the Windows operating system without the Windows Media Player. The 
2004 Decision also contemplated setting up a monitoring mechanism, with a trustee, to assist 
the Commission in overseeing Microsoft's compliance. 
 
 Microsoft filed applications to annul the 2004 Decision and to suspend the 
implementation of pending remedies. The Court of First Instance, now the General Court, 
rejected these applications with some caveats.
113
 Following the Commission’s analysis, the 
Court presumed, for the sake of simplicity, that intellectual property, including copyright, 
protected some of the interoperability information at issue. The Court revisited the criteria for 
showing an abusive refusal to license subject matters protected by intellectual property, as 
these criteria had been clarified in the I.M.S. case by the Court of Justice.
114
 First, it held that 
it is not necessary to demonstrate that all competition on the market would be eliminated; it is 
sufficient that the refusal is likely to eliminate all competition on the relevant market.
115
 
Second, the Court held that Article 82(b) of the E.C. Treaty, now Article 102(b) of the F.E.U. 
Treaty, may be violated if “a refusal to license an intellectual property right is capable of 
causing prejudice to consumers,” not only “where there is a limitation . . . of production or 
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markets, but also of technical development.”116 Accordingly, the Court upheld the 2004 
Commission Decision to the effect that Microsoft had abusively refused to license the 
information at issue and abusively tied the Windows operating system and Media Player. 
However, it ruled that the monitoring mechanism contemplated in the 2004 Decision would 
have improperly delegated the Commission’s powers of investigation to a trustee.117  
 
 Since then, the Commission, following input from its technical advisors, has repeatedly 
found that Microsoft has not fully complied with its obligations pursuant to the 2004 
Decision, especially by failing to disclose interoperability information.
118
 Furthermore, in 
January of 2008, new complaints were sent to the European Commission which are still 
under investigation regarding, once again, Microsoft’s failure to disclose interoperability 
information and its tying its browser and other products with its operating system. Almost 
exactly a year later, the Commission sent a Statement of Objections to Microsoft relating to 
the tying, and Microsoft then promised in the main to install a mechanism so that computer 
manufacturers preinstalling Windows can turn Internet Explorer on and off and to allow such 
manufacturers to pre-install any web browser of their choice. In December of 2009, the 
Commission accepted these commitments, to which Microsoft is bound for five years.
119
 In 
July of 2009, Microsoft also informally undertook to improve interoperability between its 
products and third-party products. The Commission will monitor these measures and take 
their impact into account in its ongoing investigation. 
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 [3]--Mergers.  To prevent the acquisition of market power and therefore potential abuses 
of dominant positions, E.U. law subjects mergers to oversight and to certain conditions. The 
relevant legislative instruments are the Merger Regulation, which contains the rules for the 
assessment of concentrations, and the Implementing Regulation, which lays down the 
procedural rules.
120
 These rules apply, for example, if copyright holders which are enterprises 
decide to merge.  
 
  [a]--The Universal/BMG Merger.  In 2007, the Commission assessed Universal's 
takeover of BMG's music publishing business.
121
 The Commission found that the proposed 
merger, as initially notified, risked negative effects on competition in the market for music 
publishing rights for online usage. Indeed, in the context of a new environment where 
publishers are withdrawing their rights from collecting societies, pricing power is shifting 
from the collecting societies to the publishers. The market investigation showed that, after its 
projected merger, Universal would control 50% or more of the chart hits in some Member 
States: repertoire would have become a must-have product for online music providers in 
those territories. The possibilities for online music providers to circumvent Universal would 
have decreased significantly due to the merger.  In response, Universal committed to divest 
itself of a number of important catalogs.  On that condition, the Commission cleared the 
merger.   
 
 However, before the Court of First Instance, now the General Court, Impala, an 
international association of independent music-production companies, successfully 
challenged this clearance as vitiated by manifest factual and legal errors.
122
 On appeal, the 
Court of Justice overturned this judgment, holding that the lower court had misconstrued the 
criteria of the market dominance that might arise out of the tacit coordination of the parties to 
the merger at issue.
123
 The Court of Justice remanded the case for rulings on issues that, 
though raised by Impala, had not yet been disposed of. 
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  [b]--The Oracle/Sun Merger. In September of 2009, the European Commission 
launched an examination of the proposed acquisition by Oracle of Sun Microsystems, both 
U.S. software companies, and in January of 2010 it approved the merger.
124
 The 
Commission’s main concern was for the database software market which is highly 
concentrated.  Oracle pledged to keep its main database software as open-source software, 
and there is at least one other credible open-source database software on the market. Notably 
on those bases, the Commission concluded that the merger would not significantly impede 
effective competition in the internal market.  
 
 [4]--Copyright-Management Organizations 
 
 This subsection will outline how E.C. and now E.U. competition law has been and is 
being applied, first, to societies that have nationally collected royalties for copyright and 
related uses and, second, to groups of such organizations that are now making cross-border 
arrangements to manage copyrights and related rights in online environments. 
 
  [a]--Case Law on Collecting Societies. Collecting societies have traditionally 
operated by virtue of being mandated by rightholders, and sometimes by statutes, to collect 
royalties for entire national markets.
125
 As the following cases illustrate, they may thus 
occupy dominant positions in these markets and risk falling afoul of both Articles 101 and 
102 of the F.E.U. Treaty.  
  
   [i]--The GEMA Decisions.  The Commission scrutinized the organizational 
structure of the German collecting society GEMA and found that, contrary to Article 82 of 
the former E.C. Treaty, now Article 102 of the F.E.U. Treaty, a number of GEMA’s 
restrictive rules and practices constituted an abuse of its dominant market position.  The 
following aspects of GEMA's internal rules were particularly criticized:
126
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+ Restrictions of members’ freedom to join other societies: The Commission disapproved 
rules limiting members' ability to express dissatisfaction with their national society by 
joining the society of another Member State and benefiting from whatever advantages it 
offered its members. 
 
+ Overbroad transfers of rights to the society: As licensor, not only of performing rights, 
but also of the mechanical right to record music, GEMA required a transfer of exclusive 
rights of all aspects of copyright, at home and abroad. It accordingly had a strong interest 
in preventing individual authors from being drawn out of membership and into direct 
relationship with a user such as a record company. The Commission, however, insisted 
that members should not be obliged to assign rights for territories in which GEMA did 
not act directly; nor should it take over all aspects of copyright in the territories in which 
it did so operate. Likewise it ought to be possible for a member to resign at the end of 
any period of three consecutive years. 
 
+ Overrestrictive criteria of membership: GEMA had prevented record companies from 
acquiring influence by excluding them from membership as publishers. To this the 
Commission also objected, while recognizing that it would be proper to restrict the 
voting rights of such members when they had a conflict of interests. 
 
+ Discriminatory market practices: A number of GEMA's commercial practices were also 
characterized as abusive: for example, the tariff on the mechanical right was found to 
discriminate in favor of German-produced records, and that on recording equipment in 
favor of German manufacturers. 
 
+ Collecting on rights not managed: It was improper for the mechanical-right fee in effect 
to require payments for works not under the society's control. 
 
   [ii]--Greenwich Films v. SACEM.  In the Greenwich Films case, the Court 
considered the assertion of rights in markets outside France where the collecting society 
SACEM normally operated. SACEM required payment of royalties for public showings in 
third countries of two films produced by Greenwich Films, for which members of SACEM 
had composed the music. Greenwich Films refused to pay and instead complained that, by 
requiring members to assign to SACEM all their rights for the whole world and for a very 
long period, SACEM abused its dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 of the 
former E.C. Treaty, now Article 102 of the F.E.U. Treaty.  The Court, in its judgment, ruled 
that the fact that, in a particular case, a dominant position is being abused relative to 
performances in non-member countries does not in itself prevent this provision, intended for 
the Internal Market, from being applicable. It remained up to the national court to determine 
any abuse, notably one tending to partition the Internal Market, whether directly or 
indirectly.
127
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   [iii]--G.V.L. v. Commission. In the G.V.L. case, the Court had to assess whether 
a dominant position was present, as well as abused by restrictions on membership. G.V.L., 
the only collecting society in Germany managing the "secondary exploitation" of performers' 
rights through the dissemination of previously recorded works, contended that it did not have 
a dominant position in that it was not the only trading partner of performing artists, since they 
could always exploit their rights of primary exploitation by exchanging services directly with, 
for example, promoters or manufacturers of sound recordings.  However, the Court agreed 
with the Commission that the relevant market was not the whole field of exchange of services 
in the performance of artistic works, but rather that of services relating to the management of 
secondary exploitation rights in Germany. It was this field in which G.V.L. had a dominant 
position relative to a substantial part of the Internal Market, namely Germany, but G.V.L. 
refused to enter into management agreements with foreign artists who were not resident in 
Germany. Given such a dominant position, the Court found that such refusal could constitute 
an abuse  under Article 82 of the former E.C. Treaty, now Article 102 of the F.E.U. Treaty. It 
was critical that foreign artists were prevented from benefiting from rights of secondary 
exploitation in Germany even if they could show that they held such rights.
128
 
 
   [iv]--Basset v. SACEM.  Here the Court faced a question of excessive royalties. 
It was asked: Did Article 82 of the former E.C. Treaty, now Article 102 of the F.E.U. Treaty, 
preclude the French collecting society SACEM from charging users such as discotheques, not 
merely a royalty for public performance, but a supplementary royalty based on the 
reproduction and distribution right,
129
 for playing works from the repertoires of these other 
societies on sound recordings already freely marketed in the Internal Market? It was stressed, 
on the one hand, that the law of the Member State, namely France, where the sound 
recordings were used authorized this royalty but, on the other, that the law of the Member 
State from which the recordings had been imported did not.
130
 The Court held that charging 
such a royalty, thus taking advantage of the opportunities available under the legislation of 
the Member State where the recordings were used, did not in itself constitute a forbidden 
monopolistic abuse.
131
 The Court left it up to the national Court to assess whether such 
royalty charges were excessive.
132
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   [v]--SACEM Discotheque Cases.  Comparable questions arose when French 
discotheques brought charges that, inter alia, SACEM imposed excessive royalties and other 
restrictive conditions on using its repertoire.  Confronted with these charges, French courts 
referred to the Court of Justice a number of questions which turned on the interpretation of, 
inter alia, Articles 81 and 82 of the former E.C. Treaty, now Articles 101 and 102 of the 
F.E.U. Treaty.  The Court of Justice then ruled as follows:
133
  
 
+ Reciprocal representation agreements:  The Court stated that reciprocal representation 
contracts between different national societies, tending to make each the sole licensing 
agent for the others’ repertoires in its home territory, did not in themselves violate 
Article 81 of the former E.C. Treaty, now Article 101 of the F.E.U. Treaty.   
 
+ Exclusive dealings through concerted practices:  The Court noted that such parallel 
behaviors as the societies displayed might evidence concerted practices if these 
behaviors led to abnormal conditions of competition, but it refused to presume such 
concerted practices if the behaviors at issue could be explained by other reasons, for 
example, relating to organizing systems of management to control the exploitation of 
rights abroad. 
 
+ Refusals to authorize local users: The Court stated that, in imposing contracts on users to 
safeguard the interests of their members in recorded music, the societies could not be 
considered to restrict competition within the meaning of Article 81 of the former E.C. 
Treaty, now Article 101 of the F.E.U. Treaty, unless the practice at issue exceeded the 
limits necessary to attain such goals as controlling collection costs and monitoring uses 
of musical works. 
 
+ Criteria of abuse of dominant position: The Court stated that, where a society in a 
dominant position imposed rates for its services appreciably higher than those applied in 
the other Member States, as compared on a uniform basis, that difference would indicate 
an abuse of the dominant position.  The society itself, here SACEM, had to justify any 
such difference on the basis of objective disparities between its situation and those in all 
other Member States. 
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 National courts then have to make appropriate findings pursuant to that analysis.
134
  The 
Commission itself, on October 20, 1992, rejected complaints against SACEM, given the 
difficulties of comparing royalties charged in different Member States. The discotheque 
operators lodged an appeal with the Court of First Instance, now the General Court, which 
annulled the Commission's Decision because it had provided insufficiently reasoned grounds 
for rejecting applicants' allegation that the Internal Market had been partitioned as a result of 
an alleged agreement between SACEM and other E.U. collecting societies.
135
 
 
   [vi]--Kanal 5 and TV 4 v. STIM.  The Swedish Market Court asked whether, 
under Article 82 of the former E.C. Treaty, now Article 102 of the F.E.U. Treaty, a collecting 
society would abuse its dominant position by applying a certain remuneration model.
136
 This 
model assessed royalties partly by looking to the revenues of commercial television channels; 
royalties were differently measured for comparable uses, for example, when they were 
required of public-service organizations without advertising or subscription revenues.  The 
Court of Justice emphasized that such a model should result in royalties proportional to the 
actual or likely broadcasts of protected musical works, unless another method enabled 
monitoring uses and audiences more precisely without disproportionately increasing 
management costs.  The Court interpreted Article 82 of the former E.C. Treaty, now Article 
102 of the F.E.U. Treaty, to mean that an abuse is likely to arise out of a model that calculates 
royalties differently for commercial companies than for other organizations if these distinct 
undertakings provide equivalent services. In that event, applying the model to one, but not to 
the other, could put the former at a competitive disadvantage relative to the latter.  Only an 
objective justification, such as cutting costs, could excuse the differential treatment.
137
 
 
  [b]--Collective Management for New Media. The Commission has begun to apply 
basic principles for the procompetitive operation of collecting societies, now increasingly 
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called rights-management organizations, in the field of copyright.
138
 In particular, there is a 
need for the collective management of copyright and neighboring rights to be adapted to new 
media, especially to online uses that tend to straddle European, and indeed worldwide, 
borders.
139
   
 
   [i]--The Simulcast Agreement.  On October 8, 2002, the Commission granted 
an exemption under the third paragraph of Article 81 of the former E.C. Treaty, now Article 
101 of the F.E.U. Treaty, for a model reciprocal agreement that record-producers’ collecting 
societies, under the auspices of the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry 
(IFPI), had proposed to govern the licensing of “simulcasting.”140  Simulcasting is the 
simultaneous transmission by radio and television stations, over the Internet, of sound 
recordings included in their broadcasts.  This Simulcast Agreement is intended to facilitate 
the grants of international licenses to stations that wish to engage in simulcasting.   
 
 Following the Commission’s observations, the parties agreed to amend the agreement to 
ensure that broadcasters can obtain a single “one-stop-shop” license from the collecting 
societies to cover Internet broadcasts across the E.E.A., except for Spain and France.  Thus, 
rather than being forced to obtain a license from the local collecting society in every country 
in which their Internet transmissions are accessed, broadcasters whose signals originate in an 
E.E.A. Member State will be able to approach any E.E.A.-based collecting society of their 
choice for the simulcast license.  Parties also undertook to ensure a minimum of transparency 
with regard to the fees charged for such a license, thus enabling broadcasters to identify the 
best licensing terms.  This model provision should allow for competition among E.E.A. 
collecting societies as each strives to be the one to grant these multi-territorial licenses.  
 
   [ii]--Commission Principles and Studies.  In April of 2004, the Commission 
set out principles for overseeing the collective management of copyright and neighboring 
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E.I.P.R. 220; P. Gyertyánfy, “Collective Management of Music Rights in Europe After the 
CISAC Decision,” 41 I.I.C. 59 (2010). 
 
 
140
 See Commission Press Release No. IP/02/1436, 8 Oct. 2002.  For commentary, see 
N. Bortloff, “Internationale Lizenzierung von Internet-Simulcasts durch die 
Tonträgerindustrie” (International Licensing of Internet Simulcasts by the Recording 
Industry), [2003] GRUR Int. 669. 
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rights, with particular emphasis on new media.
141
  From a competition perspective, a number 
of key issues have to be kept in mind:  
 
+ Territorial restrictions must not stand in the way of creating new “one-stop-shop” 
arrangements to make E.U.-wide and even global licensing more efficient. 
 
+ Under competition law, the Commission will look favorably at such arrangements and 
the related reciprocal agreements between rights-management systems. 
 
+ The Commission cannot allow perpetuating past restrictions where they are no longer 
indispensable. 
 
+ Right-owners must be able to determine themselves the proper mix between the 
individual and collective management of their music rights. 
 
+ Right-owners must be able to use the new digital rights-management techniques 
individually where they so choose. 
 
+ Arrangements must not unnecessarily bundle rights-management offerings.  
 
 On October 12, 2005, the Commission adopted a formal recommendation for this 
field.
142
  Here the Commission puts forward non-binding measures for improving the 
licensing of copyright and neighboring rights for a variety of innovative online services, such 
as webcasting and “on-demand” music downloads.  Stressing the need for “a licensing policy 
that corresponds to the ubiquity of the online environment and which is multi-territorial,” the 
Commission recommends, inter alia, the elimination both of territorial restrictions and of 
provisions for customer allocation, as found in existing licensing contracts.   Further, it 
proposes allowing rightholders, notably those who wish to opt out of such contracts, the 
possibility of tendering their repertoires for direct E.U.-wide licensing.  The recommendation 
also includes provisions on the governance, transparency, dispute settlement, and 
accountability of collective-management organizations.
143
 
                                                 
 
141
 Commission, Communication on the management of copyright and related rights in 
the Internal Market, 16 April 2004, COM(2004) 261 final.   
 
 
142
 Recommendation on collective cross-border management of copyright and related 
rights for legitimate online music services, 30 Sept. 2005, O.J. 2005 No. L 276, also at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/rec_crm_en.pdf .  
 
 
143
 For analyses, see P. Tuma, “Pitfalls and Challenges of the EC Directive on the 
Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights,” [2006] E.I.P.R. 220; H. Calvet, et 
al., "Concurrence et gestion collective des droits de propriété intellectuelle" (Competition and 
the collective management of intellectual property), [2006] Revue du Droit de la Concurrence 
10; Max Planck Institute in Munich, Opinion, [2006] GRUR Int. 222. 
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   [iii]--The CISAC Model Agreement.  On July 16, 2008, following complaints 
of the broadcaster Radio Télévision Luxembourg (R.T.L.) and the online company Music 
Choice, the Commission decided against the International Confederation of Societies of 
Authors and Composers (CISAC) and its E.E.A. members. It required CISAC to cease 
applying specified provisions of its model contract, as well as the implementation of 
corresponding agreements at bilateral levels by CISAC members in the E.E.A.  In particular, 
each of these members may no longer enforce the membership clause, which prevented an 
author from choosing or moving to another collecting society.  Nor may each enforce any 
territorial restriction which, coupled with an exclusivity clause, could prevent it from 
offering licenses to commercial users outside its domestic territory and, rather, obligate it to 
authorize another collecting society to administer its repertoire on a given territory.
144
   
 
 The Commission found these arrangements to constitute a concerted practice among the 
CISAC members that resulted in the segmentation of the Internal Market on a country-by-
country basis. Effectively, a commercial user who wants to offer a pan-European media 
service, such as R.T.L. or Music Choice, cannot receive a license from any CISAC member 
to provide that service, but has to negotiate with each national collecting society. Citing the 
former Santiago Agreement of CISAC concerning multi-territorial and multi-repertoire 
licensing, the Commission rejected any necessary connection between the objet spécifique of 
copyright or related rights and the territorial exclusivities that the CISAC members were 
attempting to impose contractually, thus exempting their practice from Commission 
scrutiny.
145
 Some of the CISAC members have applied to the Court of First Instance, now the 
General Court, for annulment of the Commission decision.
146
 
 
   [iv]--The Cannes Agreement: Central Licensing. The Commission obtained a 
pair of commitments concerning the Cannes Agreement
147
 between five major music 
publishers
148
 and thirteen European collecting societies.
149
  This agreement allows for central 
licensing, in which a record company can obtain, for all or part of the E.E.A., a copyright 
license for the combined repertories of all the collecting societies.  
                                                 
 
144
  Commission, Decision of 16 July 2008, C(208) 3435 final. 
 
 
145
 Id., para. 160.  On balancing such a specific aim of copyright with E.C. policies, see 
§ 2[1][c][i] infra.  
 
 
146
 Court of First Instance, Cases T-398/08, T-410/08, and T-432/08 (pending).  
 
 
147
 See Commission Press Release No. IP/06/311, 4 Oct. 2006. 
 
 
148
 I.e., BMG, EMI, Sony, Universal, and Warner. 
  
 
149
 I.e., AEPI, AustroMechana, GEMA, MCPS, MCPSI, NCB, SABAM, SDRM, 
SGAE, SIAE, STEMRA and SUISA. 
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 The commitments concerned two clauses of these agreements on which the Commission 
had expressed concerns.  The first commitment ensures that collecting societies may continue 
to give rebates to record companies out of the administrative fees they retain.  The second 
commitment consists in the removal of a no-competition clause, which would have prevented 
collecting societies from ever entering either the music publishing or the record production 
market.  If the parties to the Cannes Agreement were to break their commitments, the 
Commission could impose a fine of up to 10% of their total turnover without having to prove 
any violation of the E.U. competition rules.  
 
 [5]--Commission Policy on Standardization 
 
 The Commission has considered distinct issues with regard to standardization.  First, 
does the constitution and operation of any standard-setting body violate Articles 81 or 82 of 
the former E.C. Treaty, now Articles 101 or 102 of the F.E.U. Treaty? Second, do refusals to 
grant licenses to use an intellectual property right in connection with a standard, or the terms 
and conditions of such licenses, violate either or both of these provisions?
150
  
 
 Standard-making bodies must be mindful of the requirements regarding the fixing of 
royalty rates or other trading conditions concerning standards they make available. They must 
also avoid creating opportunities for the exchange of competitively sensitive information or 
for restrictive practices relating to quantities and prices, as well as to customer and territory 
sharing. 
 
 No decision of the Court of Justice has applied E.U. competition law to standard-setting 
as such, so its case law, discussed above, can only provide general criteria of abuse.
151
 That 
said, E.U. policy concerning research and development must be taken into account. Even if 
no other viable technology were available, the standard-making body, or potential users of the 
standard, would not necessarily be placed at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the owner 
of rights in the technology in question by the fact that no standard could be made in a given 
area or that the standard adopted was less than optimally efficient.  
                                                 
     
150
 Commission, Communication on intellectual property rights and standardization, 
COM(92) 445 final, 27 Oct. 1992.  For commentary, see G. Piesiewicz and R. 
Schellingerhout, "Intellectual Property Rights in standard setting from a competition law 
perspective," EC Competition Policy Newsletter, 2007, No. 3, p. 36. On August 30, 2007, the 
Commission opened a case against Qualcomm, the U.S. chipset manufacturer and holder of 
rights in the CDMA and WCDMA standards for mobile telephony.  In 2009, the Commission 
decided to close its formal proceedings against Qualcomm and all complainants have also 
withdrawn their complaints. See Commission MEMO/09/516, 24 Nov. 2009. 
 
 
151
 For example, on refusals to license, see § 3[2][c] supra.  
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§ 4 Harmonization Directives 
 
 [1]--Background and Prospects of Harmonization. The main purpose of the former 
E.C. Treaty had been, and a core purpose of the current E.U. and F.E.U. Treaties remains, the 
development of the Internal Market in Europe.
1
 However, this purpose could not be fully 
attained with respect to copyright and related rights as long as national laws differed 
substantially in this field.
2
  For this reason, harmonization directives have been imposed in 
this field, and the Court of Justice has begun to interpret these directives in a growing case 
law.
3
  
 
  [a]--The Aim and Treaty Basis of Harmonization. We have seen the Court of 
Justice remove obstacles to harmonization in limiting the territoriality of certain rights to 
assure freedom of commerce in the Internal Market
4
  Nonetheless, judicial measures alone 
could not avoid all negative side effects that resulted from differences between national 
copyright laws. For example, confronted by disparities between national laws and royalty 
rates, the Court of Justice responded: "Such disparities must be abolished by the means 
provided for to that end by the Treaty, and in particular through the harmonization of laws."
5
  
 
 Articles 94 and 95 of the former E.C. Treaty had provided the former European 
Community, as Articles 115 and 114 of the F.E.U. Treaty now provide the European Union, 
with powers to harmonize national laws.
6
  The word "harmonize" here means to bring 
legislation in the respective Member States more in line with each other, thus reducing 
discrepancies that work against the purposes of the Union, notably the development of an 
                                                 
 
 
1
  See § 1[1][b][ii] in fine supra.  
 
 
2
   For a synthetic analysis, see H. Ullrich, “Harmony and unity of European 
intellectual property protection,” in D. Vaver and L. Bently (eds.), Intellectual Property in the 
New Millennium: Essays in Honour of William R. Cornish, 20 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 
2004). 
 
 
3
 For this case law, see § 5 infra. 
  
      
4
 See § 2[1] supra. 
 
     
5
 Judgment of 20 Jan. 1981, Joined Cases 55/80 and 57/80, Musik-Vertrieb Membran 
GmbH and K-tel International v. GEMA, [1981] E.C.R. 147, para. 24 (discussed in § 
2[2][b][i] supra).  
 
 
6
 Further, Article 352 of the F.E.U. Treaty [Article 308 of the former E.C. Treaty] 
provides a basis for superimposing new rights on national rights: Court of Justice, Opinion 
1/94 of 15 Nov. 1994, [1994] E.C.R. I-5267. 
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Internal Market.
7
 Many directives have been issued to this end in the field of copyright, not to 
replace national statutes with any uniform European legal text, but rather to harmonize 
national laws.   
 
 Recall the distinction between regulations and directives in this regard.
8
 Regulations are 
directly applicable within national legal orders, and for private parties they can be a source of 
rights and obligations.  Directives represent different legal instruments: they are addressed to 
Member States only, and they need to be implemented in national laws. Directives set 
compulsory standards for all matters they cover, and these standards are to be followed in 
implementing and interpreting national statutes, albeit with varying margins of discretion.  
Indeed, the E.U. principles of subsidiarity and proportionality imply that Member States are 
to act in fields where they best achieve E.U. objectives, while the Union is to act only to the 
extent necessary to achieve its objectives.
9
  Nonetheless, as national courts increasingly turn 
to it with questions on point, the Court of Justice has been specifically construing copyright 
directives with an eye to giving them uniform meanings across the European Union.
10
 
 
  [b]--Pending Initiatives: Directive on Orphan Works. It has been argued that the 
harmonization initiatives that have been undertaken to date to create an Internal Market for 
copyright and related rights have been inspired by the maxim "more is better."
11
 It is true that, 
in the mid 1990s, the Community engaged in a vast program of legislative harmonization, 
which resulted in a high level of protection for rightholders, not only of copyright and of 
neighboring rights, but of a new related right in databases. However, there has been a shift in 
perspective moving into the new millennium. 
 
 Debate has been engaged on how to improve the exploitation of copyright and related 
rights across the Internal Market, notably in the digital sphere.
12
 The Commission has opened 
                                                 
 
7
  See, e.g., Judgment of 5 Oct. 2000, Case C-376/98, Germany v. Council and 
Parliament, [2000] E.C.R. I-8419 (holding that former E.C. Treaty, Art. 95, authorized only 
such measures as improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the Internal 
Market, but did not grant a general power in the Union legislature to regulate the Internal 
Market). 
 
      
8
 See § 1[1][c] supra. 
 
 
9
 See E.U. Treaty, Art. 5 [former E.C. Treaty, Art. 5] (discussed in § 1[1][c] supra). 
 
      
10
 See § 5 infra. 
  
 
11
 See T. Lueder, "The Next Ten Years in EU Copyright: Making Markets Work," 
paper delivered at the Fordham University School of Law Fifteenth Annual Conference on 
International Intellectual Property Law & Policy, 12-13 April 2007, and posted at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/index_en.htm.  
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inquiry into the impact of copyright on the information society, notably on how knowledge 
for research, science, and education can be best disseminated in the online environment.
13
 
The Commission has also issued a "blueprint" for future initiatives in the field of intellectual 
property, notably including E.U.-wide licensing in the digital market, as well as facilitating 
user-generated content and access to cultural resources.
14
 All such initiatives have to be seen 
against the horizon set by the E.U. power to “provide uniform protection of intellectual 
property rights throughout the Union.”15  
 
 At present, the Commission has turned its attention to orphan works.
16
 It has proposed a 
directive on certain permitted uses of orphan works.
17
 The Directive would apply to any work 
or other protected production that, first published or broadcast in a Member State, is an 
“orphan” in that its rightholder is not identified or, even if identified, is not locatable after a 
diligent search has been carried out, as each Member State defines such a search, with results 
recorded in a publicly accessible database. Publicly accessible libraries, educational 
establishments, museums and archives, and film-heritage institutions, as well as public 
service broadcasting organizations, would be entitled to reproduce and make available orphan 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
12
 Compare P.B. Hugenholtz, "Codes of Conduct and Copyright--Pragmatism versus 
Principle,"  29 I.I.C. 635 (2008) (arguing that the European Commission tends to encourage 
self-regulatory solutions given that "legislation is increasingly difficult and deregulation the 
name of the game"), with G. Mazziotti, EU Digital Copyright and the End-User, chap. 9 
(Springer, 2008) (arguing for far-reaching legislative reforms of Union copyright law to 
create a legal infrastructure of user rights that would counterbalance broad rights and 
technological safeguards of digital content). 
 
 
13
 Commission, Green Paper, Copyright in the knowledge economy, 16 July 2008, 
COM(2008) 466 final; Commission, Communication, Copyright in the Knowledge Economy, 
Brussels, 19 Oct. 2009, COM(2009) 532 final.   
 
 
14
 Commission, A Single Market for Intellectual Property Rights: Boosting creativity 
and innovation to provide economic growth, high quality jobs and first class products and 
services in Europe; Brussels, 24 May 2011, COM(2011), part 3.3. 
 
 
15
 F.E.U. Treaty, Art. 118. See § 1[1][b][ii] in fine supra. 
  
 
16
 See Memorandum of Understanding: Key Principles on the Digitization and Making 
Available of Out-of-Commerce Works, 20 Sept. 2011 (non-binding instrument initiated by 
the Commission to facilitate voluntary licensing agreements by publishers, authors, and 
collecting societies with libraries and similar institutions to enable the latter to digitize and 
make available online out-of-commerce books and learned journals).  
 
 
17
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain 
permitted uses of orphan works, Brussels, 24 May 2011, COM(2011) 289 final, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0289:FIN:EN:PDF. 
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works and productions, but only for their purposes in the public interest, such as preservation, 
restoration, and the provision of cultural and educational access to their collections. Member 
States may authorize further uses of orphan works subject to conditions that the Directive 
would set.
18
  
 
 [2]--Binding Directives in the Field of Copyright 
 
 As explained above, when a directive is adopted, it binds Member States to conform 
specific laws to it by whatever deadline the directive sets out.
19
  Accordingly, as adopted, 
implemented, and applied, it becomes part of established E.U. law, traditionally referred to as 
the acquis communautaire.  Indeed, directives in the field of copyright and related rights have 
been implemented by Member States in their domestic legal orders.  The Commission, 
charged with overseeing such implementation, has also issued reports on the advisability of 
revising or expanding existing directives.
20
  
 
 This process initially progressed timidly in the field of copyright. By contrast, the 
Trademark Directive
21
 and the Design Directive, coupled with the Design Regulation,
22
 
govern their respective fields of law rather systematically.  However, directives in the field of 
copyright and related rights initially restricted themselves to specific subject matters and 
rights, such as software and rental rights, and to terms of protection. Still, sometimes, broad 
issues basic to this entire field unavoidably have to be tackled, giving rise to so-called 
horizontal provisions: such provisions have effects that, to varied extents, cut across the 
entire field of copyright and related rights.
23
 For example, in many directives, the notion of 
"originality" is defined in terms of "the author's own intellectual creation," and another 
                                                 
 
18
 For commentary, see K. de la Durantaye, “How to Build an Orphanage, and Why,” 
[2011] JIPITEC 226. 
 
     
19
 N.b., as explained in § 1[1][c] supra, private parties may claim rights directly under 
a sufficiently unconditional and precise directive.   See also K. Jorna and M. Martin-Prat, 
"New Rules for the Game in the European Copyright Field and Their Impact on Existing 
Situations," [1994] E.I.P.R. 145 (especially analyzing consequences of the Rental, Satellite 
and Broadcasting, and Term Directives in transitional cases).     
 
 
20
 For these reports, texts of the directives, and background materials, go to 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/documents/documents_en.htm. 
 
 
21
 Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 Dec. 1988, O.J. 1989 No. L 40. 
 
 
22
  On this directive and regulation, see § 4[3][c] infra. 
 
 
23
 For further analysis, see H. Cohen Jehoram, "The EC Copyright Directives, 
Economics and Authors' Rights," 25 I.I.C. 821 (1994); G. Tritton, et al., Intellectual Property 
in Europe, 486-489 (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed., 2008). 
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horizontal provision treats the principal director of an audiovisual work as at least one of the 
authors of that work.
24
 With increasing use of such horizontal provisions, the directives in 
this field began to constitute an increasingly dense network of legal texts that have slowly 
moved toward one unitary European copyright law.  The Information-Society Directive edged 
a bit closer to this goal which, still unachieved, Article 118 of the F.E.U. Treaty now 
authorizes making law to reach.
25
 To complicate the matter further, a number of directives 
and regulations adopted in other related fields may have horizontal effects on copyright and 
neighboring rights.
26
  
 
  [a]--Designs of Integrated Circuits.  On December 16, 1986, the Council adopted 
its Directive on the protection of topographies of semiconductor products, that is, of designs 
of integrated circuits.
27
 Article 2 of this directive states: "Member States shall protect the 
topographies of semiconductor products by adopting legislative provisions conferring 
exclusive rights in accordance with the provisions of the Directive." 
 
 Initiatives by the United States prompted this directive. The Commission responded with 
a burst of activity to the U.S. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984. Under Sections 
902 and 914 of the U.S. Act, U.S. protection of the designs of integrated circuits by so-called 
chip rights may be extended to citizens of a foreign nation by presidential proclamation. Such 
a proclamation could issue upon an executive finding of reciprocal protection by a foreign 
country of U.S. designs of integrated circuits or, provisionally, of efforts and progress made 
by that country toward enacting legislation to that effect.
28
 
 
                                                 
     
24
 On the criterion of protection, see Art. 1(3) of the Software Directive, Art. 6 and 
Recital 17 of the Term Directive, Art. 3(1) of the Database Directive. On the status of 
audiovisual directors, see Art. 2(2) of the Rental and Related Rights Directive, Art. 1(5) of 
the Satellite and Cable Directive, and Art. 2(1) of the Term Directive. All these directives are 
explained in the following subsections.  
 
 
25
  On this directive, see § 4[2][g] infra. A regulation could achieve a unitary law 
applicable throughout the European Union in the field of copyright, as such instruments have 
done in the fields of trademark and design. On Article 118 of the F.E.U. Treaty, authorizing 
such lawmaking, see § 1[2][b] in fine supra. For a scholarly anticipation of the eventual tenor 
of an E.U. copyright code, see the Wittem Group, European Copyright Code (26 April 2010), 
at http://www.copyrightcode.eu/. 
 
 
26
  On such instruments, notably the Design Regulation, see § 4[3] infra. 
 
     
27
 Council Directive 87/54/EEC of 16 December 1986 on the legal protection of 
topographies of semiconductor products, O.J. 1987 No. L 24.  For the text of this directive, 
see Appendix 1 hereto. 
 
     
28
 See Schwartz, "United States," herein, at § 9[1][b] (hereinafter “United States”). 
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 These provisions prompted Member States to petition for such an extension of U.S. chip 
rights and, ultimately, the Commission to file such a petition for all Member States. In this 
petition, the Commission expressed its intent to issue a "Council Directive on the creation of 
a legal framework for the protection of the topographies [circuitry designs] of semiconductor 
products in all Member States." Upon this petition the U.S. indeed extended interim 
protection to the nationals of the remaining Member States. The Directive, which the Council 
did issue, follows the U.S. Act closely. Insofar as a provision would be incompatible with a 
national system of copyright, it is only optional.
29
 
 
 After the U.S. Government and the Council engaged in ad hoc reciprocal extensions of 
interim protection in the field, the Commission asserted itself internationally in the 
Diplomatic Conference which was held in May of 1989 in Washington, D.C., to conclude the 
Treaty on the Protection of Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.  It is 
noteworthy that the Commission represented the governments of the Member States in this 
conference, whose traditional powers of international representation had devolved on the 
Community by virtue of its Directive on the matter.
30
  Ultimately, the resulting Washington 
treaty was incorporated into the TRIPs Agreement.
31
 
 
  [b]--Protection of Computer Programs.  After lengthy and difficult preparation, 
the Council finally adopted, on May 14, 1991, the Directive on the copyright protection of 
computer programs, often also called the Software Directive.
32
  Debates concerning how to 
draft this directive have now given way to lively discussion concerning the meaning of its 
ultimate language.
33
  
                                                 
     
29
 See H. Cohen Jehoram, "The European Commission pressured into a 
'disharmonising' Directive on chip protection," [1987] E.I.P.R. 35. 
 
     
30
 O.J. 1989 No. C 91.  But see § 1[2][d][ii] supra (E.C. treaty-making powers do not 
cover entire field of intellectual property). 
 
      
31
 See, e.g., Decision of the Council of Ministers 94/824/EC of 22 Dec. 1994, O.J. 
1994 No. L 349 (extension of legal protection of topographies to nationals of W.T.O. 
members, as of the start of 1996). 
 
     
32
 Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer 
programs, O.J. 1991 No. L 122, recodified as Directive 2009/24/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs. 
For the codified version, as cited herein, see Appendix 2 hereto; for both the original and the 
recodification, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/documents/documents_en.htm.  
 
     
33
 For further details on the Directive, see T. Dreier, "The Council Directive of 14 May 
1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs," [1991] E.I.P.R. 319; B. Czarnota and 
R. Hart, Legal Protection of Computer Programs in Europe, A Guide to the E.C. Directive 
(London, 1991).  For an evaluation with hindsight, see E. Derclaye, “Software Copyright 
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   [i]--Subject Matter and Rights.  The Software Directive, in Article 1(1), 
obligates Member States to "protect computer programs, by copyright, as literary works 
within the meaning of the Berne Convention." 
 
 Article 1(2) specifies that this protection "shall apply to the expression in any form of a 
computer program," but not to "[i]deas and principles which underlie any element of a 
computer program, including those which underlie its interfaces." Article 1(3) sets out the 
requirement that a program be "original in the sense that it is the author's own intellectual 
creation" but specifies that "[n]o other criteria shall be applied to determine its eligibility for 
protection."
34
 
 
 Article 2(1) defines the author of a computer program as "the natural person or group of 
natural persons who has created the program or, where the legislation of the Member State 
permits, the legal person designated as the rightholder." Article 2(3) further provides that, 
"[w]here a computer program is created by an employee in the execution of his duties or 
following the instructions given by his employer, the employer exclusively shall be entitled to 
exercise all economic rights in the program so created, unless otherwise provided by 
contract."  Article 3 extends protection to all claimants "eligible under national copyright 
legislation as applied to literary works." 
 
 The Directive, in Article 4, defines "restricted acts" which rightholders have "the right to 
do or to authorize." Article 4(a) starts with the restricted act of "the permanent or temporary 
reproduction of a computer program" and specifies that, "[i]nsofar as loading, displaying, 
running, transmission or storage of the computer program necessitate such reproduction, such 
acts shall be subject to authorization by the rightholder." Article 4(b) and (c) further 
enumerates the following restricted acts: "translation, adaptation, arrangement and any other 
alteration of a computer program, and the reproduction of the results thereof"; and, as well, 
"any form of distribution to the public, including the rental, of the original computer program 
or of copies thereof."  It also indicates that "[t]he first sale in the Community [now the 
Union] of a copy of a program by the rightholder or with his consent shall exhaust the 
distribution right within the Community [now the Union] of that copy, with the exception of 
the right to control further rental."
35
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Protection: Can Europe Learn from American Case Law?,” [2000] E.I.P.R. 7 (part I) and 56 
(part II).  
 
     
34
 For the impact on German case law construing the standard of protection for 
computer programs, see "Germany," herein, at § 2[4][d].  
 
     
35
 On E.U. exhaustion generally, see § 2[2] supra.  On how E.U. law precludes 
applying a rule of international exhaustion to computer programs, see § 2[2][e] supra. 
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 The Directive, in Article 7, requires "appropriate remedies" against (a) "putting into 
circulation a copy of a computer program" or (b) "the possession for commercial purposes" of 
a copy--in either event while "knowing, or having reason to believe, that it is an infringing 
copy."  Article 7(1)(c) also requires remedies for such acts relative to "any means the sole 
intended purpose of which is to facilitate the unauthorized removal or circumvention of any 
technical device which may have been applied to protect a computer program." 
 
 The subsequently issued Term Directive has since superseded the provisions which this 
Software Directive set out concerning the term of copyright in computer programs. The 
Member States are now obligated to extend their copyright protection to the author’s life plus 
70 years.
36
 
 
   [ii]--Exceptions to Restricted Acts.  The exceptions to the "restricted acts" the 
Directive defines, that is, effectively, limitations to the rights it assures, were hotly debated 
amid pressures from industry. In particular, the resulting provisions try to strike a balance 
between exceptions, which may, and those, which may not, be contractually waived. 
 
 To start, Article 5(1) provides that, "[i]n the absence of specific contractual provisions," 
the acts mentioned in Article 4(a) and (b) "shall not require authorization by the rightholder 
where they are necessary for the use of the computer program by the lawful acquirer in 
accordance with its intended purpose, including for error protection."  Article 5(2) prohibits 
preventing "by contract" the "making of a back-up copy by a person having a right to use the 
computer program  . . . insofar as it is necessary for that use."  Article 5(3) entitles such a 
person to "observe, study or test the functioning of the program in order to determine the 
ideas and principles, which underlie any element of the program."  It requires, however, that 
this person do any such exempted acts "while performing any of the acts of loading, 
displaying, running, transmitting or storing the program which he is entitled to do." 
 
 The Directive also makes decompilation possible under specific conditions which Article 
6 sets out in some detail.
37
  Article 6(1) allows a party entitled to use a program to decompile 
it "to obtain the information necessary to achieve the interoperability of an independently 
created computer program with other programs" under three conditions. The decompilation 
must be done (a) by "the licensee or by another person having a right to use a copy of the 
program" or the agent of either. It is permissible (b) to obtain only "information necessary to 
achieve interoperability [that] has not previously been readily available" to these persons.  
                                                 
     
36
 See § 4[2][d][i] infra. 
 
     
37
 Decompilation is often necessary to access the "ideas and principles" that Article 
1(2) excludes from protection and that Article 5(3) allows a legitimate user to ascertain. 
Further, "contractual provisions contrary to Article 6 or to the exceptions provided for in 
Article 5(2) and (3)" shall, under Article 9(1), "be null and void." For commentary, see K.J. 
Koelman, "An Exceptio Standardis: Do We Need an IP Exemption for Standards?," 10 I.I.C. 
823, 826 (2006). 
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And it must be (c) "confined to the parts of the original program which are necessary to 
achieve interoperability." 
 
 Article 6(2) precludes Article 6(1) from allowing information obtained by decompilation 
(a) to be used for "goals other than to achieve the interoperability" as already defined, (b) "to 
be given to others, except when necessary for [such] interoperability," and (c) to be used for 
"the development, production or marketing of a computer program substantially similar in its 
expression, or for any other act which infringes copyright." Finally, Article 6(3) closes by 
incorporating language of the Berne Convention, so that the entire Article "may not be 
interpreted in such a way as to allow its application to be used in a manner which 
unreasonably prejudices the rightholder's legitimate interests or conflicts with a normal 
exploitation of the computer program." 
 
  [c]--Rental and Lending Rights; Related Rights.  On November 19, 1992, the 
Council adopted the Directive on the rental right and lending right and on copyright-related 
rights.
38
 According to its Article 15, the Member States had to implement this directive by 
July 1, 1994.
39
 Article 13 provides for transitional rules concerning both substantive law and 
preexisting contracts.
40
 
 
   [i]--Rental and Public Lending Rights.  The Court of Justice had opened the 
way for the Rental Directive by recognizing the fact that, before this directive, some national 
laws had recognized rental rights and some had not, while only a few countries had provided 
for lending rights.  The Court, while finding such disparities to affect trade in cassettes within 
the Internal Market, declined to prohibit the exercise of rental rights in one country.
41
  It was 
left to a directive to harmonize national laws on point. 
                                                 
     
38
 Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending 
right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property, O.J. 1992 
No. L 346, recodified as Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to 
copyright in the field of intellectual property. For the codified version, as cited herein, see 
Appendix 3 hereto; for both the text of the original directive and the recodification, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/documents/documents_en.htm.  
 
     
39
 Full implementation of this directive has not always been timely. The Court of 
Justice issued judgments for failures to implement it against the following Member States: in 
2003, Belgium (Case C-433/02); in 2006, Luxembourg (Case C-180/05), Portugal (Case C-
53/05), Italy (case C-198/05), and Spain (Case C-36/05); and, in 2007, Ireland (Case C-
175/05).  
 
     
40
 For details on the Directive generally, see J. Reinbothe and S. von Lewinski, The 
E.C. Directive on Rental and Lending Rights and on Piracy (London, 1993). 
 
     
41
 See Judgment of 17 May 1988, Case 158/86, Warner Brothers Inc. and Metronome 
Video ApS v. Erik Viuff Christiansen, [1988] E.C.R. 2605 (discussed in § 2[1][b][ii] supra). 
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 Article 1(2) of the Directive defines "rental" as "making available for use, for a limited 
period of time and for direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage."  Article 1(3) 
defines "lending" as "making available for use, for a limited period of time and not for direct 
or indirect economic or commercial advantage, when it is made through establishments 
which are accessible to the public."  According to Article 1(4), any sale or other act of 
distribution does not exhaust rental and lending rights.
42
 
 
 Article 1(1) states that "Member States shall provide a right to authorize or prohibit the 
rental and lending" of objects which Article 2 goes on to specify.
43
  Article 2(1) states that 
these rights vest in "the author in respect of the original and copies of his work," in "the 
performer in respect of fixations of his performance," in "the phonogram producer in respect 
of his phonograms," and in "the producer of the first fixation of a film in respect of the 
original and copies of his film."  According to Article 2(2), "the principal director of a 
cinematographic or audiovisual work shall be considered as its author or one of its authors.  
Member States may provide for others to be considered as its co-authors." 
 
 The rights referred to in Article 2(1) may be transferred or contractually assigned or 
licensed.  If performing artists contract with a producer to participate in the production of a 
film, they shall be presumed, subject to contractual clauses to the contrary, to have transferred 
their rental rights,
44
 while Member States may institute comparable presumptions for authors 
of film works.  All such contractual presumptions--and, indeed, all transfers--are subject to 
Article 4, which provides for a very special, and originally controversial, protection of 
authors and performing artists vis-à-vis their producers.  Where an author or performing artist 
has transferred or assigned his rental right concerning a phonogram or a film to a phonogram 
or film producer, that author or performing artist retains an unwaivable right to obtain an 
equitable remuneration for the rental.
45
  The administration of this right may be entrusted to 
collecting societies representing authors or performing artists. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
     
42
 On E.U. exhaustion generally, see § 2[2] supra. 
 
     
43
 Article 2(3) excludes "buildings and works of applied art."  Article 3 reserves the 
provisions of the Software Directive.  On this directive, see § 4[2][b] supra.  
 
     
44
 Member States may, in the alternative, provide that such a contract has the effect of 
authorizing rentals.  
 
     
45
 According to Recital 16 of the Directive, the equitable remuneration may be paid on 
the basis of one or several payments at any time on or after the conclusion of the contract.  
For a critical analysis, see P.E. Geller, "The Proposed E.C. Rental Right: Avoiding Some 
Berne Incompatibilities," [1992] E.I.P.R. 4.  
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 Under Article 5, Member States may derogate from the exclusive right of public lending, 
provided that at least authors obtain remuneration for such lending.  This right may be further 
diluted, since "Member States shall be free to determine this remuneration taking account of 
their cultural promotion objectives."  Nonetheless, for at least the public lending of films, 
phonograms, and computer programs, authors must still obtain some remuneration.  On top 
of these limitations, Member States may exempt certain categories of establishments publicly 
lending works from paying remuneration. 
 
   [ii]--Rights in Performances, Recordings, and Broadcasts.  Chapter II of the 
Directive is devoted to "Rights related to copyright." These include the neighboring rights of 
the three classes of rightholders, which the Rome Convention protects: performers, producers 
of sound recordings, and broadcasting organizations.  The Directive goes further by 
recognizing rights of a fourth category: audiovisual producers.  
 
 According to Article 7, Member States are to grant performing artists and broadcasting 
organizations the exclusive right to authorize or prohibit the fixation of their performances or 
broadcasts.
46
  Article 9(1) provides all four classes of rightholders with a distribution right for 
their fixations, phonograms, or films. According to Article 9(2), the distribution right in any 
such fixation, phonogram, or film is not exhausted "except" in one case, namely first sale in 
the Internal Market by the rightholder or with his consent.  It is implied that exhaustion only 
applies in the case where a copy, phonogram, or film is first sold in the E.E.A. with the 
consent of the rightholder, but not in any other situation, such as first sale outside the E.E.A. 
even with such consent.
47
  As already explained, read in conjunction with comparable 
provisions in other directives, this exception precludes wider international exhaustion.
48
  
 
 Article 8(1) provides performing artists with the right to control broadcasting and other 
communications to the public, except where the performance is itself already a broadcast 
performance or made from a fixation of the performance, for example, a sound or audiovisual 
recording.  Article 8(3) grants broadcasting organizations the right to control the re-
broadcasting of their broadcasts, as well as the communication of their broadcasts in places 
accessible to the public against the payment of an entrance fee. 
 
 Article 8(2) is very important, requiring Member States to ensure that the user of a 
commercially published phonogram when it, or a reproduction made of it pays a single 
                                                 
     
46
 N.b., Article 11(1)(a) of the Information-Society Directive deleted the old Article 7 
here, which assured these two classes of rightholders, as well as phonogram and film 
producers, of reproduction rights.  On the Information-Society Directive, see § 4[2][g] infra. 
 
     
47
 See  J. Reinbothe and S. von Lewinski, The E.C. Directive on Rental and Lending 
Rights and on Piracy, 105 (London, 1993).   
 
     
48
 See § 2[2][e] supra. 
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equitable remuneration, is played for broadcasting or any other communication to the public.  
This remuneration is to be shared between the performing artists and phonogram producers. 
 
 Member States may provide for limitations to the rights referred to in Chapter II with 
regard to private use, reporting of current events, ephemeral fixation by broadcasting 
organizations and use solely for the purposes of teaching or scientific research, and other 
limitations for which any Member State provides in connection with copyright. Compulsory 
licenses may be provided for only to the extent to which they are compatible with the Rome 
Convention. 
 
 The subsequently issued Term Directive has since superseded the provisions which this 
Rental Directive set out concerning the terms of neighboring rights.
49
 
 
  [d]--Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission.  On September 27, 1993, 
the Council adopted its Directive concerning satellite broadcasting and cable 
retransmission.
50
 This directive has to be seen in context: it had been preceded by the 
Directive "Television without Frontiers" on October 3, 1989,
51
 and was followed by a pair of 
directives that, as explained below, allow for technologically controlling transmissions.
52
 
 
 The Satellite and Cable Directive breaks down into distinct chapters, each governing the 
exploitation of copyright and neighboring rights in different media.  Article 2 leading off its 
Chapter II allows for exploiting contractually communication by satellite, and Article 8 
leading off its Chapter III governs comparable points concerning retransmission by cable. 
Article 1 of the Directive defines a number of terms, including "satellite," "cable 
retransmission," and "collecting society."
53
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 See § 4[2][e][i] infra. 
 
     
50
 Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain 
rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting 
and cable retransmission, O.J. 1993 No. L 248. For the text of this directive, see Appendix 4 
hereto.  
 
 
51
 Directive 89/552/EEC, O.J. 1989 No. L 298. This directive, intended to promote 
telecommunications activities in the Internal Market, largely avoided controversial copyright 
issues, although it does govern advertising breaks that interrupt the televising of works such 
as feature films. For an example of its application, see A. Musso, "Italy," herein, at § 7[1][b] 
(hereinafter "Italy"). 
 
 
52
 See § 4[3][b][i] infra.  
 
     
53
 On this and other horizontal provisions in copyright directives, see § 4[2] supra. 
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   [i]--Satellite Broadcasting.  Chapter II of the Directive, containing its Articles 
2 through 7, is devoted to the broadcasting of programs by satellite. 
 
 Article 1(2) of the Directive defines the act of communication to the public by satellite as 
taking place “solely in the Member State, where, under the control and responsibility of the 
broadcasting organization, the program-carrying signals are introduced” to be uplinked to a 
satellite.
54
 As Recital 14 of the Directive explains, "such a definition is necessary to avoid the 
cumulative application of several national laws to one single act of broadcasting." Recital 16 
acknowledges that the principle of contractual freedom makes "it possible to continue 
limiting the exploitation of these rights, especially as far as certain technical means of 
transmission or language versions are concerned." Recital 17 recognizes that payment for the 
right to communicate by satellite should take account, inter alia, of actual and potential 
audiences and language versions.
55
   
 
 Article 2 provides that the Member States are to provide an exclusive right for the author 
to authorize the communication to the public by satellite of copyright works, subject to the 
further provisions of this chapter. Article 3(1) contains the clarion call: "Member States shall 
ensure that the authorization referred to in Article 2 may be acquired only by agreement."  
Article 3(2), referring to collective agreements between a collecting society and a 
broadcasting organization, provides for the extension of their terms to rightholders not 
represented by the collecting society, but this provision will not apply to cinematographic 
works. Article 4 clarifies that the prior Directive concerning the neighboring rights of 
performers, recording producers, and broadcasting organizations continues to apply to 
satellite communication.
56
 
 
 Article 7 contains some transitional provisions. Agreements concerning the exploitation 
of works and other protected subject matters which are in force on January 1, 1995, the due 
date for compliance with the Directive, are to be subject to the main provisions of the 
Directive only as of January 1, 2000, if those agreements expire after that date.  Article 7(3) 
contains a specific transitional rule for international co-production agreements. 
 
                                                 
     
54
 N.b., this definition is subject to complex "safeguard rules" applicable in the case of 
transmissions from any non-Member State which does not provide the specified level of 
protection: if the uplink is from a Member State or if the commissioner of the broadcast is in 
a Member State, the act is deemed to take place in that state. 
 
     
55
 But cf. Judgment of 14 July 2005, Case C-192/04, Lagardère Active Broadcast v. 
SPRE and GVL, [2005] E.C.R. I-7199 (case explained in § 5[7][a][iv][A] infra).  See also 
"Introduction," herein, at § 3[1][b][iii][A] (further analyzing the choice-of-law issues in 
cross-border transmissions).   
 
     
56
 On this directive, see § 4[2][c][ii] infra. 
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   [ii]--Cable Retransmission of Broadcasts.  Chapter III of the Directive deals 
with cable retransmission. Article 8 obligates the Member States to ensure that, when 
programs from other Member States are retransmitted by cable in their respective territories, 
the applicable copyright and related rights are observed. Such retransmission should only take 
place on the basis of collective or individual contractual agreements. Denmark could 
nonetheless retain its statutory license for cable retransmission until December 31, 1997. 
 
 Collective agreements are imposed on all rightholders except broadcast organizations. 
Article 9(1) provides that only collecting societies may exercise rights to authorize, or refuse 
authorization, to retransmit a work or other media production by cable. Of course, the 
collecting societies in this field do not have authorizations from all rightholders to exercise 
their rights in works that cable-operators may want to retransmit. Article 9(2) purports to 
solve these outsiders' problem: a collecting society, which manages rights of a given 
category, is deemed authorized to manage the outsiders' rights in this category. Article 10 
provides that Article 9 does not apply to broadcasting organizations with regard to 
authorizing the cable retransmission of their own transmissions. It makes no difference 
whether or not a broadcasting organization itself acquires the rights in the contents of these 
transmissions by contract. 
 
 Articles 11 through 12 provide for measures in cases where no agreement can be reached 
to allow for cable retransmission. Rather than the compulsory licenses the Commission 
proposed in its first initiatives, Article 11 contemplates non-binding, impartial mediation in 
cases where no agreement is reached. Article 12 requires Member States to ensure that the 
parties negotiate in good faith, without unjustifiably preventing or hindering negotiations. 
 
  [e]--Term of Protection of Copyright and Related Rights.  On October 29, 1993, 
the Council adopted its Directive harmonizing the term of copyright and certain related 
rights, and this directive was codified in 2006.
57
  The general deadline for compliance was 
July 1, 1995, subject to complex transitional provisions discussed below.
58
 This directive was 
effectively amended in the Term-Amendment Directive in 2011, once again subject to 
complex transitional provisions.
59
 
                                                 
      
57
 Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 harmonising the term of 
protection of copyright and certain related rights, O.J. 1993 No. L 290, recodified as 
Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 
on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights. For the codification, as cited 
herein, see Appendix 5A hereto; for both the text of the original directive and the 
recodification, go to 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/documents/documents_en.htm.  
 
      
58
 See § 4[2][e][ii] infra. 
 
 
59
 Directive 2011/77/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
September 2011 amending Directive 2006/116/EC on the term of protection of copyright and 
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 The Term Directive followed a signal of the Court of Justice which highlighted 
differences in national terms of copyright and neighboring rights that raised barriers to the 
free movement of goods.
60
  In drafting the Directive, the Commission chose not to harmonize 
down to the Berne minimum term of copyright--that is, life plus 50 years, the term shared by 
ten Member States at the time--but rather to harmonize upwards to the German copyright 
term of life plus 70 years. The Commission reasoned, inter alia, that harmonizing 
downwards, and thereby cutting short existing terms, would run counter to holdings of the 
Court of Justice that preclude "the retroactive withdrawal of  . . .  individual rights or similar 
benefits."
61
   
 
   [i]--Substantive Provisions.  The Term Directive sets out terms of copyright in 
original works and of related rights in other media productions. 
 
 Article 8 of the Term Directive contains the generally applied provision that all these 
terms are to be calculated from the first day of January of the year following the triggering 
event upon which they are calculated, for example, the first of January after the year of death 
of the author or after the year of publication, as the case may be. Article 9 explicitly provides 
that the Directive does not prejudice the different provisions of the Member States governing 
the term of moral rights. 
 
    [A]--Copyright. The Directive, in Article 1(1), provides for a general term 
of the life of the author plus 70 years, irrespective of when the work was lawfully made 
available to the public. 
 
 Article 1(2) provides that, for works of joint authorship, the term is to be calculated from 
the death of the last surviving author, but this rule is modified for audiovisual works. The 
Term-Amendment Directive harmonizes the term of copyright in coauthored musical 
compositions, so that this term expires 70 years after the death of the last surviving coauthor, 
whether of lyrics or music. However, this rule only applies when “both contributions were 
specifically created for the respective musical composition with words.”62  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
certain related rights, O.J. 2011 No. L 265. For the text of this directive, see Appendix 5B 
hereto. 
 
      
60
 Judgment of 24 Jan. 1989, Case 341/87, EMI Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im-und 
Export Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH, [1989] E.C.R. 79.  
 
      
61
 Judgment of 22 Sept. 1983, Case 159/82, Verll-Wallace v. Commission, [1983] 
E.C.R. 2711.  
 
 
62
 Term Directive, Art. 1(7), as amended in 2011.  
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 Article 2 compromises between different national approaches to cinematographic and 
audiovisual works, starting with the horizontal provision that the principal director of such a 
work is to be deemed at least one of its authors, while leaving Member States free to 
designate other co-authors.
63
 In any event, the term of copyright in audiovisual works expires 
70 years after the death of the last of the four following persons to survive, whether or not 
that person is nationally designated as a co-author: the principal director, the author of the 
screenplay, the author of the dialog, or the composer of the film music. 
 
 According to Article 1(3), the term of protection of anonymous or pseudonymous works 
will run for 70 years after being lawfully made available to the public. Article 1(4) provides 
that, in Member States which provide for particular terms for collective works or works 
initially owned by legal entities, the term is to be 70 years after publication, but that the term 
of life plus 70 years applies where the natural persons creating a work are identified. 
According to Article 1(5), when the term runs from publication of works published in parts, 
installments, episodes, or issues, it is to run for each item separately.  Article 1(6) provides 
that, where a work is not made lawfully available to the public, and the term is not counted 
from the author's death, protection is to terminate 70 years after creation. 
 
 To end the diversity within the Internal Market with respect to copyright in photographs, 
Article 6 applies the terms set out in Article 1 to all "original" photographs. Recital 17 of the 
Directive further clarifies the horizontal definition of originality,
64
 stating that "a 
photographic work within the meaning of the Berne Convention is to be considered original 
if it is the author's own intellectual creation reflecting his personality [emphasis added], no 
other criteria such as merit or purpose being taken into account." Finally, Article 6 leaves 
Member States free to protect non-original photographs, for example, by related rights, 
ostensibly for terms comparable to those for other related rights explained immediately 
below. 
 
    [B]--Related Rights. Article 3, as amended by the Term-Amendment 
Directive, sets the terms of protection of the traditional neighboring rights for performances, 
recordings, and broadcasts--and other provisions institute and set terms for further related 
rights--as follows:
65
  
 
+ Performances live and recorded other than in a phonogram: Performers obtain 50 years 
after the performance; however, in the case where a fixation of the performance 
                                                 
     
63
 According to Article 10(4) of the Term Directive, Member States need not apply the 
provisions of Article 2(1) on the authorship of cinematographic or audiovisual works to those 
works created before July 1, 1994.   
 
     
64
 On this and other horizontal provisions in copyright directives, see § 4[2] supra.  
 
     
65
 On substantive directive provisions concerning neighboring rights, see § 4[2][c] 
supra.  
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otherwise than in a phonogram has been lawfully published or communicated to the 
public within this period, the rights expire 50 years from such publication or 
communication, whichever is the earlier.  
 
+ Performances recorded in phonograms: However, for a fixation of the performance in a 
phonogram, the term is longer. If it is lawfully published or lawfully communicated to 
the public within this period, the rights shall expire 70 years from the date of the first 
such publication or the first such communication to the public, whichever is the earlier.
66
  
 
+ Phonograms: The rights of producers of phonograms last 70 years after fixation; 
however, in the case where a fixation of the performance has been lawfully published, 
the rights expire 70 years from such publication or, absent such publication but given 
lawful communication to the public, 70 years from such communication.
67
  
 
+ Audiovisual recordings: The rights of producers of first fixations of films--that is, 
cinematographic or audiovisual works or moving images, whether or not accompanied 
by sound--last 50 years after fixation, with an extension, identical to the provision for 
performers' rights, for cases of lawful publication or communication to the public.  
 
+ Broadcast programs: The rights of broadcasting organizations expire 50 years after the 
first transmission of the broadcast. 
 
+ Editions of public-domain works: Article 4 instituted a related right which protects any 
person who, after copyright lapses in a previously unpublished work, lawfully publishes 
the work or lawfully communicates it to the public. This "editor" benefits from 
protection equivalent to the author's economic rights in the work, but only during a term 
of 25 years from first publication or communication to the public. Article 5 allows 
Member States to protect critical and scientific publications of works that have fallen 
into the public domain for 30 years from publication. 
 
   [ii]--International and Transitional Provisions.  The initial Term Directive of 
1993, as well as the Term-Amendment Directive, introduced often-new terms into rather 
complex legal situations both outside and inside the European Community.
68
  As a result, 
careful consideration must be given to its international and transitional provisions. The Term-
Amendment Directive contains further transitional and contractual provisions.  
                                                 
 
66
 Term Directive, Art. 3(1), as amended in 2011. Previously, the provision called only 
for a term of 50 years. On transitional provisions, see § 4[2][e][ii] infra. 
 
 
67
 Term Directive, Art. 3(2), as amended in 2011. Previously, the provision called only 
for a term of 50 years. On transitional provisions, see § 4[2][e][ii] infra. 
 
 
68
 Articles 1 through 11 of the Term Directive were to be implemented by July 1, 
1995; the Term-Amendment Directive, by November 1, 2013.  
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    [A]--Rule of the Shorter Term; E.U. Revival of Rights. Specific 
provisions deal with the possibility that, across both E.U. and other borders, the rule of the 
shorter may apply with regard to terms lengthened in many E.U. Member States.
69
 The rule is 
indeed applied systematically to works and productions originating outside the Community, 
subject to prior treaty obligations, but it is not applied to those originating inside. Rather, 
rights may be revived in such works and productions otherwise fallen into the public domain 
in any Member State.  
 
 Article 7 of the Directive obligates the Member States to apply its rule of the shorter 
term to foreign works. These are works not authored by a "Community [now an E.U.] 
national" but with a "country of origin," as defined by the Berne Convention,
70
 that is not an 
E.U. Member State. Protection of such a work is to lapse in the Member State upon "the date 
of expiry of the protection granted" in its country of origin if protection has not already 
lapsed under the national law of the Member State.
71
  Article 7(2) sets out the rule of the 
shorter term with respect to neighboring or related rights, but the comparison takes place by 
looking at the "expiry of the protection granted" in the country "of which the rightholder is a 
national."
72
  Article 7(3) applies to Member States which, on October 29, 1993, are bound by 
international obligations, for example, under a bilateral treaty, to grant a longer term of 
protection than that which would result from the E.C., now the E.U., rule of the shorter term. 
They may maintain this longer term pending the conclusion of other international agreements 
on the term of protection.
73
 
 
 Article 10(1) provides that if, in a Member State, a term of protection still running on 
July 1, 1995, is longer than the corresponding term provided by the Directive, this term, one 
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 On the rule of the shorter term, see “Introduction,” herein, at § 5[2].  
 
     
70
 On applying the Berne notion of "country of origin," which can have shifting 
meanings from case to case, see “Introduction,” herein, at § 4[3][b][ii].  
 
     
71
 Relative to the Paris Act of the Berne Convention, the Directive adopts the language 
of "expiry of the term" found in Article 18(1) rather than that of "the term fixed in the country 
of origin" in Article 7(8) in fine.  For further analysis of this and other issues of applying the 
E.U. rule of the shorter term between E.U. and non-E.U. Member States, see "Introduction," 
herein, at § 5[2][b][ii]. 
 
     
72
 Note that Article 7(3) applies this rule "without prejudice to the international 
obligations of the Member States" that the Rome Convention determines in many cases of 
neighboring rights, but without providing for any categorical rule of the shorter term. 
 
     
73
 For examples of Member States subject to such agreements with the United States, 
see "Germany," herein, at § 3[3][b]; "Italy," herein, at § 3[3][b].  For further analysis, see 
"Introduction," herein, at §§ 5[1][c][ii] and 5[2][b][ii]. 
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effectively subject to acquired rights, will not be shortened. Most importantly, Article 10(2) 
states: "The terms of protection provided for in this Directive shall apply to all works and 
subject matter which are protected in at least one Member State" on July 1, 1995 "pursuant to 
national provisions on copyright or related rights or which meet the criteria for protection 
under" the Directive which provides for the protection of performances, phonograms and 
videograms, and broadcasts.
74
 For example, copyright in all works still protected by Germany 
on July 1, 1995, because Germany already had the long term of life plus 70 years, but which 
had fallen into the public domain in other Member States because of a prior shorter term, 
would be revived in those other Member States. 
 
 The Phil Collins decision of 1993, discussed above, gave an unexpected twist to the 
effect of Article 10(2) of the Term Directive, its revival provision.
75
 The rationale of this 
decision precludes any Member State from applying the rule of the shorter term to any work 
by a national of another Member State. Consider a work protected in Germany which, under 
the Phil Collins decision, could not have had the German copyright term of life plus 70 years 
cut back to any shorter term previously in effect in another Member State.
76
  Article 10(2) of 
the Directive then allows the author to invoke this longer German copyright in his work, if it 
still subsists on July 1, 1995, as a basis for obtaining the longer term under the Directive in 
other Member States. This argument would apply if the work at issue had fallen into the 
public domain in these other countries because of a prior expiry of term under their respective 
national laws. As a result, it could require reviving copyright in the work.
77
   
 
    [B]--Reliance and Contractual Provisions. The revival of lapsed rights 
calls for taking account of the reliance interests of third parties. Such parties, before any 
relevant effective date, may have already started exploitation of works or productions that 
they could have then legitimately regarded as having fallen into the public domain. Therefore, 
transitional provisions are provided both in the Term Directive and in the Term-Amendment 
Directive. The Term Directive, in Article 10(3), provides that it shall not prejudice any acts 
of exploitation performed before July 1, 1995. Furthermore, Member States are to adopt 
provisions necessary to protect rights acquired by third parties. 
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 On this directive, see § 4[2][c][ii] supra.  
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 On the Phil Collins decision, see § 1[2][e][i] supra.  
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 N.b. this effect holds even for works created before the E.C. Treaty went into effect 
between the protecting country and the Member State of which the author was a national.  
Such was the ruling, for example, in a case of the works of Puccini, long dead before the E.C. 
Treaty went into effect between Germany and Italy.  On the Puccini decision, see §§ 
1[2][e][ii] and 1[2][e][iii] supra.  
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 For further analysis, see "Introduction," herein, at § 4[3][a][i][C].  
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 The Term-Amendment Directive amends the Term Directive by adding further 
transitional provisions, as well as contractual provisions safeguarding performers’ interests in 
the extended terms of their rights, as follows:
78
  
 
+ Joint musical works with words: Article 10(6) of the Term Directive provides that 
Article 1(7) shall apply to musical compositions with words of which at least the musical 
composition or the lyrics are protected in at least one Member State on November 1, 
2013, and, of course, also to musical compositions with words which come into being 
after that date. However, acts of exploitation that occurred before that date, as well as 
rights that third parties may have acquired before that date, remain untouched.  
 
+ Performances and phonograms: Article 10(5) of the Term Directive provides that if the 
prior 50-year term of a related right in a phonogram, whether benefiting any performer or 
phonogram producer, is still running up to October 31, 2011, then the term extended to 
70 years under the Term-Amendment Directive shall subsequently apply “as at” 
November 1, 2013.  Ostensibly, if the old term were running on October 31, 2011, the 
newly extended term would start running in a Member State on the date when that State 
implemented the extension, which it should do no later than November 1, 2013.  Of 
course, phonograms made after the implementation date will be protected for the 
extended term of 70 years. 
 
+ Performers’ termination of contract; further remuneration: The Term-Amendment 
Directive adds, to the Term Directive, Articles 2a through 2e, which strengthen 
performers’ entitlements vis-à-vis recording producers.  To start, where a record 
producer does not market a phonogram within 50 years as prescribed, a performer has an 
unwaivable right to terminate his contract with the producer.  Further, where a 
performer’s contract provides for lump-sum remuneration, the performer has an 
unwaivable right to obtain annual supplementary remuneration, amounting to 20% of 
revenues from each prior year, from the phonogram producer following the 50th year 
after publication or lawful communication to the public of the phonogram: this 
performer’s right must be administered by collecting societies. Finally, where a 
performer’s contract provides for recurring payments, neither advance payments nor 
contractually defined deductions are to be deducted after the 50th year of publication or 
public communication. 
 
+ Contracts extended for new terms: Article 10a is added, providing that contracts or 
transfers concluded prior to November 1, 2013, will continue in their effects even if, 
according to the old term of 50 years, the performer’s protection would have expired, 
provided that there are no clear contractual indications to the contrary. Article 10a gives 
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 November 1, 2013, is the deadline for implementing the Term-Amendment 
Directive. Quaere whether, where these provisions give that date, one should read the date of 
implementation of the Term-Amendment Directive in a given Member State. Quaere, as 
well, what happens if a Member State is tardy in implementation. 
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the option to Member States to provide that contracts which, if they had been concluded 
before November 1, 2013, and entitled a performer to recurring payments, may be 
modified following the 50th year after the phonogram was lawfully published or, if it 
was never published, in the 50th year after it was lawfully communicated to the public. 
 
  [f]--Databases: Copyright and Related Rights.  After successive proposals and a 
common position, the Council of Ministers adopted a Directive on the legal protection of 
databases on March 11, 1996.
79
  This directive, in addition to harmonizing copyright in 
databases, established a new related right in database contents.
80
   
 
 The reasons for the Directive are twofold.  First, it is intended to eliminate differences in 
national laws with direct, negative effects on the Internal Market as regards databases.  
Second, a stable and uniform legal regime is supposed to stimulate investment in modern 
systems of information storage and retrieval, vital tools in the development of an information 
market.  In early 1991, during the elaboration of the Directive, the Dutch Grote Van Dale 
decision and the U.S. Feist decision, brought attention back to one basic requirement for 
copyright protection: Works must possess a modicum of creativity or personal character, 
which database contents do not necessarily display.
81
  The Commission then proposed 
protecting databases by copyright or, absent creativity, by a sui generis right in database 
contents. 
 
 The Directive provides in its Article 1(1): "This Directive concerns the legal protection 
of databases in any form."  After some hesitation in its preparatory stages, it thus includes 
data compilations printed and published on paper as well as electronic databases accessible 
online and on hard copies such as CD-ROMs.  Article 1(2) then gives a wide definition: the 
term "database" means a collection of works, data, or other independent materials arranged in 
a systematic or methodical way and individually accessible by electronic or other means.  
                                                 
     
79
 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the legal 
protection of databases, O.J. 1996 No. L 077. For the text of this directive, see Appendix 6 
hereto.  
 
     
80
 For general commentary, see J. Gaster, Der Rechtschutz von Databanken (Cologne, 
1999); V. Bensinger, Sui generis Schutz für Databanken, die EG-Datenbank Richtlinie vor 
dem Hintergrund des nordischen Rechts (Munich, 1999); M. Leistner, Der Rechtsschutz von 
Datenbanken im deutschen und europäischen Recht, Eine Untersuchung zur Rechtlinie 
96/9/EG und zu ihrer Umsetzung in das deutsche Urheberechtsgesetz (Munich, 2000); M. 
Davison, The Legal Protection of Databases (Cambridge, 2003); A.-M. Beunen, The 
European Database Directive and its effects in the Netherlands, France and the United 
Kingdom (Nijmegen, 2007); E. Derclaye, The Legal Protection of Databases, A Comparative 
Analysis (Cheltenham, 2008). 
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 On these decisions, respectively, see H. Cohen Jehoram, "Netherlands," herein, at § 
2[3][b]; "United States," herein, at § 2[3][c].  
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Protection may also apply to the materials necessary for the operation or consultation of 
certain databases, such as the thesaurus and indexing systems.  However, the Database 
Directive is to apply without prejudice to the prior Software, Rental, and Term Directives.
82
 
 
 A transitional provision governs the application of laws implementing the Database 
Directive with regard to copyrights and to sui generis rights in database contents. Under 
Article 14, databases which (1) exist at the date the Directive is implemented, (2) were 
protected by copyright law in a Member State at that time, but (3) do not fulfill the new 
eligibility criteria remain protected for the full preexisting copyright term, while sui generis 
rights are available in databases fulfilling requirements for such rights and made not more 
than 15 years before January 1, 1998. 
 
   [i]--Copyright in Databases.  Articles 3 through 6 of the Directive provide for 
the copyright protection of databases that, by reason only of the selection or arrangement of 
their contents, constitute the author's own intellectual creation.
83
 
 
 Copyright protection covers the structure of the database, which results from the 
selection or arrangement of its contents or both. But this copyright protection does not extend 
to its contents themselves, without prejudice to any rights that might exist in those contents, 
whether copyrights in component works or sui generis rights in raw data.
84
  Copyright in the 
database allows the copyright owner to control the following restricted acts: (a) temporary or 
permanent reproduction; (b) translation, adaptation, arrangement, or any other alteration; (c) 
distribution to the public of the database or of copies, subject, however, to exhaustion of this 
right by the first sale in the Internal Market;
85
 (d) communication, display, or performance to 
the public.  Any translation, adaptation, arrangement, or other alteration, mentioned in the 
second item, is subject to the restricted acts mentioned in the other items. 
 
 The lawful user of a database may perform any of these restricted acts if necessary for 
the purposes of access and normal use of the database. Where the lawful user is authorized to 
use only part of the database, the right to perform these acts applies only to that part.  
Member States have the option of providing further, specific limitations to this copyright, on 
the condition that such limitations do not unreasonably prejudice the rightholder's legitimate 
interests or conflict with the normal exploitation of the database.   
 
                                                 
     
82
 On the Software Directive applicable here, see § 4[2][b] supra. 
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 On this "horizontal" definition of originality in the directives, see § 4[2] supra. 
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 On this right, see § 4[2][f][ii] infra. 
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 On such exhaustion, see § 2[2] supra. 
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   [ii]--Sui Generis Rights in Contents.  Chapter III of the Directive institutes a 
sui generis right in the contents of a database, alongside any copyright protection possibly 
available in the structure of the database. 
  
 The rationale for this innovative and experimental right lies in related concerns.  To start, 
neither all databases nor their contents fulfill the requirements for copyright protection.  
Furthermore, the increasing use of digital recording technology enables the copying and 
rearranging of data from a first database to such an extent that any resulting second database 
could have identical contents as the first, but without infringing copyright in that first one. 
 
 Article 7(1) sets out the new right, which protects, not the results of originality or 
creativity, but only substantial investment, which may consist in expending financial 
resources as well as time, effort, and energy. Recital 19 mentions the compilation of several 
recordings of musical performances as an example of insufficient investment to result in the 
applicability of the sui generis right.  Article 7(1) should be quoted in extenso here:  
 
 "Member States shall provide for a right for the maker of a database which shows 
that there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either 
the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents, to prevent acts of extraction 
and/or reutilization of the whole of or a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or 
quantitatively, of the contents of that database." 
  
 Two restricted acts are defined in Article 7 to protect the results of investment: 
extraction and reutilization.  The term "extraction" means the permanent or temporary 
transfer of all or a substantial part of the contents of a database to another medium by any 
means or in any form. The term "re-utilization" means any form of making available to the 
public of all, or a substantial part, of the contents of a database by the distribution of copies,
86
 
by renting, or by online or other forms of transmission. 
 
 The sui generis right of the maker of a database in its contents may be contractually 
transferred, assigned, or licensed. The sui generis right may not be given effect so as to 
prejudice other rights, like copyrights, relative to the contents of a given database.  The 
rightholders remain free to decide whether or in what manner they will allow their works, 
other media productions, or the results of other services to be included in a database.  No 
provision is to be found on rights in databases made by employees. 
 
 According to Article 8, a lawful user of a database made available to the public may not 
be prevented from extracting or reutilizing insubstantial parts of its contents.  Article 9 gives 
Member States the options of providing specific exceptions to the sui generis right to the 
benefit of lawful users of a database made available to the public, for private purposes, for 
the purposes of illustration for technical or scientific research or public security, or the proper 
performance of an administrative or judicial procedure.  Nonetheless, national laws may not 
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 On exhaustion of the distribution right, see § 2[2] supra. 
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permit such repeated and systematic extraction or reutilization of insubstantial parts of the 
contents of a database as would unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the maker 
or conflict with the normal exploitation of the database, nor other acts of a lawful user with 
such effects.
87
   
 
 The term of protection, under Article 10, expires 15 years from January 1 of the year 
following the date of completion. If a database is made available to the public in that period, 
then the 15 years run from the end of the year of that initial making available. Article 10(3) 
addresses databases that are continually being updated: any substantial change to the contents 
of a database triggers a new term.  It suffices for the changed database to represent a 
substantial new investment, even if it results from the accumulation of successive additions, 
deletions, or alterations. 
 
 Article 11 reserves the sui generis protection to E.C., now E.U., nationals or residents, as 
well as to firms established under the laws of a Member State and with their registered office, 
administration, or principal place of business within the former Community, now the Union. 
The Council may conclude agreements extending the right to databases that are made in third 
countries and that the Directive does not otherwise protect. 
 
  [g]--Copyright in the Information Society.  The Information-Society Directive 
went through many phases of preparation.
88
 The most broadly sweeping of the harmonization 
directives in the field of copyright, the Directive was finally adopted on April 9, 2001,
89
 but 
not without provoking much critical analysis both before and after adoption.
90
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 The projected provision for compulsory licenses to avoid abuses of dominant 
positions disappeared from the final version. On this and other points, see Commission, First 
evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases, 12 Dec. 2005, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.pdf. 
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 See, inter alia, Commission, Proposal for a Directive on the harmonization of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 10 Dec. 1997, 
COM(97) 628 final,, O.J. 1998 No. C 108; Amended Proposal, COM(1999) 250 final, O.J. 
1999 No. C 108.  
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 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 
O.J. 2001 No. L 167, p. 10.  For the text of this directive, see Appendix 7 hereto; for a 
correction, go to http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001L0029R%2801%29:EN:HTM.   
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 For critical commentaries, see B. Hugenholtz, “Why the Copyright Directive is 
Unimportant and Possibly Invalid,” [2000] E.I.P.R. 499; Th. C. Vinje, “Should We Begin 
Digging Copyright’s Grave?,” [2000] E.I.P.R. 551; B. Knies, “Erschöpfung Online?--Die 
aktuelle Problematik beim On-Demand-Vertrieb von Tonträgern im Lichte der Richtlinie zur 
Informationsgesellschaft” (Exhaustion Online--Present Issues Concerning Online Commerce 
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 The deadline for implementing the Directive, under Article 13(1), was December 22, 
2002.
91
 Article 10 applies the Directive to all subject matters protected by copyright or 
related rights on that date, but without prejudice to rights acquired before that date. Article 
1(2) makes clear that this Information-Society Directive does not affect prior directives in the 
field.
92
 Article 9 clarifies that other intellectual property rights apply cumulatively with the 
rights that the Directive assures.  
 
 An important goal of the Directive is to guide Member States in implementing their 
obligations under the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performers and Phonograms 
Treaty. However, as these WIPO Treaties only provide for minimum standards, the Directive 
does not literally track all their terms but, at some points, goes beyond their standards.  
Indeed, on December 14, 2009, the European Union, as a full Contracting Party, along with 
Member States, ratified the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty, effective March 14, 2010.
93
  
 
 This directive joins a number of others that complement each other in applying to digital 
transmissions and uses.
94
 Article 8 of this Information-Society Directive obligates Member 
States to assure "effective, proportionate and dissuasive" remedies for rights and entitlements 
for which the Directive provides. These remedies are to include seizures and injunctions, 
even against intermediaries, for example, Internet services, used by third parties to infringe 
copyright or related rights. However, Recital 16 of this directive confirms that monetary 
liability for network activities concerns, not only such rights, but also other areas such as 
                                                                                                                                                       
in Recordings in the Light of the Information Society Directive), [2002] GRUR Int. 317; M. 
Hart, “The Copyright in the Information Society Directive: an Overview,” [2002] E.I.P.R. 58; 
M. Favale, "Fine-tuning European copyright law to strike a balance between the rights of the 
owners and users," [2008] E.L. Rev. 666 (analyzing the national implementation of the 
Information-Society Directive in the 27 Member States and assessing the extent to which it 
has attained the intended harmonization and whether it is effective to achieve the balance of 
rights). 
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 The Commission sued Sweden, Finland, Spain, Belgium, France, and the United 
Kingdom for failures to implement this directive, and the Court of Justice decided against 
those countries in 2004.  Actions are still pending against the Czech Republic and 
Luxembourg. 
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 Subject to Article 11, which amended certain provisions of prior directives, as 
indicated at appropriate spots above. 
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 See Commission Press Release No. IP/09/1916, 14 Dec. 2009.  On the E.U. power 
to participate in such treaties, see § 1[2][d][ii] supra.  
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 On the Advanced-Television and Conditional-Access Directives, see § 4[3][b][i] 
infra. 
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defamation, misleading advertising, trademarks, etc. The issue of such liability is addressed 
horizontally in the Electronic-Commerce Directive.
95
 Further remedies are confirmed in the 
Directive concerning remedies for intellectual property, including border controls.
96
 
 
   [i]--Rights and Exceptions. The Information-Society Directive harmonizes the 
following rights and exceptions: 
  
+ Article 2 assures the right of reproduction for authors, performing artists, phonogram 
producers, film and other audiovisual producers, and broadcasting and cable-casting 
organizations. It extends this right to direct or indirect, temporary or permanent 
reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part.
97
 
 
+ Article 3 assures the right of communication to the public for authors and the right of 
making available to the public for the other rightholders just named.  It clarifies that 
these rights extend control over making works and other protected media productions 
accessible to members of the public in any place and time that these members 
individually choose, for example, on-demand in the digital environment. 
 
+ Article 4 subjects the right of distribution of authors to exhaustion in the Internal Market, 
but not internationally.  Recital 29 makes it clear that the question of exhaustion does not 
arise in the case of services, notably online services.  Nor does it extend to any material 
copy made by a user of such a service with the consent of the rightholder, nor to the 
rental or lending of copies.
98
 
 
 Article 5(1) sets out the only mandatory exception, allowing for temporary acts of 
reproduction that are "transient or incidental," "an integral and essential part of a 
technological process," and have the "sole purpose to enable" network transmission by an 
intermediary or a lawful use.  Otherwise, Article 5 lists twenty optional limitations and 
exceptions exhaustively, thus precluding Member States from providing any others. Five of 
these may limit the rights of reproduction and distribution; fifteen may limit these rights as 
well as the right of communication or making available to the public. While private copying 
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 On the Electronic-Commerce Directive, see § 4[3][b][ii] infra. 
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 On the Enforcement Directive, see § 4[3][d] infra. 
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 It remains undecided how far this right extends, given the complex limitations and 
exceptions to which it is subject.  For one analysis, see Christophe Geiger, "Legal or Illegal? 
That is the Question!  Private Copying and Downloading from the Internet," 39 I.I.C. 597 
(2008). 
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 See S. von Lewinski, “International Exhaustion of the Distribution Right under EC 
Copyright Law,” [2005] E.I.P.R. 233.  
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generally calls for "fair compensation" of the rightholders, different institutional uses are 
treated differently depending on their purposes and expected impacts. Other traditional 
exceptions, such as for quotation, parody, and news uses, are also recognized. 
 
 In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity,
99
 Member States will be free to choose 
to apply any, some, or all of these limitations or exceptions, subject to the Berne/TRIPs three-
step test which is enshrined in Article 5(5) of the Directive: limitations and exceptions should 
be confined to special cases that neither conflict with normal exploitation nor unreasonably 
prejudice the rightholder's legitimate interests.
100
 Calls have been made for further 
harmonizing the entire set of E.U. limitations and exceptions, albeit flexibly.
101
 
 
   [ii]--Anticircumvention; Rights Data.  The WIPO Treaties introduce new 
remedies for rightholders in the digital environment.
102
 The Information-Society Directive 
requires that such remedies be implemented while coordinating the provisions on point with 
its other provisions.
103
 
 
 Article 6(1) requires Member States to provide "adequate legal protection against the 
circumvention" of effective technological measures, for example, of copy control, encryption, 
etc., where such circumvention is carried on knowingly or with reason to know.   Article 6(2) 
further requires protection against the manufacture and commercialization of devices, 
products, components, and services that are marketed "for the purpose of circumvention," 
have only a "limited commercially significant purpose or use" other than to circumvent, or 
are "primarily" designed, made, offered, or fit for such purposes.    
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 On this principle, see §§ 1[1][c] and 4[1][a] supra. 
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  For commentary, see M. Senftleben, Copyright Limitations and the Three Step Test 
(Kluwer Law Internat’l, 2004); K.J. Koelman, "Fixing the Three-step Test," [2006] E.I.P.R. 
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"Towards a Balanced Interpretation of the ’Three-step Test’ in Copyright Law," [2008] 
E.I.P.R. 489.  
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  See P.B. Hugenholtz and M. Senftleben, “Fair use in Europe: In search of 
flexibilities,” at 
http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/Fair%20Use%20Report%20PUB.pdf. 
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 See M. Kretschmer, “Digital copyright: the end of an era,” [2003] E.I.P.R. 333. 
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 See N. Braun, “The interface between the protection of technological measures and 
the exercise of exceptions to copyright and related rights: comparing the situation in the US 
and in the EC,” [2003] E.I.P.R. 496. 
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 Such technological measures as copy control, encryption, etc., can be used to block 
access to public-domain materials, as well as to materials otherwise subject to exceptions or 
limitations that the Directive itself allows.  Accordingly, Article 6(4) of the Directive 
instructs Member States to take "appropriate measures" to ensure that rightholders make 
available "means" to use materials that, although blocked, fall under exceptions and 
limitations that include private copying and a variety of institutional uses.
104
  These "means" 
to access the technologically blocked materials are only to be extended to the "beneficiaries" 
of the specified exceptions and limitations.   Nonetheless, it is contemplated that such access 
may be governed by "voluntary measures" taken by rightholders or "agreements" with these 
beneficiaries. 
 
 Article 7(1) requires Member States to provide "adequate legal protection against any 
person" who, without authority but "knowingly" or with grounds to know, removes or alters 
electronic rights-management information.   It also requires such protection against anyone 
who thus commercializes, or otherwise makes available to the public, works or other 
protected subject matters from which, without authority, such information has been removed 
or on which it has been altered. 
 
   [h]--Resale Right: Droit de Suite.  On September 27, 2001, the Directive on the 
resale right, that is, the right commonly known under the French term droit de suite, was 
finally adopted,
105
 following an intense conciliation procedure between the Parliament and 
the Council.
106
 The deadline for implementation was January 1, 2006.
107
 
 
 Prior to implementation of this directive, a majority of Member States provided for 
resale rights or droit de suite.
 
  At that time, however, such laws, where they existed, 
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 These include: private copying on paper and like media; non-commercial copying by 
public libraries, educational institutions, museums, or archives; ephemeral recordings by 
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  For commentary, see P. Katzenberger, “EG-Richtlinie zum Folgerecht” (E.C. 
Resale-Right Directive), [2004] GRUR Int. 20; P. Valentin, "Droit de Suite," [2006] E.I.P.R. 
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107
 See, e.g., Judgment of 31 Jan. 2008, Case C-32/07, Commission of the European 
Communities v Kingdom of Spain, [2008] E.C.R. I-17 (ruling that Spain had failed to 
implement the Directive in timely fashion). 
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displayed certain differences, notably as regards the works they covered and the rates they set 
for royalties, and there were gaps of coverage relative to Member States that did not provide 
for resale rights.
108
  Such disparities had negative impacts on the proper functioning of the 
Internal Market in embodiments of works of art; hence, the need for a legislative instrument.  
Moreover, the Directive will give the Union a basis on which to promote the international 
recognition of resale rights.  Article 14ter of the Paris Act of the Berne Convention only 
makes such a right optional internationally.  Recital 7 of the Directive contemplates efforts to 
make it compulsory. 
 
 Time limits, a contentious topic, are subject to a complex compromise.  The resale right, 
under Article 8(1), lasts as long as economic copyright.  Under Article 6(1), the right 
devolves on an author's heirs upon his death.  In principle, under Articles 10 and 12, Member 
States must implement the Directive in national law by January 1, 2006.  However, under 
Article 8(2), Member States may opt to apply resale rights only to living artists during a 
further four years, that is, until January 1, 2010.  In addition, if a Member State requests, this 
further deadline of 2010 may be extended for another two years, subject to a consultation and 
transparency mechanism in which the Commission will play a part.
109
 However, this long 
period for implementation must be considered as exceptional.
110
 
 
   [i]--Subject Matter and Rights. The subject matter of the resale right is the 
physical embodiment of a work of art protected by copyright, effectively the art object.  
Article 2(1) of the Directive gives this list of examples: "works of graphic or plastic art such 
as pictures, collages, paintings, drawings, engravings, prints, lithographs, sculptures, 
tapestries, ceramics, glassware and photographs, provided they are made by the artist 
himself" or "are copies considered to be original works of art" or original "copies."  Article 
2(2) defines such copies as those "which have been made in limited numbers by the artist 
himself or under his authority" and indicates that such prints, sculptures from molds, etc., 
"will normally have been numbered, signed or otherwise duly authorised by the artist."  
 
  The resale right itself, according to Article 1(1) of the Directive, is "an inalienable right, 
which cannot be waived, even in advance, to receive a royalty based on the sale price 
obtained for any resale of the work, subsequent to the first transfer of the work by the 
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 See Commission declaration in the Council minutes concerning the Directive on 
resale rights, O.J. 2001 No. C 208.  
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author."  Thus the right represents an economic interest in receiving remuneration, that is, the 
resale royalty, from successive sales of each qualifying embodiment, and its aim is to allow 
artists and their heirs and other successors on death to share in the sellers’ profits that accrue 
from the increased value of such embodiments, thus restoring some balance between the 
economic situation of artists and that of other creators who can exploit their works several 
times over.  Under Article 1, the resale right is to apply to all acts of resale by art dealers, 
including sellers or buyers or intermediaries who are art-market professionals, such as 
salesrooms and art galleries.
111
   
 
 According to Article 7 of the Directive, Member States may treat habitual residents as 
their nationals for purposes of according resale rights.  Member States only need accord this 
right to non-E.E.A. claimants on the basis of treaty obligations, notably Article 14ter of the 
Paris Act of the Berne Convention, or simple reciprocity.  The Commission is to keep a 
declarative list of such third countries as fulfill Berne or other reciprocity conditions for their 
nationals to enjoy the right.  However, the Phil Collins decision
112
 compels E.E.A. states to 
provide for national treatment for all E.E.A. nationals with regard to the resale right. 
 
   [ii]--Royalty Rates; Administration.  Schedules for royalty rates and 
implementation were controversial.  Under Article 3 of the Directive, resale rights will apply 
to any sale where the price exceeds € 3,000.113  Works of art that are not sold at prices above 
this threshold--for example, some sketches, engravings, and photographs--may not be 
covered.  Paintings and sculptures are likely to give rise more often to the payment of resale 
royalties.  Even so, the effect of this restriction is tempered by the option given to Member 
States of applying resale rights to sales of less than € 3,000.   In these cases Article 4(3) 
provides for a resale right of not less than 4% of the selling price.  
 
 The European art markets find their main competitor for the sale of modern and 
contemporary works in New York City.  The U.S. does not federally recognize resale 
rights;
114
 nor does Switzerland.  Art-market professionals feared that, upon the imposition of 
an E.C. and now an E.U.-wide resale right, sales of art objects will shift to the U.S. or 
Switzerland.  Precaution has been taken in the Directive to prevent any such shift from taking 
                                                 
 
111
  Member States may exceptionally provide that one of the natural or legal persons 
subject to the right, other than the seller, may be liable, or be jointly and severally liable with 
the seller, for payment of the royalty.  
 
 
112
  Judgment of 20 Oct. 1993, Joined Cases C-92/92 and C-326/92 (discussed and 
referenced in § 1[2][e][i] supra). 
 
 
113
  Member States may exceptionally provide that the right not apply to a resale where 
the seller has acquired the work directly from the author less than three years before the resale 
in question and where the resale price does not exceed € 10,000. 
 
 
114
  California has such a scheme. See "United States," herein, at § 4[3][f]. 
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place. To ensure that there is no incentive to move sales of art in the highest price-brackets 
outside the Internal Market, Articles 4 and 5 of the Directive introduce the principle of a 
tapering scale of rates.  The maximum that an artist can receive as resale royalties on a single 
sale is limited to € 12,500.  Otherwise, under Article 4, artists will receive a percentage of the 
resale price of their works ranging from 4% to 0.25% in five levels of selling price: 
 
+ 4%--or 5%, at Member States’ discretion--for the threshold price of € 3,000 up to € 
50,000;  
 
+ 3% from € 50,000 to € 200,000;  
 
+ 1% from € 200,000 to € 350,000;  
 
+ 0.5% from € 350,000 to € 500,000;  
 
+ 0.25% over € 500,000. 
 
 Under Article 6(2), Member States may provide for compulsory or optional collective 
management of the royalties deriving from the resale right.  Under Article 9, parties obligated 
to pay such royalties are also obligated to provide claimants with information regarding any 
pertinent sale for three years after that sale. 
 
 In December 2011, the Commission issued its first and long-overdue report evaluating 
this directive.
115
  
 
 [3]--Related Directives, Regulations, and Other Instruments 
 
  [a]--Jurisdiction and Choice of Law. The Union has an arsenal of instruments for 
governing jurisdiction and choice of law in cross-border cases.  Such issues become 
increasingly more frequent as trade increases in the Internal Market, especially with the 
advent of the Internet.   
 
 Effective March 1, 2002, the Regulation on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters superseded the 1968 Brussels Convention as between most E.C. 
and now E.U. Member States.
116
 Thus, if the conditions of this Brussels I Regulation are 
                                                 
 
115
 Report on the Implementation and Effect of the Resale Right Directive 
(2001/84/EC), 14 Dec. 2011, COM(2011) 878 final, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/resale/report_en.pdf .  
 
 
116
 Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I 
Regulation), O.J. 2001 No. L 12.   N.b., while the Brussels I Regulation parallels the Brussels 
Convention, its provisions are numbered differently, and not all Member States are bound by 
it.   
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satisfied, as construed by a growing case law, a judgment or an interim order obtained in one 
Member State with regard to the infringement of intellectual property will be enforceable in 
another.
117
 Under the prior Brussels Convention, the Court of Justice had already disallowed 
objections to such enforcement even when European public policy, freedoms of commerce, 
and competition law were invoked.
118
  
 
 The Lugano Convention still applies to jurisdiction and to the enforcement of judgments, 
inter alia, as between E.U. Member States and E.E.A. countries.
119
 However, on October 30, 
2007, the European Community, now the European Union, and Iceland, Norway, and 
Switzerland signed the new Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.
120
 This new Lugano Convention 
takes account of the Brussels I Regulation in many regards.
121
 
 
 On July 11, 2007, the European Parliament and the Council adopted the Regulation on 
the law applicable to non-contractual obligations.
122
 Article 8(1) of this Rome II Regulation 
provides that law applicable to an infringement of an intellectual property right is to be the 
law of the country for which protection is claimed.
123
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 For an overview relative to copyright, see "Introduction," herein, at § 6[1][a]. 
 
  
118
 Judgment of 11 May 2000, Case C-38/98, Renault v. Maxicar, [2000] E.C.R. I-
2973.  For commentary, see L. Gonzalez Vaqué and D. Millerot, “L’application de l’article 
28 (ex-article 30) aux marchandises en transit: l’arrêt 'Pièces détachées'” (Application of 
Article 28 to Goods in Transit: the "Spare Parts" Decision), [2001] Revue du Droit de 
l’Union Européenne 189. 
 
 
119
 Lugano Convention of 16 September 1988 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, O.J. 1988 No. L 319. 
 
 
120
 For the text, go to 
http://www.ofj.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/wirtschaft/ipr.Par.0022.File.tmp/260307_entw_lu
gano_convention-e.pdf. 
 
 
121
  See Council Decision of 15 Oct. 2007 on the signing of the Convention on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, O.J. 2007 No. L 339. 
 
    
122
 Council Regulation (EC) 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II Regulation), 
O.J. 2007 No. L 199. 
 
  
123
 For analysis relative to copyright, see "Introduction," herein, at § 3[1][a]. 
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 On June 6, 2008, the Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations was 
adopted.
124
 Article 3(1) of this Rome I Regulation starts with the principle of contractual 
freedom: “A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.” Subsequent 
provisions govern contracts where the parties have not made such a choice of law, as well as 
exceptions to the basic principle of contractual freedom. This regulation does not address 
issues that may arise in copyright cases because of inalienable author’s rights.125 
 
  [b]--Related Internet Directives and Proposals. A number of directives, as they 
take effect together, influence the legal environment for the online exploitation of copyright 
and related rights in the European marketplace.
126
  
 
   [i]--Television and Conditional-Access Directives.  The Council adopted the 
Directive "Television without Frontiers" on October 3, 1989, which dealt with promoting 
E.C.-wide, thus now E.U.-wide, activities in the field of telecommunications, but which 
carefully avoided controversial copyright issues.
127
  Since then, it has adopted a pair of 
further directives in this field with increasing impact on just such issues.  
 
 The Advanced-Television Standards Directive had diverse goals.
128
 One, of many, was 
to provide a measured balance between the objective of encouraging investment in digital-
television services and protecting consumers’ interests by promoting eventual competition.  
Indeed, there has been concern that the use of proprietary technology in this context could, if 
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 Council Regulation (EC) 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), O.J. 2008 No. L 
177.  N.b., this Rome I Regulation applies to contracts concluded after December 17, 2009, 
but it is not necessarily binding on all Member States. For details on how the Regulation 
applies to intellectual property licences, see P. Torremans, “Licences and assignments of 
intellectual property rights under the Rome I Regulation,” [2008] Journal of Private 
International Law 397. 
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 For further analysis, see "Introduction," herein, at §§ 6[2] and 6[3]. 
 
      
126
 For a critical analysis, see Th. Heide, "Access Control and Innovation under the E.U. 
Electronic Commerce Framework," [2000] Molengrafica Europees Privaatrecht 65, and 15 
Berkeley Technology Law J. 993 (2000). 
 
      
127
 Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain 
provisions laid down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States 
concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities, O.J. 1989 No. L 298. This 
directive does govern advertising breaks that interrupt the televising of works such as feature 
films. For an example of its application, see "Italy," herein, at § 7[1][b]. 
 
      
128
 Directive  95/47/EC on the use of standards for the transmission of television 
signals, O.J. 1995 No. L 281. 
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uncontrolled, lead to the creation and abuse of dominant positions to the detriment of fair 
competition and user welfare. Article 4 of the Directive therefore requires conditional-access 
service providers who administer decoders to offer conditional access services to all 
broadcasters on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.  It also requires that holders of 
industrial-property rights in relevant devices grant licenses to manufacturers and that 
procedures are easily available to resolve disputes concerning that application of these 
provisions.   
 
 The Conditional-Access Directive complements this scheme.
129
  It aims at ensuring 
equal treatment of the suppliers of cross-border broadcasts, regardless of their place of 
establishment.  It requires that each Member State prohibit, on its territory, the use of illicit 
devices, for example, decoders of encrypted broadcasts, that is, equipment or software 
designed or adapted to give access to television and radio-broadcasting services provided 
against remuneration and based on conditional access.
130
 Member States are also under an 
obligation to provide for sanctions that are to be effective, dissuasive, and proportionate to 
the impact of any activity allowing for unauthorized access to such protected broadcasting 
services.  This directive thus constitutes one basis for preventing the circumvention of 
technical devices blocking access to information services, since the scope of this legislation 
covers pay television, video-on-demand, and electronic publishing, as well as a wide range of 
online services. The Information-Society Directive now generically protects technological 
safeguards against circumvention.
131
 
 
   [ii]--The Electronic-Commerce Directive.  A few years after the Commission 
Proposal
132
 and the Common Position for an Amended Proposal,
133
 the Directive on certain 
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 Directive 98/84/EC on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, 
conditional access, O.J. 1998 No. L 320.   For commentary, see S. Dusollier, “Electrifying the 
Fence: The Legal Protection of Technological Measures for Protecting Copyright,” [1999] 
E.I.P.R. 285; V. Mcevedy, “The DMCA and the E-Commerce Directive,” [2002] E.I.P.R. 65.  
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 One case has tested sanctions against dealings in decoders: Judgment of 4 Oct. 2011, 
Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, Football Association Premier League v. QC Leisure 
and Karen Murphy v. Media Protection Services, [2012] F.S.R. 1, para. 64 (as discussed § 
5[8][b] infra).  
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 On this directive in this regard, see § 4[2][g][ii] supra.  
 
       
132
 Commission, Proposal for a Directive on certain legal aspects of electronic 
commerce in the internal market, COM(98) 586 final, 18 Nov. 1998.  
 
       
133
 Commission Document of 17 Aug. 1999, COM(1999) 427 final. 
 
EU: p. 126 
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the 
Internal Market was adopted on June 8, 2000.
134
  Regulations on point are also expected. 
 
 The goals of the Directive include, inter alia, harmonizing legal regimes among the 
Member States to facilitate electronic commerce in the Internal Market.  The scope of the 
Directive is determined in part by Article 2, which sets out definitions that effectively cover a 
large range of electronic services.  These include business-to-business and business-to-
consumer services, as well as those provided free of charge, for example, those funded by 
advertising or sponsorship revenues.  Article 3(1), read in conjunction with Recital 19, 
applies the Directive only to service providers established within the former Community, 
now the Union, while Article 2(c) defines the place of establishment as that where an 
operator actually pursues an economic activity through a fixed establishment, irrespective of 
where technological facilities such as web-sites or servers are situated.   
 
 Under Article 1, the Directive is to complement other E.C. and now E.U. laws, as well as 
national laws, protecting consumer interests.
135
   Article 3(2) generally precludes each 
Member State, in matters subject to coordination by the Directive, from restricting the 
freedom to provide relevant services from another Member State.   Under Article 3(4) read in 
conjunction with Recital 11, Member States will only be allowed to impose proportionate 
restrictions on such services from another Member State on a case-by-case basis if necessary 
to protect certain public interests.
136
  Article 3(4)(b) establishes procedures for such 
exceptional measures, including advance notification to the Member State where the service 
provider is established and to the Commission, which may veto unjustified measures. 
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 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in 
the Internal Market, O.J. 2000 No. L 178.  For commentary, see G. Pearce and N. Platten, 
“Promoting the Information Society: The E.U. Directive on Electronic Commerce,” [2000] 
European Law J. 363; A. Palacio Vallelersundi, “Le commerce électronique, le juge, le 
consommateur, l’entreprise et le Marché Intérieur” (Electronic Commerce, Courts, 
Consumers, Enterprises, and the Interior Market), [2001] Revue du Droit de l’Union 
Européenne 5; I. Walden, “Regulating electronic commerce: Europe in the global e-conomy,” 
[2001] E.L. Rev. 529; J. Bornkamp, "GRUR meets Brussels: E-Commerce Directive v. IP 
Rights Enforcement Directive. Legal Balance Achieved?," [2007] GRUR Int. 642; W. 
Osthaus, "Fighting Piracy and Counterfeiting in the Light of the European Principles  of 
eCommerce,” [2007] GRUR Int. 644.  
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 This directive does not purport to govern, inter alia, jurisdiction and the choice of 
law.  On E.U. law on point, see § 4[3][a] supra. 
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 These include protecting minors, as well as consumers and investors, assuring 
public health and security, and restraining hate crimes and speech, as well as offenses to the 
human dignity of individuals.   
 
EU: p. 127 
 Consumers are protected on a number of levels, including online contracting.
137
  Articles 
5 through 7 require service providers and commercial communications, such as advertising 
and direct marketing, to provide certain basic information: for example, commercial 
electronic mail must be clearly identifiable as such.  Under Article 9, Member States must 
legislatively allow for electronic contracts in common fields of commerce, and Article 11 
allows consumers to order services by technological means, such as clicking on an icon.  
Under Article 10, the service provider is obligated to indicate clearly to consumers in what 
stages any offered contract is to be formed, whether it will be archived by the service, how it 
can be accessed again, how input errors can be corrected, languages for concluding the 
contract, and any relevant code of conduct.  The service provider has to provide consumers 
with technical means to correct input errors and to allow them to store and reproduce 
contracts.  The service provider also has to acknowledge receipt of orders electronically and 
without undue delay.  The order and acknowledgment of receipt are deemed received upon 
access by the addressee.
138
  
 
 Intermediary liability is also governed horizontally, that is, not just for a specific field 
like copyright, but for all subject communications. The Directive acknowledges in its Recital 
40 that service providers have a duty to act, in certain circumstances, with a view to 
preventing or stopping illegal activities.  It therefore aims at providing for the development of 
rapid and reliable procedures for removing and disabling access to illegal information, 
ostensibly including materials infringing copyright or related rights.  That said, Articles 12 
through 14 of the Directive define functions, namely acting as “mere conduit,” “caching,” 
and “hosting,” that service providers may play without incurring monetary liability as long as 
they maintain passive roles in conveying information from third parties.
139
  These exemptions 
thus cover only cases where, for the sole purpose of making the transmission more efficient, 
the service provider limits itself to technical processes of operating and giving access to a 
communication network over which third-party information is transmitted or temporarily 
stored.  According to Recital 42, to benefit from these exemptions, the service provider must 
have neither knowledge of, nor control over, the information in question. 
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 For commentary, see F. Dessemontet, "Contracting and Licensing on the Net," in L. 
Gorton, et al. (eds.), Festkrift till Gunnar Karnell, 111 (Stockholm, 1999); P. Samuelson and 
K. Opsahl, “Licensing information in the Global Information Market: Freedom of Contract 
Meets Public Policy,” [1999] E.I.P.R. 386; P. Mankowski, “Internet und Internationales 
Wettbewerbsrecht” (Internet and International Competition Law), [1999] GRUR Int. 909. 
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 N.b., some of the contractual requirements indicated here, while ostensibly 
applicable to consumer contracting on the World Wide Web, do not apply to contracts 
concluded by electronic mail or equivalent individual communications. 
 
     
139
 Intermediaries may still be subject to injunctions if they are implicated in conveying 
materials that infringe copyright or related rights.   See § 4[2][g] supra. 
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   [iii]--Privacy and Related Instruments.  The privacy of personal data may be 
endangered online.  Human rights protect privacy generally, while directives specifically 
govern the electronic transmission of potentially private data.
140
 Of particular importance is 
the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, which in 2002 amended the prior 
specific directive on point.
141
 Case law exploring the impact of such law on the enforcement 
of copyright and related rights is discussed below.
142
 
  
 Since 1998 the U.S. Department of Commerce has sought to settle on a set of internal 
“safe harbor” privacy principles, to which U.S. companies would adhere on a voluntary basis 
and which would provide “adequate protection” of privacy interests pursuant to E.C. and now 
E.U. standards.  Under an agreement adopted by the Commission, compliance by U.S. 
companies with such European standards would, for the most part, require a combination of 
dispute-settlement mechanisms and U.S. laws forbidding unfair and deceptive acts.
143
  The 
Commission has also adopted standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to 
any third country that has not been declared by the Commission as providing an adequate 
level of data protection.
144
 
 
   [iv]--Online Piracy; Notice and Takedown. In May of 2011, the Commission, 
in association with a number of well-known companies, adopted a code of practice to fight 
the online commerce in pirated and counterfeit goods, in which copyright, design rights, or 
trademark rights subsist.
145
 The so-called code does not bind its signatories, providing only 
guidelines for them and other stakeholders. The memorandum entered into force on May 5, 
2011, effective for one year. After that, the signatories will reassess it and may prolong it. 
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  See, e.g., Directive 95/46/EC, O.J. 1995 No. L 281  (the “general” directive); 
Directive 97/66/EC, O.J. 1998 No. L 24 (the “specific” directive relative to the 
telecommunications sector). 
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 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 
2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector, O.J. 2002 No. L 201, as amended by Directive 
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protection issues related to intellectual property rights, 18 Jan. 2005 (in particular in 
connection with digital-rights management and the enforcement of copyright). 
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 See § 5[1][b][ii] infra. 
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 Decision 520/2000, 26 July 2000, O.J. 2000 No. L 215. 
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 Decision 497/2001, 15 June 2001, O.J. 2001 No. L 181.   
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 See Memorandum of Understanding, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/memorandum_04052011_en.pdf. 
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 These guidelines contemplate, inter alia, notice-and-takedown procedures, as well as 
other proactive and preventive measures, including cooperation with customs and other law-
enforcement authorities. Most importantly, internet platforms are to provide easily used and 
efficient notice-and-takedown procedures accessible by electronic means, and right owners 
are to assist internet platforms by sending them information to help them identify pirated and 
counterfeit goods and monitor offers on websites, but internet platforms are not subject to any 
general obligation to monitor such sites. Both right owners and internet platforms will adopt 
other measures, including the detection of repeat infringers, and Internet platforms commit to 
suspend or restrict the accounts of sellers who repeatedly sell counterfeit or pirated goods and 
prevent their re-registration.  
 
  [c]--Design Rights and Copyright.  Both industrial property and copyright laws 
may apply to industrial designs. After long deliberations, a directive was issued to harmonize 
the interplay between these laws at national levels, along with a regulation to institute a two-
tiered system of E.C.-wide, now E.U.-wide, design rights.
146
   
 
   [i]--The Design Directive. The Directive "on the legal protection of designs" of 
October 13, 1998, was adopted with a deadline for implementation of October 28, 2001.
147
   
This directive harmonizes the substantive provisions on design rights under the Member 
States' respective national regimes of industrial property, but gives due regard to the interplay 
of these regimes with national copyright laws. The substantive terms of this directive, which 
are only outlined here, are repeated word for word in the Design Regulation, which is 
discussed more fully below.
148
  
 
 These regimes protect a design upon registration but, according to the Directive, only to 
the extent that it is new and has individual character.
149
 Novelty is present if no identical 
design has been made available to the public, and a design has individual character if the 
overall impression it produces on the informed user differs from that made by an older 
design.  A design right is not to subsist in features of appearance of a product, which are 
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 For commentary, see K.A. Levin and M.B. Richman, “A survey of industrial design 
protection in the EU and the US,” [2003] E.I.P.R. 111.  
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 Directive 98/71/EC, O.J. 1998 No. L 289.   For commentary, see P. Kamina, "La 
Directive No. 98/71/CE du 13 octobre 1998 sur la protection juridique des dessins ou 
modèles" (Directive No. 98/71/EC of 13 Oct. 1998 on the legal protection of designs and 
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 See § 4[3][c][ii] infra. 
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 Quaere whether this double requirement is in conformity with Article 25 of the 
TRIPs Agreement, which requires protection of independently created industrial designs that 
are new or original.  
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solely dictated by its technical function; nor is it available for features of appearance subject 
to the so-called must-fit exclusion.  That is, the right does not protect such features as must 
be reproduced in their exact form and dimensions in order to permit the designed product to 
be mechanically connected to, or placed in, around, or against another product, so that either 
product performs its function.
150
  An unending battle has been fought over a must-match 
provision that could have put into question design rights in spare parts the automobile 
industry wishes to retain.
151
   
 
 On September 14, 2004, the Commission adopted a proposal amending the Directive.
152
  
This amendment is to abolish design protection of visible spare parts, for example, in the case 
of automobiles, body panels, bumpers, lighting fixtures, or windshields.  This measure is 
intended to give consumers, who need to repair such a component part of a complex product, 
better choices and value for their money.  The proposal also pursues an important industrial 
policy objective: according to an impact assessment carried out by the Commission, this 
proposal, if adopted, would stimulate a thriving market for small and medium-sized 
companies producing spare parts for cars. 
 
 The term of protection is five years, which may be renewed up to a total term of 25 
years. A design is to be refused registration or be declared invalid if legal requirements have 
not been met. The registration of a design gives rise to the exclusive right to use the design 
and to prevent any unauthorized third party from using it.  Such use encompasses, in 
particular, the making, offering, putting on the market, importing or exporting a designed 
product, as well as stocking such a product for those purposes. The Directive enumerates a 
number of limitations to the design right, notably with respect to acts done privately and for 
non-commercial purposes, acts done for experimental purposes, and acts of reproduction for 
                                                 
     
150
 But a design right may subsist in a design serving the purpose of allowing multiple 
assembly or connection of mutually interchangeable products within a modular system.  This 
exception to the exception was inserted on the insistence of the Danish Lego firm, which 
produces toy-building elements.  
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 Commission Document of 14 Sept. 2004, COM(2004) 582 final.  Article 14 of the 
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“Designschutz für Ersatzteile--Der Kommissionsvorschlag zur Einführung einer 
Reparaturklausel” (Design Protection for Spare Parts--The Commission Proposal to Introduce 
a Repair Clause), [2005] GRUR Int. 449;  J. Straus, “Design Protection for Spare Parts Gone 
in Europe? Proposed Changes to the EC Directive: The Commission’s Mandate and its 
Doubtful Execution,” [2005] E.I.P.R. 391. 
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citation or teaching, if these are compatible with fair commercial practices.  The design right 
may not be exercised with respect to equipment on ships and aircraft registered in another 
country, to spare parts for repairing such craft, and to the execution of repairs on such craft.  
Article 15 of the Directive imposes E.E.A.-wide exhaustion and precludes the international 
exhaustion of distribution rights, as discussed above.
153
  
 
 Copyright is also addressed.  The Directive, however, fails to resolve the pressing 
problem of coordinating the protection of designs by diverse legal regimes.  In its Article 16, 
the Directive declares that it does not prejudice any provision of E.C. and now E.U. law or of 
any national law relating to unregistered design rights, trademarks or other distinctive signs, 
patents and utility models, typefaces, and civil relief for unfair competition.  In previous 
versions of draft texts, the Commission had at least tried to weed out the most Baroque 
systems that precluded the cumulating of design rights and copyright in some European 
countries,
154
 but all such harmonizing measures proved to be politically unworkable.  Article 
17 of the Directive, in its first sentence starts out by declaring that design rights and copyright 
are to protect designs cumulatively, but the second sentence undermines this point by stating:  
“The extent to which, and the conditions under which, such [copyright] protection is 
conferred, including the level of originality required, shall be determined by each State.” An 
important harmonizing purpose of the Directive has thus been missed.
155
 
 
   [ii]--The Design Regulation.  On December 12, 2001, the Council finally 
adopted the Design Regulation.
156
 Effective March 6, 2002, this regulation established a dual 
system for protecting designs in the former Community, now in the Union.
157
 A design may 
be protected, on the one hand, as a registered design or, on the other, as an unregistered 
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 Council Regulation 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs, O.J. 2002 
No. L 3. 
 
 
157
 Unregistered design rights are available from this effective date.  See T. Headdon, 
“Can the Unregistered Community Design Right Apply Retroactively,” [2005] E.I.P.R. 1.  
On regulations for registering designs at the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market 
(OHIM), in Alicante, Spain, see M. Schlötelburg, “The Community Design: First Experience 
with Registrations,” [2003] E.I.P.R. 383. 
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design. Under Article 1(3) of the Regulation, such protection is to have "equal effect 
throughout the Community," thus now throughout the Union.
158
 
 
 Article 3 defines a "design" as "the appearance of the whole or a part of a product 
resulting from" features such as "the lines, contours, colours, shape, texture and/or materials 
of the product itself and/or its ornamentation."  A "product" is "any industrial or handicraft 
item, including . . . packaging, get-up, graphic symbols and typographic typefaces, but 
excluding computer programs," as well as a part "to be assembled into a complex product," 
that is, a product composed of multiple, replaceable parts.  Article 4 provides that a design is 
to be protected “to the extent that it is new and has individual character,” but a design of "a 
component part of a complex product" is protected only to the extent that, while "visible 
during normal use . . . by the end user," it is new and has individual character.  Article 8 
precludes protection of appearance features of a product that are "solely dictated by the 
technical function" of the product and of must-fit features of any product that, in fitting with 
another product, help one product or the other to "perform its function."
159
  
 
 Article 5 of the Regulation provides that a "design shall be considered to be new if no 
identical design has been made available to the public."  Article 6 provides that a "design 
shall be considered to have individual character if the overall impression it produces on the 
informed user differs from the overall impression produced on such a user by any design 
which has been made available to the public."   For a registered design, the relevant date for 
determining novelty and individual character is the date of filing for registration at the Office 
for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM), based in Alicante, Spain, or, if priority is 
claimed, the date of priority.
160
  For an unregistered design, the relevant date for determining 
                                                 
 
158
 For commentary, see C.-H. Massa and A. Strowel, “Community design: Cinderella 
revamped,” [2003] E.I.P.R. 68; A. Folliard-Monguiral and D. Rogers, “The Community 
Trade Mark and Designs System and the Enlargement of the European Union,” [2004] 
E.I.P.R. 48; U. Koschtial, “Design Law: Individual Character, Visibility and Functionality,” 
36 I.I.C. 297 (2005); J.J. Izquierdo Peris, “Registered Community Design: First Two Year 
Balance from an Insider’s Perspective,” [2006] E.I.P.R. 146; R. Plaistowe and M. Heritage, 
"Europe versus the World--Does Unregistered Community Design Right only Protect 
Designs First Made Available in Europe?," [2007] E.I.P.R. 187; T. Headdon, "Community 
Design Right Infringement: An Emerging Consensus or a Different Overall Impression?," 
[2007] E.I.P.R. 339. 
 
 
159
 But cf. Council Regulation 6/2002, Art. 8(3) (exception for cases of "multiple 
assembly or connection of mutually interchangeable products within a modular system"). 
 
 
160
 N.b.,  under Article 4(C)(1) of the Paris Convention and Articles 41 et seq. of the 
Design Regulation, a claimant who duly files to register a design in a Paris or W.T.O. 
member has a right of priority for six months from that initial filing in which to file in the 
OHIM.  That is, during those six months, this initial date of filing will count for purposes of 
establishing novelty and individual character as if the filing were made at the OHIM.   
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novelty and individual character  is the date on which the design has first been made available 
to the public.   In either case, under Article 7, making "available to the public" here means 
"published following registration or otherwise, or exhibited, used in trade or otherwise 
disclosed," ostensibly anywhere in the world.  However, a disclosure will not count for 
priority purposes where specialists within the Community, now the Union, could not 
reasonably have known of such disclosure "in the normal course of business."
161
  Article 6(2) 
clarifies that, in "assessing individual character, the degree of freedom of the designer in 
developing the design shall be taken into consideration." 
 
 Under the regime for registered designs, claimants apply to register eligible designs at 
the OHIM.
162
  Filing for registration starts the term of protection running, under Article 12 of 
the Regulation, for an initial term of five years from the date of filing; after that, the term may 
be extended, upon renewal pursuant to Article 13, for successive terms of five years, up to a 
maximum term of 25 years from the date of filing.  Under the regime for unregistered 
designs, specifically under Article 11, eligible designs are protected for three years running 
from the date on which the design is made available to the public in the Community, now the 
Union.
163
  Articles 14 through 18 deal with the parties vested with design rights under 
different circumstances, such as employment, jointly created or team designs, and licenses.  
Articles 27 through 34 concern transfers, licensing, collateralizing, and related transactions 
affecting the ownership of design rights.  Transfers and related transactions should be duly 
recorded at the OHIM in Alicante to obtain full effects against third parties. 
 
 Rights differ, pursuant to Article 19, under the registered and unregistered design 
regimes.  In both cases, relief is available against use, notably against making, marketing, 
importing, exporting, or using products made according to the design or stocking them for 
those purposes.  For a registered design, relief is available against both deliberate and 
unconscious copies: the independent development of a similar design is no defense against 
infringement.  For an unregistered design, by contrast, relief is available "only if the contested 
use results from copying the protected design," not when "it results from an independent 
work of creation by a designer who may be reasonably thought not to be familiar with the 
                                                 
 
161
 Nor will a disclosure made in confidence, for informational purposes, or abusively 
by a third party.  See also Council Regulation 6/2002, Art. 7(2)(b) (granting a grace period 
for disclosures made during one year before any OHIM or other priority filing).   
 
 
162
 See also Council Regulation 6/2002, Arts. 45-50 (governing registration procedure).   
 
 
163
 See also Council Regulation 6/2002, Art. 11(2) (deeming such making "available to 
the public" to take place when the design is "published, exhibited, used in trade or otherwise 
disclosed in such a way that, in the normal course of business, these events could reasonably 
have become known to the circles specialised in the sector concerned, operating within the 
Community," but not when the design is disclosed in confidence). 
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design made available to the public by the holder."
164
  Under either regime, according to 
Article 10, the scope of protection only extends to relief against other designs that produce on 
the informed user the same "overall impression," with due account taken of the designer's 
"degree of freedom." 
 
 Article 20(1) of the Regulation exempts from such rights: (a) acts done privately and for 
non-commercial purposes; (b) acts done for experimental purposes; (c) acts of reproduction 
for making citations or teaching, if these are compatible with fair trade practice and do not 
unduly prejudice the normal exploitation of the design and mention is made of the source.  
Article 20(2) exempts the following: (a) equipment on ships and aircraft registered in a third 
country; (b) the importation into the Community, now the Union, of spare parts and 
accessories for repairing such craft; and (c) the execution of repairs on such craft.  Article 21 
provides for the exhaustion of rights upon the first sale in the Community, now the Union, 
with the rightholder's consent.  Article 22 concerns rights of prior use, and Articles 24 
through 26 govern invalidation.
165
 
 
 This design system coexists with the Member States' national design systems.
166
  The 
prior harmonization of national design systems by the Design Directive ought to have 
minimized conflicts between the E.C. and now the E.U. design system and national design 
systems, as well as among these national systems themselves.
167
 Nonetheless, full 
harmonization could not be achieved relative to the issue of whether a component product 
made according to a protected design may be used in repairing another product which 
incorporates the component product.  The Regulation therefore remains silent on such uses, 
and the Council is to decide its policy on point in the light of a Commission proposal which 
is expected within three years.
168
 
 
                                                 
 
164
 See also Council Regulation 6/2002, Art. 19(3) (exceptionally applying this defense 
of independent creation to the case of a registered design "subject to deferment of publication 
as long as the relevant entries in the register and the file have not been made available to the 
public" in due fashion). 
 
 
165
 See, e.g., Council Regulation 6/2002, Art. 25(1)(f) (setting out, among the many 
grounds for invalidation, a use infringing copyright under the law of a Member State). 
 
 
166
 On the relationships between the copyright and design systems under national laws, 
see the national chapters, herein, at § 2[4][c], respectively. 
 
 
167
 On this directive, see § 4[3][c][i] supra.   For commentary, see Annette Kur, 
"'Freeze Plus' Melts the Ice--Observations on the European Design Directive," 30 I.I.C. 620 
(1999). 
 
 
168
 See Council Regulation 6/2002, Recital 13. 
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 Article 96 of the Directive confirms that it applies "without prejudice" to other E.C. and 
now E.U. laws or to Member States' national laws, such as copyright or trademark laws, that 
may also protect designs. However, consistently with the Design Directive, Member States 
are free to establish to what extent copyright protects designs and the conditions under which 
such protection is conferred.  This approach leaves untouched the reciprocity provision of the 
Berne Convention relative to copyright claims in foreign designs.
169
  
 
 The Regulation does not preclude foreigners from claiming these design rights.  
However, Articles 77 and 78 apply to a foreign claimant, that is, any natural or legal person 
without a domicile, a principal place of business, or a real and effective industrial or a 
commercial establishment in the Community, now the Union. Such a claimant must be 
represented before the OHIM by a legal practitioner qualified in one of the Member States or 
by a professional representative whose name is on the list of official representatives in the 
OHIM.   
 
 Rather complex provisions, set out in Articles 79 et seq. of the Design Regulation, 
govern jurisdiction and procedure before the OHIM, as well as before national courts that are 
to handle design cases under the Design Regulation.
170
 
 
 On December 22, 2005, the Commission made two proposals to link this European 
design system with the international WIPO design-registration system.
171
  
 
  [d]--Intellectual Property Remedies, Including Border Controls.  The 
Enforcement Directive harmonizes diverse measures that Member States have taken to 
implement TRIPs obligations with regard to remedies for infringement.
172
 The Border-
Control Regulation supplements such measures with remedies not foreseen in the TRIPs 
Agreement.  
 
 The Commission proposed a directive on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, 
including copyright.
173
  It explained that national disparities in the means of enforcing 
                                                 
 
169
 For further analysis, see "Introduction," herein, at § 4[1][c][i][A].  
 
 
170
 See P. Mengozzi, “Le contrôle des décisions de l’OHMI par le Tribunal de Première 
Instance et la Cour de Justice dans le contentieux relatif aux droits de la propriété 
industrielle” (The Oversight of the Decisions of the OHIM relative to Disputes concerning 
Industrial Property by the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice), [2002] Revue du 
Droit de l’Union Européenne 315. 
 
 
171
 Commission Document of 22 Dec. 2005, COM(2005) 687 final. 
 
 
172
 Cf.  Judgment of 16 June 1998, Case C-53/96, Hermès International v. FHT 
Marketing Choice BV, [1998] E.C.R. I-3603 (discussed § 1[2][d][ii] supra). 
 
 
173
 Commission Document of 30 Jan. 2003, COM(2003) 46 final.   
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intellectual property rights, apart from hampering the functioning of the Internal Market, had 
made it difficult to combat counterfeiting and piracy effectively.  This lack of harmony had 
supposedly led to a loss in confidence in economic circles in the Internal Market and, hence, 
to a reduction in investment.  The Enforcement Directive was finally adopted on April 26, 
2004,
174
 to be implemented within the following two years.
175
 
 
 Article 2 of the Enforcement Directive defines its scope as reaching “any infringement of 
intellectual property rights as provided for by Community law [now Union law] or by the 
national law of the Member State concerned,” however, without prejudice to prior E.C. and 
now E.U. provisions on enforcement or substantive intellectual property rights. Article 3 
imposes on Member States a general obligation to provide for measures, procedures, and 
remedies that are necessary to ensure the enforcement of intellectual property rights, but that 
shall be “fair and equitable and shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail 
unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays.”   
 
 In particular, the Enforcement Directive includes procedures to assure the discovery and 
preservation of evidence and for provisional measures such as injunctions and seizure.
176
 
Article 8 provides for a right of information allowing judges to order certain persons to reveal 
the names and addresses of those involved in disseminating illicit goods or services, along 
with details of the quantities and prices involved.  Other remedies include the destruction, 
recall, or permanent removal from the market of illegal goods, as well as other injunctive 
relief and financial compensation, including damages.
177
 It remains controversial what 
remedies may be permissible for enforcing copyright within and against file-sharing 
networks, not only under current E.U. case law,
178
 but also under provisions in other 
directives limiting disconnect remedies.
179
 
                                                 
 
     
174
 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, O.J. 2004 No. L 157.  For the text of 
this directive, see Appendix 9 hereto; for corrections, go to http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0048R%2801%29:EN:HTML 
and http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:204:0027:04_DIR_2004_48_27:E
N:HTML.    
 
    
175
 For commentary, see K. Huniar, “The Enforcement Directive: Its Effects on UK 
Law,” [2006] E.I.P.R. 92; R.M. Hilty, A. Kur and A. Peukert, "Statement of the Max Planck 
Institute on the Proposal for a Directive of the EP and of the Council on Criminal Measures 
Aimed at Ensuring the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights," 10 I.I.C. 970 (2006). 
 
 
176
 Enforcement Directive, Arts. 6, 7, and 9. 
 
 
177
 Enforcement Directive, Arts. 10, 11, and 13. 
 
 
178
  On such case law, see § 3[3][b][iii][B] supra. 
EU: p. 137 
 
 With regard to border controls, this Enforcement Directive complements the Council 
Regulation of July 22, 2003.
180
 This regulation provides measures to stop counterfeit and 
pirated products at the external frontier of the European Union, applying only to movements 
of suspected counterfeit and pirated goods between third countries and the Union, not to 
movements within the Union.
181
 Member States may supplement such border controls within 
the parameters of E.U. law.
182
  
 
  [e]--Exploitation of Public Sector Documents.  On June 5, 2002, the Commission 
adopted a proposal for a Directive to establish a minimum set of rules on the re-use and 
commercial exploitation of documents that are both held by public-sector bodies of the 
Member States and generally accessible.
183
  The directive was adopted in 2003
184
 and 
implemented with some delays.
185
  
                                                                                                                                                       
 
 
179
  See Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and 
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 
Directive 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and 
services, O.J. 2009 No. L 337/37. Article 1(1)(b) of Directive 2009/140/EC inserts a 
paragraph 3a in the Directive 2002/21/EC, which provides that, to safeguard “fundamental 
rights or freedoms . . .  within a democratic society,” measures disconnecting suspected file-
sharers from the Internet, for example, on a third complaint or infraction, “may only be taken 
with due respect for the principle of the presumption of innocence and the right to privacy. A 
prior, fair and impartial procedure shall be guaranteed.”  
 
 
180
 Council Regulation (EC) 1383/03 of 22 July 2003 concerning customs action 
against goods suspected of infringing certain intellectual property rights and the measures to 
be taken against goods found to have infringed such rights, O.J. 2003 No. L 196. For the text 
of this regulation, see Appendix 10 hereto.  It superseded Council Regulation (EC) 3295/94 
of 22 December 1994 laying down certain measures to prohibit the release for free 
circulation, export, re-export or entry for a suspensive procedure of counterfeit and pirated 
goods, O.J. 1994 No. L 341, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) 241/99, O.J. 1999 No. 
L 27.   
 
 
181
 For commentary, see O. Vrins and M. Schneider (eds.), Enforcement of intellectual 
property rights through border measures: Law and Practice in the EU (Oxford, 2006); E. 
Bonadio, “Protecting intellectual property rights through EU customs procedures,” [2008] 
International Trade Law and Regulation 80. 
 
       
182
 On case law limiting border controls between Member States, notably with regard to 
parallel imports within the Internal Market, see § 2[2][f] supra. 
 
 
183
 Commission Document of 5 June 2002, COM(2002) 207 final. 
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 The goal of the Directive goal is to stimulate the growth of the European information 
market by allowing re-use of public-sector information, access being already broadly ensured 
by national laws. The Directive covers all printed, aurally or visually recorded, or 
electronically accessible documents of public-sector bodies.
186
 Article 3, the core provision, 
states: “Member States shall ensure that, where the re-use of documents held by public sector 
bodies is allowed, these documents shall be re-usable for commercial or non-commercial 
purposes in accordance with the conditions set out in Chapters III and IV. Where possible, 
documents shall be made available through electronic means.” Member States do not have an 
obligation to allow re-use as their public sector bodies still retain the right to choose to allow 
such re-use or not.
187
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
 
184
 Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
November 2003 on the re-use of public sector information, O.J. 2003 No. L 345 (hereinafter 
PSI Directive). For commentary, see K. Janssen and J. Dumortier, “Towards a European 
Framework for the Re-Use of Public Sector Information: A Long and Winding Road,” [2003] 
11 International Journal of law & Information Technology 184; G. Aichholzer and H. Burkert 
(eds.), Public Sector Information in the Digital Age (Cheltenham, 2005); H. Kranenborg and 
W. Voermans, Access to Information in the European Union, A Comparative Analysis of EC 
and Member State Legislation (Groningen, 2005); E. Derclaye, “Does the Directive on the re-
use of public sector information affect the State's database sui generis right?,” in J. Gaster, E. 
Schweighofer and P. Sint (eds.), Knowledge rights--legal, societal and related technological 
aspects, 137 (Vienna, 2008). 
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 I.e., relative to the deadline of July 1, 2005.  Pursuant to its Article 13, the 
Commission submitted, on May 7, 2009, a review of the application of the Directive: 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European economic and social committee and the Committee of the regions--Re-use of 
public sector information: review of Directive 2003/98/EC, COM(2009) 212 final. 
 
 
186
 PSI Directive, Art. 2 (defining public sector bodies as states, including regional and 
local authorities and bodies governed by public law). Computer programs are excluded from 
this definition, and the following documents are otherwise excluded: those in which third 
parties hold intellectual property rights; those of public-service broadcasters and their 
subsidiaries; those held by educational, cultural, archival, or research establishments; those 
excluded by national-access regimes, notably on grounds of national or public security or 
defense or of statistical or commercial confidentiality. 
 
 
187
 For critical commentary on point, see C. Booth, “The Public Sector Information 
Regulations,” [2005] Public Procurement Law Review, NA144-149; A. Beunen, Protection 
for databases, The European database Directive and its effects in the Netherlands, France 
and the United Kingdom, 255-256 (Nijmegen, 2007). 
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 The second and third chapters of the Directive concern procedures for requesting re-use 
of such documents. Public-sector bodies must process requests within a reasonable time 
consistent with that already stated in national-access regimes or, otherwise, within no longer 
than 20 or 40 days, the latter if the request is complex or extensive; requests and access 
should, wherever possible, be processed electronically.
188
 If the public sector body refuses, it 
must state the reason and the means of redress if the applicant wants to appeal the decision.
189
 
Where charges are made, the total income from supplying and allowing re-use of documents 
shall not exceed the cost of collection, production, reproduction, and dissemination, together 
with a reasonable return on investment.
190
 Article 7 then sets out a transparency requirement 
according to which public-sector bodies must publish conditions and standard charges for re-
use of its documents. However, these conditions should neither be discriminatory for 
comparable categories of re-use, nor restrict competition; if a public body re-uses its 
information in competition with private entities, it must apply to itself the same conditions 
that it applies to these entities. Exclusive agreements are also forbidden, except when they are 
in the public interest.
191
 Finally, Member States must indicate what their public-sector 
information is and where it can be found.
192
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 PSI Directive, Arts. 4(1), 4(2) and 5(1). 
 
 
189
 PSI Directive, Arts. 4(3) and 4(4). 
 
 
190
 PSI Directive, Art. 6. 
 
 
191
 PSI Directive, Arts. 8, 10, and 11. 
 
 
192
 PSI Directive, Art. 9. 
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§ 5 Harmonization Case Law 
 
 [1]--Introduction 
 
 E.U. directives, intended to harmonize the copyright and related laws of E.U. Member 
States, have been outlined above.
1
 The Court of Justice is now often asked to interpret these 
directives and related regulations. This section shall outline its growing case law on point.
2
   
 
  [a]--Jurisprudential Method. As explained above, Article 274 of the F.E.U. Treaty 
governs the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice.
3
 Article 267 of the F.E.U. Treaty provides for 
a procedure for preliminary rulings on questions that national courts refer to the Court of 
Justice with regard to E.U. law.
4
 
 
   [i]--References from National Courts. The Court of Justice has, inter alia, the 
task of overseeing the relations between E.U. laws and national laws.
5
 We have already seen 
this oversight at work in the field of copyright law with regard to E.C. and now E.U. primary 
laws, notably treaties.
6
 The Court further engages in it in considering questions referred to it 
concerning E.U. secondary laws, for example, directives.
7
 
 
 Indeed, a national court may be faced with an argument that primary law, notably a 
provision of the E.U. or F.E.U. Treaty, overrides or requires a certain interpretation of 
secondary law, notably of a directive provision: at that point, a national court may refer 
resulting questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. In principle, moreover, the 
legality of secondary law adopted by an E.U. institution may, under Article 263 of the F.E.U. 
                                                 
 
 
1
 See § 4 supra.  
 
 
2
 For further analysis, see T. Dreier, "The Role of the ECJ for the Development of 
Copyright in the European Communities," 54 J. Copyright Society USA 183.  
 
 
3
 See § 1[1][c][iv] supra. 
 
 
4
 For further analysis, see M. Broberg and N. Fenger, Preliminary references to the 
European Court of Justice (Oxford Univ. Press, 2010).  
  
       
5
 See § 1[1][c] supra.  
 
 
6
 See, e.g., § 2 supra (concerning the distribution of copies across borders); § 3 supra 
(concerning antitrust abuses of rights). 
 
 
7
 On average, it takes between one and two years from the date of a reference for the 
Court of Justice to rule on it.  
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Treaty, be challenged before the Court of Justice by another such institution or a Member 
State.
8
 Private parties will only be admissible in such an action for annulment if they can 
demonstrate that the measure is of direct and individual concern to them. 
 
 The Court of Justice also hears references asking how to apply directives, inter alia, in 
the field of intellectual property. Most notably, questions may arise before a national court 
concerning the validity or construction of national law enacted to implement a directive 
provision, and the national court may refer the questions to the Court of Justice for 
preliminary rulings in response.
9
 In any event, national courts are obligated to refer such 
questions to the Court of Justice when their decisions would be the last or only judicial 
remedy in a case and when it is necessary to clarify the point of E.U. law in order for the 
national court to decide.
10
 The exception to this latter rule is when the point of law is acte 
clair: the provision is so clear that there is no reasonable doubt about its application.
11
 This 
chapter will not consider pending references in any detail, but only judgments rendered to 
respond to them.
12
  
 
   [ii]--The Scope of Rulings on References. The Court of Justice does not rule 
on the facts of  disputes relative to which national courts refer questions to it for preliminary 
rulings. Rather, it replies only as to the meaning of the treaty or directive provisions invoked 
in the context of the specific case which has generated the questions. Along with the 
questions, the national court must also send a statement setting out the factual and legal 
context of the dispute. The Court of Justice may not look beyond this statement and 
determine facts anew.  
 
                                                 
 
8
 See, e.g., Judgment of 9 Oct. 2001, Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. Council and 
Parliament, [2001] E.C.R. I-8419 (rejecting challenge of the Netherlands to the Directive on 
the legal protection of biotechnical inventions). 
 
 
9
 F.E.U. Treaty, Art. 267(2). 
 
 
10
 F.E.U. Treaty, Art. 267(3). 
 
 
11
 See Judgment of 6 Oct. 1982, Case 283/81, CIFLIT v. Ministry of Health, [1982] 
E.C.R. 341. 
 
 
12
 National chapters may consider such references to the extent that they are 
domestically significant. See, e.g., “United Kingdom,” herein, at § 1[3][c] (procedure and 
examples of references both decided and pending). A list of pending references to the Court 
of Justice can be consulted on the U.K. Intellectual Property Office web site: 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/pro-policy/policy-information/ecj.htm. 
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 The Court of Justice has made clear that its preliminary rulings, such as it renders to 
respond to referred questions, bind all the national courts in the Union.
13
 It should be borne in 
mind that this binding effect is not necessarily the same as that of stare decisis in the tradition 
of the common law, especially since the Court’s legal rulings in response to references are 
not intimately bound up with facts that the Court itself finds. If the national court referring a 
question is not satisfied with any of the Court of Justice’s answers or finds an answer unclear 
given the facts of the case before it, it may refer the question back to the Court.
14
  
 
 Over the years, the Court of Justice has predominantly interpreted E.U. treaty and 
directive provisions by looking to the contexts and goals of the provisions in question. In 
determining the meaning and scope of such E.U. provisions, the Court seeks to give them 
autonomous and uniform interpretations throughout the European Union: this method follows 
from the need to have a uniform application of E.U. law and from the principle of equality.
15
 
The case law has begun to explore to what extent the principles of proportionality and 
subsidiarity may also come into play here.
16
 
 
  [b]--Roles of Human Rights. According to Article 6 of the E.U. Treaty, E.U. 
institutions and Member States, when they apply or implement E.U. law, must respect 
fundamental rights, that is, human rights.  
 
   [i]--Sources in the European Legal Order. There are three European sources 
of such rights: E.U. Member States’ constitutional traditions,17 the E.U. Charter of 
                                                 
 
13
 See Judgment of 13 Jan. 2004, Case C-453/00, Kühne & Heitz v. Produuctschap 
voor Pluimvee en Eieren, [2004] E.C.R. I-837; Judgment of 21 June 2007, Case C-231/06, 
NPO v. Jonkman, [2007] E.C.R. I-5149; Judgment of 4 July 2006, Case C-212/04, Adeneler 
v. ELOG (Ellenikos Organismos Galaktos), [2006] E.C.R. I-6057. 
 
 
14
 See, e.g., Infopaq II, Case C-302/10 (a reference now pending in a matter already 
adjudged, as discussed in §§ 5[2][a] and 5[7][a][i] infra).  
 
 
15
 See, e.g., Judgment of 2 July 2009, Case C-32/08, Fundación Española para la 
Innovación de la Artesanía (FEIA) v. Cul de Sac Espacio Creativo, S.L. and Acierta Product 
& Position SA, [2009] E.C.R. I-5611, paras. 63 et seq. (restating this methodology) 
(discussed in § 5[4][a] infra). 
 
 
16
 On these principles, see §§ 1[1][c] and 4[1][a] supra.  On the role of the principle of 
proportionality in rulings relative to human rights, see § 5[1][b][ii] infra and, relative to 
protecting reliance interests where rights apply retroactively, § 5[3] infra. On the role of the 
principle of subsidiarity with regard to determining holders of rights, see § 5[4] infra. 
 
 
17
 See, e.g., “Germany,” herein, at § 8[2][b][ii] (explaining how national constitutional 
guarantees of freedom of expression, press, etc., compel granting more “leeway” for such 
uses of copyright materials as parody, artistic quotation, political caricature, etc.).  For 
EU: p. 143 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms,
18
 and the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Freedoms.
19
 The rights at stake include the rights to “respect for one’s 
private life” and to “freedom of expression,” as well as the freedom to conduct a business, 
but account must be taken of the right to respect for one’s “property,” including “intellectual 
property.”20 Both the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have 
confirmed that rights of intellectual property fall within the scope of the right to respect for 
property.
21
 However, the right to intellectual property is neither an absolute nor an inviolable 
right.
22
 
 
 The European Union is not yet a party to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights, but the E.U. Treaty requires it to accede.
23
 In any case, the Court of Justice 
scrutinizes E.U. acts in the light of that convention as well as the E.U. sources of human 
rights; however, it has so far been reluctant to strike down E.U. legislation for failure to 
respect such rights. Nonetheless, each Member State must, when implementing E.U. 
                                                                                                                                                       
commentary, see P.E. Geller, “A German Approach to Fair Use: Test Cases for TRIPs 
Criteria for Copyright Limitations?,” 57 J. Copyright Society USA 553 (2010). 
 
 
18
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, O.J. 2000 No. C 364 
(hereinafter referred to as the E.U. Charter). 
 
 
19
 This treaty is sometimes abbreviated as the E.C.H.R., as is the European Court of 
Human Rights, which will here rather be abbreviated as the E.Ct.H.R. This treaty and court 
are institutions of the Council of Europe, an international organization in Strasbourg which 
brings together 47 countries of Europe to promote democracy and protect basic rights.   
 
 
20
 See, respectively, E.U. Charter, Art. 8 (personal data), Art. 10 (freedom of thought), 
and Art. 17(2) (intellectual property); E.C.H.R., Art. 8 (respect for private life), Art. 10 
(freedom of expression), and Protocol No. 1, Art. 1 (property). For further analysis, see C. 
Geiger, “Intellectual ‘property’ after the Treaty of Lisbon: Towards a Different Approach in 
the New European Legal Order?,” [2010] E.I.P.R. 255; L. R. Helfer, “The New Innovation 
Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human Rights,” 49 Harvard 
International Law Journal 1 (2008). 
 
 
21
 Compare E.C.J. Judgment of 12 Sept. 2006, Case C-479/04, Laserdisken ApS v. 
Kulturministeriet, [2006] E.C.R. I-8089, para. 65 (related rights), and E.C.J. Judgment of 29 
Jan. 2008, Case C-275/06, Promusicae v. Telefónica, [2008] E.C.R. I-271 (copyright), with 
E.Ct.H.R. Judgment of 11 Jan. 2007, Application No. 19247/03, Anheuser-Busch v. Portugal, 
[2007] 45 E.H.R.R. 36; [2007] E.T.M.R. 24, paras. 62-72 (trade marks); E.Ct.H.R. Judgment 
of 8 Jan. 2008, Application No. 73049/01, Balan v. Moldova, [2009] E.C.D.R. 6 (copyright).  
 
22
 Judgment of 24 Nov. 2011, Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, [2012] 
E.C.D.R. 54, para. 43 (discussed in §§ 5[1][b][ii] and 5[8] infra). 
 
 
23
 E.U. Treaty, Art. 6(2). Negotiations to this effect started in 2010. 
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enactments, respect human rights: if it fails to do so, individuals may sue the Member State, 
but not the Union. A distinction must be drawn between recourse to the Court of Justice and 
to the European Court of Human Rights to challenge E.U. or national acts for failure to 
respect human rights. In the European Union, depending on the issue, an E.U. enactment or 
judgment may bind a state or a private party; judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights bind only states.  
 
   [ii]--Case Law: Human Rights and Enforcement. The case law has addressed 
the relationship between human rights, such as rights to privacy and to free speech, on the 
one hand, and copyright enforcement, on the other. Where tensions have arisen, the Court of 
Justice has contemplated balancing opposing considerations, subject to the principle of 
proportionality.
24
  
 
 In the Promusicae case, a collecting society asked a Spanish Court to order an Internet-
service provider to disclose the identities of its allegedly file-sharing clients.
25
 The collecting 
society claimed that such an order was mandated under the Information-Society, Electronic-
Commerce, and Enforcement Directives.
26
  In its defense, the service provider invoked 
Spanish law that required it to keep such data confidential and argued that the file sharing at 
issue was not, under that law, a criminal offense.
27
 In response, the Court of Justice held that 
the disclosure sought would be prima facie contrary to the Directive on Privacy and 
Electronic Communications, which in Article 5 provides that Member States must assure the 
confidentiality of communications and which in Article 6 subjects the retention and 
processing of traffic data to restrictive conditions.
28
 However, the Court noted that some 
derogation of these provisions may be allowed under Article 15(1) of this directive such that 
Member States may impose “an obligation to disclose personal data in the context of civil 
proceedings” to protect “the rights and freedoms of others.”29  Furthermore, the Court 
invoked the right of "protection of personal data and hence of private life" as recognized both 
                                                 
 
24
 On this principle, see §§ 1[1][c] and 4[1][a] supra.  
 
  25 
Commercial Court (Juzgado de lo Mercantil), Section 5, Madrid, 13 June 2006 
(unreported preliminary ruling) (discussed in Bercovitz, “Spain,” herein, at § 8[4][a][i] 
(hereinafter "Spain")). 
 
 
26
 On these directives, respectively, see §§ 4[2][g], 4[3][b][ii], and 4[3][d] supra.   
 
 
27
 I.e., Spanish Law 34/2002 on information society services and electronic commerce, 
implementing the Electronic-Commerce Directive and data-protection directives, including 
the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications discussed in § 4[3][b][iii] infra. 
 
 
28
 Judgment of 29 Jan. 2008, Case C-275/06, Promusicae v. Telefónica, [2008] E.C.R. 
I-271, paras. 47-49.  
 
 
29
 Id., paras. 53-54.  
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in Articles 7 and 8 of the E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and in Article 8 
of the European Convention of Human Rights.
30
 It stressed the "need to reconcile” such basic 
rights under E.U. law “and the rights to protection of property and to an effective remedy.”31 
The Court thus recognized that, along with the principle of proportionality, European human 
rights set parameters for E.U. directives.
32
  
 
 Ruling that a mere access provider may be regarded as an "intermediary" in the sense of 
Articles 5(1)(a) and 8(3) of the Information-Society Directive, the Court of Justice also held 
that the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications did not, in principle, preclude 
the disclosure of personal electronic-traffic data to private third parties for the purpose of 
civil proceedings for alleged infringements of copyright. It left it to local courts, guided by 
the principle of proportionality, to balance the privacy and enforcement interests at stake in 
each case.
33
 
 
 In a file-sharing case, the Court of Justice considered an open-ended order compelling an 
Internet-service provider to filter all communications that it handles. It held that such an order 
would not strike a fair balance between basic rights of the service, as well as of its 
customers,
34
 and copyright in works possibly shared.
35
  
 
 [2]--Subject Matters; Protectability Criteria  
 
 As seen above, certain copyright directives harmonized subject matter and protectability 
criteria for certain types of copyright works, as well as for one type of subject matter 
protected by related rights, to wit, database contents.
36
 The Court of Justice has begun to 
generalize some of these criteria. 
                                                 
 
30
 Id., paras. 63-64.  
 
 
31
 Id., para. 65.   
 
 32 Id., para. 68. 
 
 
33
 Order of 19 Feb. 2009, Case C-557/07, LSG-Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung von 
Leistungsschutzrechten v. Tele2 Telecommunication, [2009] E.C.R. I-01227.  
 
 
34
  I.e., the customers’ rights to receive or impart information and to the protection of 
personal data, as well as the provider’s freedom to conduct its business: Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts. 16, 11, and 8. 
 
 
35
 Judgment of 24 Nov. 2011, Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, [2012] 
E.C.D.R. 54 (also discussed in § 5[8][a] infra). 
 
 
36
  I.e., the Software Directive, the Term Directive as to copyright in photographs, and 
the Database Directive as to copyright in databases, respectively discussed in §§ 4[2][b][i], 
4[2][e][i], and 4[2][f][i] supra. 
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  [a]--Copyright Works. Though specific directives formulated a criterion of 
originality and thus protectability for specific types of works, namely the criterion of the 
author's own intellectual creation, the case law has interpreted the directives broadly to 
suggest the possibility that all productions, to be protected by copyright as works, might have 
to meet this criterion.
37
  For example, the Court of Justice has opined that football matches 
are not copyright works because they are “subject to the rules of the game, leaving no room 
for creative freedom.”38  
 
   [i]--Short Informational Texts.  In the Infopaq case, the Court of Justice 
specifically considered what acts violate the right of reproduction “in whole or in part” of a 
newspaper article.
39
 At the threshold, the Court of Justice asked how the criterion of 
protection, as it appears in a number of directives, namely the author’s own intellectual 
creation, may qualify a “part” of a work for copyright protection, thus suggesting that this 
E.U. criterion of creativity applies “horizontally” to all works.40 In the case of literary works 
such as newspaper articles, the Court held that such creativity may be found in the author’s 
choice, sequencing, and combination of words, but not in any single word.
41
  
 
   [ii]--Graphic Interfaces for Software.  In the Softwarová case, the Court of 
Justice had to consider the protectability of a graphical user interface (GUI) for computer 
software as it is broadcast.
42
 The Court had been asked whether such an interface is a form of 
expression of the computer program, for which the Software Directive had provided the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
 
37
 On such horizontal effects of directives, see § 4[2] supra.    
 
 
38
 Judgment of 4 Oct. 2011, Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, Football Association 
Premier League v. QC Leisure and Karen Murphy v. Media Protection Services, [2012] 
F.S.R. 1, para. 98 (also discussed in §§ 2[3][b], 3[2][a][iii], and 4[3][b][i] supra and in 5[7] 
infra). This conclusion, however, would not preclude protecting sporting events by other 
national legislation, even by related rights, where appropriate. 
 
 
39
 On questions of infringement raised in this case, see § 5[7][a][i] infra. 
 
 
40
 For analysis in one national context, see E. Derclaye, “Wonderful or Worrisome? 
The Impact of the ECJ ruling in Infopaq on UK Copyright Law,” [2010] E.I.P.R. 247; E. 
Rosati, “Originality in a work, or a work of originality: the effects of the Infopaq decision,” 
[2011] E.I.P.R. 476. 
 
 
41
 Judgment of 16 July 2009, Case C-5/08, Infopaq International A/S v. Danske 
Dagblades Forening, [2009] E.C.R. I-6569, paras. 38-48. 
 
 
42
 On the question of whether the interface is thus communicated to the public, see § 
5[7][a][iv][C] infra. 
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criterion of “the author's own intellectual creation."43 The Court replied in the negative, 
noting that the interface does not enable the reproduction of the program, but merely 
constitutes one of its elements by means of which users make use of the program.
44
 
Nonetheless, the Court admitted that the interface itself might be protectible under the 
Information-Society Directive as long as it met the criterion of intellectual creation. The 
Court, while leaving that issue to the national court, opined that, if forms of the interface 
were “dictated by their technical function,” it might not so qualify.45  
 
   [iii]--Photographs. In the case of a portrait photograph, the Court of Justice 
considered that the photographer has more than negligible freedom in creating such 
photographs. It noted that, during the preparation phase, the photographer can choose the 
background, the pose, the lighting, the framing, the angle, and the atmosphere and that, in 
retouching, developing, etc., different techniques, including software, are available. Such 
choices “can stamp the work created with [the photographer’s] ‘personal touch’” that would 
have the photograph display enough creativity to attract copyright.
46
 Since the copyright 
directives do not indicate that copyright protection should be less strong for less creative 
works, the Court held, it should not be weaker for portrait photographs than for other 
works.
47
 
 
  [b]--Performances, Recordings, Broadcasts. As indicated above, the Rental and 
Related-Rights Directive specifically assures copyright-related rights in performances, sound 
and audiovisual recordings, and broadcasts.
48
 There has not yet been case law addressing the 
criteria of protection of such media productions. 
 
  [c]--Database Contents. Article 7(1) of the Database Directive sets out criteria that 
a database must meet for the sui generis right to protect the contents of the database. The 
                                                 
 
43
 On this criterion, see § 4[2][b][i] supra.  
 
 
44
 Judgment of 22 Dec. 2010, Case C-393/09, Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace--Svaz 
softwarové ochrany v. Ministerstvo kultury, [2011] E.C.D.R. 70, paras. 41-42. For 
comments, see L. Smith, “Whether copyright protects the graphic user interface of a 
computer programme,” [2011] C.T.L.R. 70; E. Derclaye, “L’arrêt Softwarová: une révolution 
en droit d’auteur ou une ‘erreur de jugement’?,” [2011] 43 Revue du Droit des Technologies 
de l’Information 57. 
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 Id., paras. 45-49 (also citing the Infopaq judgment discussed in § 5[2][a][i] supra). 
 
 
46
 Judgment of 1 Dec. 2011, Case C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer v. Standard Verlags 
GmbH, [2011] E.C.D.R. 297, paras. 91-93. 
 
 
47
 Id., paras. 97-98. 
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 On this directive, in pertinent part, see § 4[2][c][ii] supra. 
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database itself must display “qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in 
either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents.”49 The Court of Justice has 
interpreted this language so that it does not apply to generating database contents alone, but 
only to the actual bringing of such contents together into a database itself. 
 
 In the British Horseracing (B.H.B.) case, the Court of Justice held that investments made 
in organizing horse races, and therefore in selecting horses and coordinating other factors in 
scheduling races, merely generated the data in question, but did not necessarily qualify any 
database itself at issue for protection. In companion cases, the court similarly held that 
investments made in determining data such as the dates and times and venues for football 
matches, so-called sports fixtures, did not in itself qualify any subsequent database for 
protection.
50
 Furthermore, it distinguished between verifying data alone and verifying 
database contents, for example, in monitoring them, holding only investment at the latter 
stage to count in meeting the criteria of protectability.
51
   
 
 There remains the problem of so-called spin-off databases, which may be analyzed into 
three separate, but logically interrelated, issues.
52
  First, does the investment in creating data 
which is subsequently spun off into the database at issue qualify as relevant investment in the 
“obtaining” of data? The Court’s answer, in the cases just discussed, would seem to be 
negative. Second, is it possible for spun-off data to be covered by the sui generis right 
anyway, on the basis of separate substantial investment in the obtaining, verification, or 
presentation of the data in a new database? The Court’s answer appeared to be affirmative on 
this point. Third, in a case where a particular investment is common to both the creation of 
                                                 
 
49
 On this directive, in pertinent part, see § 4[2][f][ii] supra. 
 
 
50
 Judgments of 9 Nov. 2004: Case C-203/02, The British Horseracing Board Ltd. v. 
William Hill Organization Ltd., [2004] E.C.R. I-10415; Case C-46/02, Fixtures Marketing 
Ltd. v. Oy Veikkaus AB, [2004] E.C.R. I-10497; Case C-338/02, Fixtures Marketing Ltd. v. 
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 Id., para. 34. But cf. M.J. Davison and P.B. Hugenholtz, “Football Fixtures, Horse 
Races and Spin-offs: the ECJ Domesticates the Database Right,” [2005] E.I.P.R. 113 (asking 
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checks, in the course of research); A. Mazumder, "Information, Copyright and the Future," 
[2007] E.I.P.R. 180 (analyzing further implications of database rights). 
 
 
52
 See C. Ritter, Case Comment, [2005] C.M.L. Rev. 125; E. Derclaye, “The Court of 
Justice interprets the data base sui generic right for the first time,” [2005] E.L. Rev. 420; A. 
Masson, "Creation of Database or Creation of Data: Crucial Choices in the Matter of 
Database Protection," [2006] E.I.P.R. 261; E. Derclaye, "Database Sui Generis Right: What 
is a Substantial Investment? A Tentative Definition," 37 I.I.C. 2 (2006). 
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data and the obtaining, the verification, or presentation of the database, does it qualify as a 
relevant investment?  The answer here was negative.
53
 
 
 [3]--Duration of Protection; Retroactivity; Reliance 
 
 The Term Directive harmonizes the terms of copyright and related rights in E.U. 
Member States.
54
 As already explained above, the Term Directive has retroactive effect at 
least within the European Union, not only because of its provisions, but also because of the 
principle of non-discrimination against E.U. nationals.
55
 The Court of Justice has allowed for 
discretion in formulating transitional provisions to implement the Term Directive where 
retroactivity might impinge on reliance interests.
56
 It has also clarified that the principle of 
proportionality limits such discretion.   
 
 In the Butterfly Music case, the Court had to consider the validity of the Italian scheme 
for taking account of reliance interests, that is, so-called acquired rights of third parties, when 
recouping works out of the public domain. Recordings of the famous Italian singer Mina, 
made between 1958 and 1962, had entered the public domain under the Italian law which, 
prior to implementation of the Term Directive, had protected performances for a term of only 
30 years. Butterfly Music had compiled such public-domain recordings into a new recording 
without consent, but faced claims for royalties that, upon the implementation of the Term 
Directive in Italy, were based on revived rights in the old recordings. Butterfly Music 
challenged the Italian law implementing the Term Directive, which stipulated that third 
parties having exploited the work while it was in the public domain were allowed to continue 
the distribution of recordings for a transitional period of three months following the date the 
law went into effect. However, the Court of Justice noted that the Directive gave Member 
States discretion to fashion measures to accommodate the reliance interests in question and 
accordingly concluded that the Italian legislation met directive requirements in this regard.
57
 
The Court rejected the argument that this interpretation violated legitimate expectations, 
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 On this directive, see § 4[2][e] supra.  
 
 
55
 On the application of this principle, see § 1[2][e] supra. 
 
 
56
 For a case concerning the terms of rights in foreign sound recordings, protected in 
one E.U. Member State before the Term Directive went into effect, see § 5[6] infra. 
  
 
57
 Judgment of 29 June 1999, Case C-60/98, Butterfly v. CEMED and FIMI, [2000] 
E.C.R. I-3939.  
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which E.C. and now E.U. law protects in principle, citing case law to the effect that such 
protection may not be so applied to preclude all new legislation.
58
   
 
 Such discretion was, however, limited in a design case where different transitional 
provisions were asserted. Defendants had sought to market a work of applied art in Italy, 
namely a lamp made according to a design protectible under Italian copyright law as it had 
been revised to implement the Design Directive, effective April 19, 2001.
59
 The lamp had 
ostensibly fallen into the Italian public domain under prior Italian law, and the Italian 
transitional regime, itself repeatedly revised since the Design Directive had been pending, 
arguably precluded suit on the copyright which had been revived in the lamp when Italy 
implemented that directive.
60
 The Court of Justice noted that the Design Directive did not 
allow for the same margin of discretion as did the Term Directive for fashioning any 
transitional provision to take account of reliance interests, that is, so-called acquired rights of 
third parties, that might be prejudiced by rights revived by the effect of the directive.
61
 Inter 
alia, the Court ruled that a transitional provision could not preclude suit on such a revived 
copyright in a work of applied art for an indefinite or substantial period, for example, the 10 
years provided by the Italian legislation. This grace period was found not to conform to the 
principle of proportionality, because it failed to display a sufficiently reasonable relation to 
the goal of protecting the legitimate interests of reliance parties.
62
  
 
 [4]--Ownership and Transfers 
 
 As seen above, copyright harmonization in relation to ownership and transfers has not 
been extensive.
63
 In the few cases raising questions on point, the Court of Justice has begun 
to apply the principle of subsidiarity, distinguishing issues left for national decision makers. 
 
  [a]--Initial Ownership. The Court of Justice has ruled that the terms “employer” 
and “employee,” as used in Article 14(3) of the Design Regulation,64 may not be interpreted 
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 Id., para. 25.  
 
 
59
 On the Design Directive, see § 4[3][c][i] supra.  
 
 
60
 On this implementation, see “Italy,” herein, at § 2[4][c]. 
 
 
61
  Judgment of 27 Jan. 2011, Case C-168/09, Flos SpA v. Semeraro Casa & Famiglia 
SpA, [2011] E.C.D.R. 161, paras. 36-42 and 48-52 (also distinguishing the Butterfly Music 
case). 
 
 
62
  Id., paras. 57-65. For further analysis of the interplay between Italian transitional 
provisions and E.U. parameters, see “Italy,” herein, at § 3[2][c].  
 
 
63
 See § 4[2] supra. 
 
 
64
 On the Design Regulation, see § 4[3][c][ii] supra.  
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broadly. The Court held that this Article 14 applies only to designs made by employees, that 
is, persons who are subject to master-servant relationships in the course of their 
employment.
65
 Accordingly, Article 14(3) of the Design Regulation does not apply to 
commissioned designs; rather, national laws regulate the ownership of rights in these designs. 
This holding may suggest that, under pertinent copyright directives, works for hire and 
commissioned works may not necessarily be subject to the same rules.
66
 
 
  [b]--Transfers and Licenses. None of the few directive provisions concerning the 
contractual transfer or licensing of rights has yet been subject to judicial inquiry.
67
  
 
  [c]--Limitations: Droit de Suite. In the Dalí  case, it was asked who may be entitled 
to receive royalties accruing from droit de suite after an author’s death. In his will, the painter 
Salvador Dalí had appointed the Spanish state as the sole legatee of his rights even though he 
had several heirs. However, the French law implementing the Resale-Right Directive
68
 
contains a provision which reserves the benefit of droit de suite exclusively to heirs at law. 
The society collecting royalties on behalf of the Spanish state sued the French collecting 
society to have it transfer royalties collected on behalf of Dali’s heirs for the resale right. The 
French court in turn referred questions to the Court of Justice, asking largely whether 
Member States may reserve the benefit of the resale right to the artist’s heirs at law alone, to 
the exclusion of testamentary legatees. As the term “those entitled” to the right in Article 6(1) 
of the Directive is left undefined, the Court of Justice interpreted it in view of the Directive’s 
objectives and the principle of subsidiarity.
69
  It held that the Directive did not preclude a 
Member State from reserving the benefit of the resale right to the artist’s heirs at law alone, 
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 Judgment of 2 July 2009, Case C-32/08, Fundación Española para la Innovación de 
la Artesanía (FEIA) v. Cul de Sac Espacio Creativo SL and Acierta Product & Position SA, 
[2009] E.C.R. I-5611.  
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 For example, the issue remains to be decided with regard to provisions in the 
Software and Database Directives. On these directives, respectively, see §§ 4[2][a] and 
4[2][f] supra.  
 
 
67
 But cf. § 5[7][b][iv] infra (criteria of remuneration under involuntary licenses).  
 
 
68
 On this directive, see § 4[2][h] supra.  
 
 
69
 On this principle, see §§ 1[1][c] and 4[1][a] supra.   
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to the exclusion of testamentary legatees.
70
 It also left the resolution of any conflict of laws, 
and thus the choice of the applicable law, Spain’s or France’s, to the trial court.71 
 
 [5]--Formal Procedures 
 
 E.U. directives in the field of copyright contain no provisions establishing or confirming 
formalities. The E.U. Member States have long complied with the Berne Convention, 
according to which neither the enjoyment nor the exercise of copyright may be subject to 
formalities.
72
 Thus the Court of Justice would have no occasion to consider such formalities. 
Three caveats, however, are in order. 
 
+ Remuneration schemes: Formal procedures may help in claiming and collecting 
remuneration. Case law concerning remuneration schemes, often implemented by 
collecting societies, is discussed below.
73
 
 
+ Enforcement requirements: National laws may call for notices or marks to distinguish 
licitly used media or copies or otherwise to implement enforcement schemes. In the 
Schwibbert decision, the Court of Justice questioned whether, under a non-copyright 
directive, Italy had to notify the European Commission of such a requirement.
74
 
 
+ Industrial-property regimes: The law of industrial property, including E.U. design law 
discussed above, may impose formalities such as registration.
75
 
 
 [6]--Protection of Non-E.U. Claims 
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  Judgment of 15 April 2010, Case C-518/08, Fundación Gala-Salvador Dalí, Visual 
Entidad de Gestión de Artistas Plásticos (VEGAP) v. Société des auteurs dans les arts 
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  Id., para. 36 (also as noted in “Introduction,” herein, at § 6[3][c][i]). 
 
 
72
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  Judgment of 8 Nov. 2007, Case C-20/05, Pubblico Ministero v. Schwibbert, [2007] 
E.C.R. I-9447 (referring to Directive 98/34, as amended by Directive 98/48, requiring 
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herein, at § 5[4][b]).  
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 As already explained above, the principle of non-discrimination against E.U. nationals 
assures national treatment by one E.U. or E.E.A. Member State of the nationals of another.
76
 
Treaty or national provisions will govern the rights of foreign claimants, from outside the 
European Union or Economic Area, with regard to copyright or neighboring rights in any 
Member State, except where E.U. law provides otherwise.  
 
 In a German case, protection was sought in Germany for recordings that had been made 
of the U.S. artist Bob Dylan and originally released in the United States. Before the Term 
Directive took effect, these recordings had not been protected in Germany, for lack of any 
treaty grounds for protection, but they were protected in the United Kingdom as of July 1, 
1995. The German Federal Court of Justice asked the Court of Justice whether Article 10(2) 
of the Term Directive compelled protecting such previously unprotected works or media 
productions with the new terms of protection granted as a result of implementing the Term 
Directive if such works or media productions met its condition of being protected in at least 
one Member State on July 1, 1995.
77
 The Court of Justice answered in the affirmative, at the 
same time holding that the fact that the initial rightholders were not nationals of Member 
States was not relevant for applying Article 10(2) of the Term Directive.
78
 
 
 [7]--Rights; Limitations and Exceptions 
 
 The harmonization case law relating to rights and exceptions is already quite rich, most 
certainly because so many harmonizing provisions in the several directives relate to rights 
and exceptions. 
 
  [a]--Economic Rights  
 
   [i]--Reproduction. In the Infopaq case, a Danish news aggregator sued for a 
declaration of the legality of its methods of creating summaries of journalistic articles that it 
sends to its clients via email. It scans articles, converts them into computer files, enters key 
words and captures the five words before and after each key word, prints out the resulting 
eleven-word strings on paper, and finally deletes the computer files manually. Asked whether 
these several acts constituted actionable reproduction, the Court of Justice interpreted Article 
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2 of the Information-Society Directive
79
 to hold that printing a string of eleven words 
together may constitute an act subject to the right to control the reproduction “in whole or in 
part” of a work if such a text is protected by copyright.80  
 
 In the Premier League case, the Court applied an Infopaq holding to the reproduction of 
copyright works within the memory of a satellite decoder and on a television screen. It held 
that “the reproduction right extends to transient fragments of the works” within such memory 
“provided that those fragments contain elements” that together attract copyright.81 
 
   [ii]--Distribution; Importation. As explained above, before any copyright 
directive was passed, the Court of Justice limited national rights of distribution by applying 
the exhaustion doctrine within the Internal Market.
82
 The Court has construed this right as 
applicable only upon first sale of an embodiment and confirmed that it is exhausted only 
upon such a sale within the Internal Market.  
 
 The very meaning of "distribution" in the sense of Article 4 of the Information-Society 
Directive
83
 was put at issue by the German Federal Court of Justice in a case where classic 
pieces of modern furniture were put at the disposition of clients in the rest areas of clothing 
stores, but not sold to the public.
84
  In reply, the European Court of Justice held that, under 
that directive provision, the notion of "distribution" to the public applies only where there is a 
transfer of the ownership of the embodiment at issue, so that neither allowing the public to 
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use the furniture nor exhibiting the pieces to the public would constitute distribution 
triggering exhaustion.
85
 
 
 Territorially, the Court of Justice confirmed that Article 4(2) of the Information-Society 
Directive legitimately precludes Member States from providing for the exhaustion of the 
distribution right upon first sale anywhere in the world outside the Internal Market. It found a 
legal basis for this provision, inter alia, in Article 95 of the former E.C. Treaty, now Article 
114 of the F.E.U. Treaty, authorizing harmonization directives, and it rejected the argument 
that Article 4(2) was contrary to the 1960 O.E.C.D. Convention and to the WIPO “Internet” 
Treaties.
86
 
 
   [iii]--Rental and Public Lending. In principle, if the first sale of a hard copy 
fully exhausted the distribution right, that copy could subsequently be freely rented or lent to 
members of the public. However, the Rental Directive has legislatively precluded that 
consequence by establishing rental and lending rights as self-standing rights.
87
 As discussed 
above, the Court of Justice has rejected a pair of challenges to the rental right.
88
  
 
   [iv]--Communication, Making Available, to Public. Further judgments have 
construed the right of communication or making available to members of the public, as E.U. 
directives assure this right.
89
 Three types of issues have arisen: Where to localize a 
communication or making available?  Which intermediaries handling it are subject to the 
right? What public must it address for the right to apply? 
 
    [A]--Localization of Communication. Communications, often crossing 
borders, have to be localized to determine which countries' laws apply to them, as well as 
how to assess royalties.  The Court of Justice has approached the issue of localization only in 
a case in which the cross-border application of the directive scheme for remunerating 
rightholders for satellite-relayed broadcasts was at issue.
90
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 The Satellite Directive localizes the act triggering the right to control such broadcasts at 
the point of uplinking, while it contemplates assessing remuneration in the light of potential 
and actual audiences.
91
 In the Lagardère case, a French broadcaster was relaying French-
language programs by satellite from a transmitter in Germany, and its broadcasts were largely 
received across the border in France, with some reception in Germany as well.
92
 The Court 
recognized that, since the programs were enjoyed mostly in France, remuneration could be 
claimed for French reception, although claims could also be made for any German reception, 
albeit without prejudice to the calculation of remuneration for reception in France.
93
 
 
    [B]--Intermediaries Subject to Right. In the course of a communication, 
various intermediaries might try to facilitate reaching the market and eventually to profit from 
so doing. In what cases are they subject to the communication or making-available right of 
holders of rights in works or other media productions communicated or made available?  
 
 One type of intermediary offers the public a package of satellite channels that can be 
enjoyed by subscribers to whom it provides decoders to access encrypted packages.  The 
Court of Justice was asked whether such a package provider must obtain authorization from 
the holders of rights in works or other productions thus reaching the public. It held that the 
package provider’s encryption and other reprocessing of broadcast signals were ordinary 
technical procedures so that the chain of communication was not interrupted.
94
 However, the 
package provider needed authorization from the rightholders because its intervention made 
protected matters available to a wider public than did any originally authorized broadcast.
95
 
 
    [C]--When is Communication Public?  Which members of the public 
must a communication or a making-available reach before it falls under the right in question? 
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The Court of Justice has broadly construed the relevant public in this regard, with some 
caveats. 
 
 In a case of programs retransmitted inside a hotel, the Court of Justice ruled that the 
retransmission at issue fell under the notions that the Satellite and Cable Directive set out of 
an “act of communication to the public” and of “reception by the public.”96 The Court 
subsequently broadened this construction, holding that the right of "communication to the 
public," as set out in the Information-Society Directive, extends to retransmission into private 
hotel rooms. It distinguished between, on the one hand, a hotel’s provision of facilities, which 
did not as such amount to the "communication to the public" at issue, and, on the other, the 
transmission of protected materials to clients, which did constitute such a "communication." 
Moreover, the Court clarified that, while clients of a hotel might have privacy claims relative 
to their respective hotel rooms, the hotel itself, subject to the communication right, did not.
97
 
The Court later clarified that, by providing hotel rooms with televisions able to pick up 
broadcasts, a hotel manager makes a communication to the public.
98
  
 
 In the Premier League case, the Court of Justice applied this case law to a barkeeper’s 
intentional transmission of broadcasts via television screens and speakers to customers in a 
bar which was open to the public.
99
 In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated, based on 
Recital 23 of the Information-Society Directive, that the right of communication to the 
public, harmonized by Article 3(1) of that directive, only includes communication to persons 
not present at the place where the communication originates: no E.U. directive harmonizes 
the right of live performance in the presence of  a public.
100
 However, this was not the case 
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where broadcasts, here of football matches taking place elsewhere, were transmitted to 
customers of the bar, who were more likely to come to the bar to see the matches. The Court 
then held that, under Article 3(1) of the Information-Society Directive, such transmission was 
a communication to the public.
101
 
 
 The broadcast of a graphical user interface (GUI) for software alone does not constitute 
communication to the public of a copyright work for purposes of claiming remuneration for 
the broadcast.
102
 The Court reasoned that, as it is broadcast, such an interface loses its 
interactive functions, given that viewers then receive it only passively.
103
  
 
   [v]--Extraction and Reutilization of Data. The Court of Justice has had to 
disentangle criteria of infringement from the definition of sui generis rights in database 
contents. 
 
    [A]--Criteria of Infringement. Article 7(1) of the Database Directive sets 
out the sui generis right to control the “extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a 
substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that 
database.”104  
 
 In the British Horseracing (B.H.B.) and companion cases, the Court of Justice construed 
these complementary criteria of infringement. First, the qualitative test refers to the scale of 
the investment in the obtaining, verification, or presentation of particular data in the making 
of the database at issue, insofar as data are extracted or reutilized from that database, since 
even a quantitatively negligible part of the contents of a database may in fact represent 
significant investment.
105
 Second, the quantitative test refers to the volume of the extracted 
                                                                                                                                                       
pentru Drepturi de Autor (UCMR - ADA) (ruling that live circus performances do not fall 
under the communication right as the Information-Society Directive harmonizes this right). 
  
 
101
 Judgment of 4 Oct. 2011, Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, Football 
Association Premier League v. QC Leisure and Karen Murphy v. Media Protection Services, 
[2012] F.S.R. 1, paras. 204-206. 
 
 
102
 On the question of whether the interface is protected as part of a computer program, 
see § 5[2][a][ii] supra. 
 
 
103
 Judgment of 22 Dec. 2010, Case C-393/09, Bezpečnostní Softwarová Asociace--
Svaz Softwarové Ochrany v. Ministerstvo Kultury, [2011] E.C.D.R. 70, para. 57.  
 
 
104
 On this directive, in pertinent part, see § 4[2][f][ii] supra.  
 
 
105
   Recall, however, that the Court ruled that the data taken in the B.H.B. and 
companion cases did not necessarily represent investment contributing specifically to the 
making of any database itself. On this ruling with regard to the protectability of database 
contents, see § 5[2][c] supra.  
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data, assuming investment in the making of these data into a database, as analyzed relative to 
the contents of the whole of the database at issue.
106
    
 
 Five years later, in the Bulgarian Apis case, the plaintiff, an organizer of “a general legal 
information system,” sued prior employees for extracting modules of data, some data 
gathered from non-public and some from public sources, and for reutilizing such data, along 
with its cross-references, definitions, notes, etc., in another such system. The defendant in 
response alleged that its system was “the fruit of a substantial, independent investment,” 
using its own more efficient software and modules of “a fundamentally different structure.” 
Inter alia, the Court held that each module has to be considered as an independent database 
relative to which substantiality may be assessed. It also noted that infringement may occur as 
well when data is taken from several modules at once, so that substantiality then has to be 
analyzed relative to the overall database.
107
  
 
    [B]--Extraction/Reutilization.  Article 7(2) of the Database Directive 
defines the acts restricted by the sui generis rights in database contents. These may be acts of 
extraction, including permanent or temporary transfer of database contents to other media, 
and of re-utilization, including making such contents available to the public.  
 
 In the B.H.B. and companion cases, the Court construed such acts as including any 
unlicensed act of appropriating, and making available to the public, the results of the database 
maker’s investment, thus depriving the maker of revenue that would have enabled him to 
recoup his investment. While the Court opined that consulting a database did not include 
such acts, it did admit that such acts could include instances where the data is extracted and 
reutilized from a copy of database contents and made public again. The exploitation of a copy 
of database contents, it noted, may prejudice the investment of the maker of the database just 
as much as may the exploitation of the original source materials.
108
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 In the Bulgarian Apis case, the Court had to construe "temporary" and "permanent 
transfer" for the purpose of determining whether restricted acts of extraction and reutilization 
had taken place.  It held that a transfer will count as a "permanent transfer" only if the data is 
stored in a permanent manner in a medium other than the database for more than a limited 
period of time after extraction. Extraction is independent of the objective pursued by the 
perpetrator of the act at issue, of any modifications that he may make to the contents of the 
materials transferred, and of any differences in the structural organization of the databases. 
Furthermore, the fact that the physical and technical characteristics present in the contents of 
a protected database made by a particular person also appear in the contents of a database 
made by another person leads to a presumption of extraction.  However, the fact that non-
publicly available materials have been used by the maker of a database is not sufficient to 
prove extraction, but may constitute circumstantial evidence of that fact.
109
  
 
 In a German case, a professor of literature had compiled 1,100 titles of German poems 
created between 1730 and 1900, and the university employing him claimed the sui generis 
right in the database constituted by this compilation.
110
 In this case, the German Federal 
Court of Justice asked the Court of Justice whether, under Article 7(2) of the Directive, the 
concept of "extraction" requires physical copying of the elements of a database or whether it 
covers also the process of transferring the elements of one database to another database 
following visual consultation and a selection on the basis of a personal assessment of the 
person carrying out the operation. The Court held that such manual transfer, upon visual 
inspection and personal assessment, may fall within the ambit of an actionable "extraction" if 
it met the qualitative or quantitative tests of infringement.
111
  
 
  [b]--Limitations and Exceptions to Economic Rights. While prior directives 
limited some rights on specific points, the Information-Society Directive unpacked a full 
range of limitations and exceptions to rights.
112
 
 
   [i]--Quotation for Criticism, Review, Etc. In the Painer case, newspapers 
reproduced a protected photograph depicting a missing person without indicating the 
photographer’s name.113 The Court of Justice had to clarify the criteria for applying the 
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exception that Article 5(3)(d) of the Information-Society Directive allows for quotation, 
criticism, or review. First, it held that it does not matter which kind of work the quoting work 
is: Article 5(3)(d) does not require that a quotation be made only within a literary work. 
Second, if the newspapers received the photograph without the author’s name indicated by 
the security authority providing it, then the newspapers were required only to indicate the 
source, not the name of the author.
114
 
 
   [ii]--Use for Purposes of Public Security. Also in the Painer case, the Court 
ruled that, since the Information-Society Directive does not address the circumstances in 
which the interests of public security can be invoked, the Member States have a wide margin 
of discretion in applying exceptions to protect such interests. But in so doing, Member States 
must respect the principle of proportionality, may not compromise protection that the 
directive accords to authors and other rightholders, must comply with the need for legal 
certainty, and must take account of the three-step test for exceptions. Accordingly, the Court 
held that the media benefit from the exception within the framework of an action taken by a 
national authority to ensure public security and in agreement and coordination with it.
115
  
 
   [iii]--Transient Reproduction. The Court of Justice has narrowly read Article 
5(1) of the Information-Society Directive providing the technical exemption from liability for 
specified technical acts of reproduction. 
 
 In the Infopaq case, the Court had to clarify this provision, which exempts “acts of 
reproduction” that are “transient or incidental [and] an integral and essential part of a 
technological process” if they are made with the “sole purpose” of enabling either network 
transmissions by an intermediary or a lawful use with “no independent economic 
significance.”116 The Court confirmed that the conditions of this exemption are cumulative, 
noting that any directive provision derogating from a general principle, here any directive 
right, must be strictly applied. Most notably, it held that an act is transient in the requisite 
sense “only if its duration is limited to what is necessary for the proper completion of the 
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technological process in question.” The Danish court, referring the questions, had to decide 
whether the conditions of the exemption are met by the acts of reproduction at issue.
117
  
 
 The Premier League case raised the question: Did acts of reproduction within the 
memory of a satellite decoder and on a television screen fall within the exception for transient 
or incidental reproduction? The Court noted that the purpose of this exception is to “allow 
and ensure the development and operation of new technologies and safeguard a fair balance 
between the rights and interests of right holders on the one hand, and of users of protected 
works and productions who wish to use such new technologies, on the other.”118 The Court 
only examined the fourth and fifth conditions of the exception, ruling that the ephemeral acts 
of reproduction at issue were exempted as they enabled lawful uses such as the reception of 
broadcasts in private, even with the use of a foreign decoder card.
119
 The temporary acts of 
reproduction within the memory of the satellite decoder and on the television screen are 
inseparable from the process of receiving the broadcast, and the receivers have no influence 
on this process, so that they generate no economic advantage beyond that derived from 
merely receiving the broadcasts.
120
  
 
   [iv]--Non-Voluntary Licenses; Related Schemes. Directives contemplate or 
allow some limitations to rights in the form of non-voluntary licenses or of collective-
management schemes.
121
 In addition to the issues broached below, issues that have arisen in 
the application of such regimes to cross-border communication have already been 
discussed.
122
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    [A]--Equitable Rates of Remuneration. The Court of Justice has 
explored the parameters of the discretion with which national regimes may set standards of 
remuneration that non-voluntary licenses or collective-management schemes generate for 
rightholders. 
 
 For the communication to the public of phonograms, Article 8(2) of the Rental Directive 
provides for equitable remuneration.
123
 In the SENA case, the Court of Justice ruled that, 
while the term “equitable remuneration” must be interpreted uniformly in all the Member 
States, each Member State may determine the most appropriate criteria of “equitable 
remuneration” in its own territory, subject to limits imposed by E.U. law. Further, it held, 
Article 8(2) of the Rental Directive does not preclude a model for calculating what 
constitutes “equitable remuneration” that operates by reference to variable and fixed factors, 
such as the number of hours and audience densities of broadcasts, the royalty rates fixed by 
agreement or set by the public-broadcast organizations in the Member States bordering on the 
Member State concerned, and the amounts paid by commercial stations.
124
 
 
 Public lending, under Article 6(1) of the Rental Directive, calls for remuneration. The 
Court was asked whether this provision precludes legislation under which remuneration 
payable to authors for public lending is calculated exclusively according to the number of 
borrowers registered with public establishments and based on a fixed flat-rate amount per 
borrower per year.
125
 As opposed to rental, public lending is not directly or indirectly 
commercial in nature, so that remuneration cannot be calculated by reference to the value in 
trade as in the SENA case, and the amount of remuneration will also be less than that which 
corresponds to equitable remuneration: accordingly, the Court concluded that it may even be 
fixed on a flat-rate basis.
126
 However, to assure remuneration for potential market harm, the 
criteria used to establish the remuneration must take into account the extent to which the 
works are made available, namely the number of works made available and the number of 
borrowers registered with the lending establishment.
127
 
 
    [B]--Who Pays Remuneration.  Issues have arisen with regard to the 
parties obligated to pay or fund remuneration for rightholders. 
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 Media and devices susceptible of private copying are subject to levies that, under Article 
5(2)(b) of the Information-Society Directive, are to fund “fair compensation” to be paid to 
rightholders.
128
 A firm, marketing copying media and devices, refused to pay the levies 
funding such compensation in Spain, giving rise to questions concerning the indiscriminate 
application of this compensation regime.  The Court reconfirmed that “fair compensation,” as 
a concept of E.U. law, must be uniformly interpreted in all the Member States and then held 
that fair compensation must be calculated based on the criterion of the harm caused to 
rightholders by the private copying subject to the exception. It also required some link 
between the application of the levies intended to fund fair compensation and the use of 
products subject to the levies for the purposes of private copying. Accordingly, it barred any 
indiscriminate application of levies to media or devices not made available to private users or 
clearly reserved for uses other than private copying.
129
 
 
 The private-copying regime has also prompted questions of territorial scope. Opus, a 
German company, sold blank media via the Internet to Dutch customers, but did not pay the 
levies on such media either in Germany or in the Netherlands. The Dutch agency recovering 
the levies sued Opus in the Netherlands for failure to comply with Dutch law calling for 
levies on blank media. The Court reasoned that, in principle, the end-user who carries out the 
copying must be responsible for funding the corresponding remuneration, but it admitted that 
it is often impossible to identify such private users. Accordingly, Member States may 
establish levies on copying media according to which the persons who make the media 
available to end-users are responsible for payment since they can then pass the amount of the 
levies in the price paid by the users. The Dutch agency collecting such levies could sue in this 
case because the potential harm to be remunerated by the levies arises on the territory of the 
Member State where the end-users reside, here the Netherlands.
130
  
 
 [8]--Enforcement, Liability, and Remedies 
 
  [a]--Civil Remedies: Injunctions; Monetary Liability. In an initial pair of cases 
concerning enforcement, the Court of Justice addressed the question: May an Internet-service 
provider be judicially compelled to disclose, to rightholders or to collecting societies, the 
identities of its clients who were allegedly file sharing? As discussed above, the Court 
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indicated that privacy considerations could entail some constraints on such copyright 
remedies.
131
  
 
 In one such case, the Court of Justice had to decide whether a pending injunction would 
comply, most importantly, with the Electronic-Commerce Directive, along with the 
Enforcement Directive.
132
 However, the injunction pending in a Belgian court would have 
imposed a filtering system on an Internet-service provider to monitor all data of all its 
customers on an ongoing basis at its own expense in order to prevent any future infringement 
of copyright, notably by file sharing. The Court held that such an injunction would violate the 
Electronic-Commerce Directive which, in Article 15(1), prohibits measures that would 
generally obligate Internet-service providers to monitor information that they transmit.
133
 The 
Court noted that such a filtering system would be costly and complicated, would collect 
users’ IP addresses that identify the users precisely, and could block lawful communications. 
Accordingly, the injunction risked incompatibility with Article 3 of the Enforcement 
Directive, which calls for equitable and proportional measures that are not excessively 
costly.
134
 Furthermore, the Court noted, any such filtering system might not be able to 
determine whether a communication is lawful or not, especially under one of the exceptions 
to copyright.
135
 In a subsequent case, the Court reached comparable conclusions, although the 
service in question, an online social network, was a hosting-service provider rather than, 
strictly speaking, an online-service provider.
136
 
 
  [b]--Other Relief: Customs; Technological Safeguards. The directives 
contemplate other types of relief: some are administrative, such as customs controls, and 
others reinforce self-help measures, such as the use of technological safeguards.  
 
 In one customs case, allegedly infringing copyright works were at the border of the E.U. 
customs territory. The Court of Justice then had to interpret Regulation No. 1383/2003 with 
regard to the conditions for stopping entry into this territory.
137
 The Court held that, to be 
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subject to procedures stopping such entry of goods allegedly violating intellectual property, it 
has to be shown that they are intended to be put on sale in the Internal Market.
138
 Such a 
showing would include, for example, that the copyright work has been sold or offered or 
advertised for sale to a consumer in that market or evidence in customs documents that such 
sale is envisaged to consumers in that market.
139
 
 
 In the Premier League case, the Court ruled on the issue: When would foreign decoder 
cards be illicit devices under the Conditional-Access Directive? The term “illicit device” 
there only refers to “equipment that has been manufactured, manipulated, adapted or 
readjusted without the authorization of the service provider.”140 Therefore, even if the 
decoder cards are bought in another Member State, are procured or enabled by the provision 
of a false name and address, or are used in breach of a contractual limitation permitting their 
use only for private purposes, they are still licit devices according to the directive. The reason 
is that these cards have been manufactured and placed on the market with the authorization of 
the service provider, with remuneration paid in the Member State where they were initially 
sold. However, the Court then ruled that Article 3(2) of the Conditional-Access Directive 
does not preclude national legislation from preventing the abuse of foreign decoding devices, 
because such legislation does not fall within the field coordinated by the directive.
141
 
 
 [9]--Collective Management 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
137
 On this regulation, see § 4[3][d] supra. 
 
 
138
 Judgment of 1 Dec. 2011, Joined Cases C-446/09 and C-495/09, Koninklijke Philips 
Electronics NV v. Lucheng Meijing Industrial Company Ltd. and Nokia Corporation v. Her 
Majesty’s Commissioners of Revenue and Customs, [2012] E.T.M.R. 13. The case also 
involved allegedly infringing trade marks.  
 
 
139
 Id., para. 61 (indicating, for example, evidence such as “the fact that the destination 
of the goods is not declared whereas the suspensive procedure requested requires such a 
declaration, the lack of precise or reliable information as to the identity or address of the 
manufacturer or consignor of the goods, a lack of cooperation with the customs authorities or 
the discovery of documents or correspondence concerning the goods in question suggesting 
that there is liable to be a diversion of those goods to European Union consumers”). 
 
 
140
 Judgment of 4 Oct. 2011, Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, Football 
Association Premier League v. QC Leisure and Karen Murphy v. Media Protection Services, 
[2012] F.S.R. 1, para. 64 (also discussed in §§ 2[3][b] supra and in §§ 5[2][a] and 5[7[a] 
infra). 
 
 
141
 However, the Court did rule against the partition of the Internal Market through 
contractually restricting commerce in the decoders at issue in the case. See § 3[2][a][iii] 
supra.  
 
EU: p. 167 
 In the Uradex case, the Court of Justice clarified the scope of the powers conferred by 
Article 9(2) of the Satellite and Cable Directive on a collecting society mandated to manage 
the transmission rights of a right-owner who has not yet agreed to such management.
142
 The 
Court inferred from the preamble to the Directive that a Member State may have a collecting 
society conclusively presumed to exercise a rightholder's right to grant or refuse authorization 
to a cable operator for retransmission. This construction seems to be based on considerations 
of legal certainty: most notably, the law has to provide assurances to cable operators that they 
have actually acquired all the rights necessary to retransmit programs.  Conversely, third 
parties holding rights in certain elements of the programs may not challenge contractual 
arrangements authorizing the retransmission of those programs.
143
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